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This thesis is an investigation of urban poverty as a legal-aesthetic composition. I explore 
the connections between practices of poverty knowledge, antipoverty law and direct 
interventions upon poor populations and territories. The knowledge-law-intervention 
compound is examined in this thesis as co-producing poverty as a problem to be fixed. 
Together, they integrate the ‘industry of global poverty reduction’ which, capitalising on 
the idea of non-profit aid, creates its own objects of intervention and the conditions for its 
own global expansion. As this is a critical legal research project, law is conceptualised as an 
active mediator, enabling both circuits of knowledge and intervention by enacting and 
enforcing ways of seeing poverty. I draw on the scholarship of law and aesthetics to argue 
that legal practices set in motion a series of techniques of visualisation which activate the 
images of poverty contained in poverty data. As such, quantitative indicators are turned 
into qualifications of poverty, shaping interventive measures that are designed to remedy 
the problem of poverty as it has been created. Therefore, I provide a characterisation of 
poverty as primarily a command of legal techniques, a normative designation which then 
ascribes to its concept the contours of an attribute, a state of being, and a material 
condition. Poverty is thus both produced and productive, in relation to which law itself is, 
in turn, both formative and formed as an emergent effect – with forms, codes and 
institutional structures. By observing the ways in which multilateral financial institutions 
reconfigure the visual economy of poverty in the age of microfinance, I establish 
connections between local and global practices aimed at ‘saving the poor’ and argue that 
they work as legal-aesthetic modulations organising territories and populations. In 
determining these practices, I am guided by my own position as a ‘socio-legal practice 
researcher’ who develops social projects in Brazilian urban territories of poverty and 
violence.  
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It was Josué de Castro, the Brazilian geographer of hunger and chairman of the United 
Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization in the 1950s, who used to say that the world’s 
population is split into two: those who do not eat and those who do not sleep in fear of 
the revolt of those who do not eat.1 This thesis is about the things one does to get some 
sleep. I investigate practices of ‘the nonpoor’ directed towards ‘the poor’ in the circuits of 
knowledge production and of interventions against poverty. I am interested in the 
mundane practices that manufacture grand ideas, organise the world and work to produce 
actually existing entities. In investigating the making of poverty, I situate ‘law’ at the 
intersection, bridging data and action, where the materialisation of poverty takes place.  
The practices that constitute these circuits of knowledge and intervention and their legal 
interface are here condensed into one metaphorical gesture by the nonpoor, a technical-
analytical gaze that observes, surveys, and visualises the poor. Notwithstanding its 
‘objectivist’ attitude, the gaze reveals itself as an affective gaze of fascination, fear, 
hostility, hatred, pity, benevolence and, I will argue, nostalgia. It is also a divisive gaze of 
classification. It consolidates a perspectivist encounter between its subject and its object 
and fabricates those perspectives as entities, as ontological categories of people and 
territories. This materialisation has long been conceptualised as reification. I attempt to 
look beyond reification in order to analyse the conceptual-empirical making of poverty 
itself, as an entity fabricated by practices which precede its ordering effect within social 
relations. It is after this fabrication that populations and territories are ascribed positions, 
attributes and functions, thus entering the social structures and processes of reification. 
This comprehension of poverty departs from – but certainly does not negate – the 
concrete experience of poverty. Whilst socioeconomic perspectives define poverty as a 
material condition, this same definition also reveals that there is no fixed material basis to 
poverty of any kind. That is to say, poverty is determined by lack, scarcity and deprivation 
of the basic necessities required for a minimum standard of life. It is the negative pole of a 
relationship, the sub-standard of the nonpoor. It is propertylessness in the world of the 
propertied, the dispossession of that which others accumulate. That is to say, poverty is 
not a material thing, not an attribute, not a state, not even a living condition. Poverty is 
 
1 See Josué de Castro, The Geography of Hunger (Gollancz 1952). 
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first and foremost an imperative, a normative designation, a classification to which the 
contours of an attribute, a state and a condition are then assigned. Poverty is not induced, 
it is deduced; not inferred, but ascribed. Lives are ascribed to poverty and then, in filling 
the form with material components, poverty comes into a shape. In that regard, I assert 
that poverty is primarily a legal-aesthetic composition. I attempt to demonstrate in this 
thesis that law is much more implicated in the history and preservation of poverty than it 
has been hitherto conceived. Yet, I emphasise the disclaimer that none of the critiques 
raised in this research are meant to suggest that poverty is an abstract fantasy and this 
note of caution will be continually reiterated. 
In what follows I examine poverty’s socio-technical formation, resulting from practices of 
knowledge and intervention, by foregrounding its legal composition. I argue that law sets 
in motion a series of techniques of visualisation that activate images of poverty which, in 
turn, enables the operation of circuits of knowledge and intervention. As a result of this 
approach, poverty is conceptualised as, simultaneously, a scientific proposition, a technical 
classification, a social problem to be fixed and a technology that produces effects upon 
populations and territories thus classified. I shall argue that these formations are aesthetic 
compositions and hold further aesthetic functions that transform the concrete 
manifestations of poverty. In other words, poverty is both produced and productive. 
Knowledge, data, and concepts do not merely represent social reality, they rather create 
reality. Along with poverty, other techniques emerge from this process. Law itself is one 
such emergent effect. It appears at the intersection between knowledge and intervention, 
mediating the knowledge-law-intervention compound.  
It is through this legal-aesthetic framework that I examine the connections between 
practices of poverty knowledge, antipoverty law and direct interventions upon populations 
and territories classified as in poverty. The knowledge-law-intervention compound is 
examined in this thesis as it forms the ‘industry of global poverty reduction’ and the 
development agenda towards global prosperity based on technical knowledge, which 
creates its own objects of intervention. This industry, which capitalises on the idea of aid, 
undoubtedly serves interests and brings advantages to beneficiaries. But I am not 
interested in exploring intentions, ideologies or gains. This work has already been done 
and convincingly so by many ‘post-development’ voices who critique the international 
order as part of the problem, not the solution, in establishing the basis of global 
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governance.2 To add to these critical voices, I designed a research project that draws on 
the disinterested practices – or at least, practices that are not primarily motivated by any 
vested interest in capitalist accumulation – of researchers, lawyers, experts, activists, 
organisations, collectives, movements who act in the name of social justice. These 
practices, although aimed at challenging the logics and motors that reproduce poverty, are 
nonetheless part of the circuits of knowledge and intervention that co-produce such 
industry. In that sense, poverty knowledge and intervention are part and parcel of poverty 
production. This thesis is, therefore, informed by multiple practices which co-produce 
poverty. For sure, they can be found in the World Bank’s loans and exports of know-how 
that interfere in policies and institutions all over the world. But they can also be found in 
the allocation of resources to and from research centres in any part of the world, as well as 
in an ethnographer’s fieldnotes within a fellowship programme, in the career path of a 
human rights expert, in the artifacts produced by artisans funded by microcredit; they can 
also be found in the practices of local authorities which oversee compliance with 
conditionalities of cash transfer programmes, in the gestures of police violence that 
criminalise informal housing and livelihoods as well as in the organised strategies of 
protest which enact new forms of urban life. 
 
Notes on method 
My own perspective and my prior engagement with my object of research should be made 
explicit from the outset as they inform the approach and methods of research that I 
adopted. My position is that of a ‘socio-legal practice researcher’ who for the last 10 years 
has been involved in social projects in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, observing and participating in 
different initiatives and indeed different institutions (nongovernmental organisations and 
research institutes) concerned with issues of violence and poverty. The term ‘socio-legal 
practice researcher’ is here used to indicate that I was positioned at the intersections of 
social sciences and law, as well as of knowledge production and intervention. ‘Socio-legal’ 
is a fertile yet conflicting encounter of disciplines, which I attempt to agitate in this 
research from a critical perspective. Having come from a background in social sciences, a 
traditionally Marxist area of study in Brazilian public universities, I learned to see the 
poverty I worked with as a social phenomenon in the cyclical motion of its own 
 
2 Writers who have powerfully criticised global governance and who influenced this research in different ways 
are: Milton Santos, Florestan Fernandes, Aníbal Quijano, Amílcar Cabral, Arundhati Roy, Raquel Rolnik, Silvia 




reproduction, a product of and a requirement for capital’s valorisation and expansion. As a 
legal practitioner, I was trained to see poverty in snapshots, i.e. poverty as crystallised 
relationships in concrete, naturalised forms, a condition of unfortunate, if not dangerous 
circumstances. On the one hand, poverty is both a necessary consequence of 
accumulation and a precondition for the capitalist mode of production. On the other hand, 
poverty is an attribute, a quality of populations and territories with further legal 
implications. Consequently, I was permanently situated in an interstitial point. My role 
involved participating in collective initiatives of mediation between two incommunicable 
worlds, the institutional circles of policy and the everyday life struggles of social 
movements or grassroot groups. Moreover, as a ‘practice researcher’, I was situated at 
another intersection, that which mediates knowledge and intervention. I was struck by 
rather incompatible tasks – both challenging the structures that manage the poor and 
contributing to the driving forces that continually assimilate the poor; both helping to 
develop strategic infrastructures through which radical movements can flourish against 
alienation, and strengthening external threats to such movements by playing by the rules 
of the institutionalising game – not to mention benefiting professionally by laying claim to 
an assumed proximity and credibility acquired amidst grassroot, community organisations.  
The position of the socio-legal practice researcher is not a comfortable one, particularly 
when one’s field of observation consists of areas marked by urban violence and armed 
conflict.3 I am not narrating an unusual and unheard of feeling of discomfort, unfamiliar to 
those who act ‘on the ground’.  While mediating irreconcilable domains, one is also in 
conflict with those domains. A mediator between worlds typically struggles with two 
seemingly opposed aims of trying to make effective change by playing the game and of 
trying to overthrow the game, hoping to twist it against itself. It is a never-ending job 
destined to failure, but also one which must advertise its own indicators of success to 
secure resources for future projects. These disquieting aspects of my professional 
trajectory prompted me to pursue an investigation into the practices that I was committed 
to and also in conflict with. I sought, at Birkbeck School of Law, a way to deal with it 
 
3 In such circumstances, the challenges of research ethics faced by researchers within violent settings 
encompass a range of sensitive issues and corresponding strategic decisions that require balancing ‘practical 
ethics issues’ and ‘broader ethical questions of the values and principles of research’ as outlined by Kirsten 
Campbell in relation to war crimes. An approach to ethical accountability, then, requires critical reflexivity 
about the implications of research practices – from early conceptual definitions to later forms of 
dissemination of findings – but it cannot (and perhaps should not) resolve the researcher’s constant sense of 
consternation, which include the concern of not reproducing or adding more violence to one’s research field. 
Kirsten Campbell, ‘Ethical Challenges: Researching War Crimes’ in Malcolm Cowburn, Loraine Gelsthorpe and 
Azrini Wahidin (eds), Research Ethics in Criminology: Dilemmas, Issues and Solutions (Routledge 2017). 
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through a critical legal, rather than a socio-legal, approach. Of course, this international 
move also brought me a new set of ethical and political concerns. As I designed my 
research project and methodological strategies, I struggled with the thought of being in 
another kind of mediating position: an overseas informant in the ‘Global North’, thriving in 
the role of showcasing fascinating exotic contexts and modes of living faraway in the 
‘Global South’.  
Being familiar with this predicament, I refrained from proposing an investigation that 
would reproduce the same logic by developing a socio-legal study within a field that I 
already navigated, i.e. the industry of global poverty reduction. In a way, I already had 
‘ethnographic’ materials to build on from experience and recollection.4 Although the 
reflections I develop in the thesis draw upon my experience as a practice researcher – the 
practices, the interactions, the collaborative work, the results of that work and the shared 
critical reflections with colleagues over the years in the field – the argumentation that I 
develop in the thesis is focused on the mechanisms through which that ‘field’ was formed 
to begin with, the driving forces that seem to move it, the networks that support it and, 
centrally, the aesthetic elements it mobilises in order to exist or operate in the world 
today. In that sense, I do not undertake a case study, an ethnography or an applied 
empirical analysis as if the ‘field’ was stable, established and formal. Instead, I take a multi-
sited approach seeking to unravel intricate webs of temporalities and spaces that connect 
local and global practices of poverty knowledge, antipoverty law and interventions against 
poverty.5 My aim is to contemplate the complex circulation of trends, orientations, 
influences and communications that set in motion an industry of poverty reduction. I am 
interested in the machinery that enables such transmissions rather than in their content, 
aiming to capture the practices that are typically left invisible in the records, reports, 
guidelines and indicators of success produced by such industry.6  
 
4 In reference to Rachael Dobson’s ‘Recollection-as-Method’, using personal recollections from experiences of 
academic life and social policy work in her methodology for critical welfare practice research. Rachael 
Dobson, ‘Recollection-as-Method in Social Welfare Practice: Dirty Work, Shame and Resistance’ (2017) 17(3) 
Qualitative Research Journal 164. 
5 For this multi-sited approach, I draw on ponderations from Irus Braverman, ‘Who's Afraid of Methodology? 
Advocating a Methodological Turn in Legal Geography’ in Irus Braverman, Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney, 
Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar (eds), The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography (Stanford University 
Press 2014).  
6 Here, I draw from Ananya Roy’s adaptation of the method of global commodity chain analysis for the 
mapping of ‘millennial development’ and its circuits of capital (profit, speculation and investment) and truth 
(authoritative knowledge about poverty). Ananya Roy, Poverty Capital: Microfinance and the Making of 
Development (Taylor & Francis 2010). 
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In other words, I focus on the global-local circuits of knowledge and intervention, in order 
to observe the workings of legal operations and techniques in their conjunction. This is 
what I mean by invoking the knowledge-law-intervention compound. I adopt a legal-
aesthetic perspective, following the traces of such circuits as to connect practices that are 
seemingly disconnected from an institutional point of view but which are clearly linked ‘on 
the ground’. My analyses build on such ‘on the ground’ contexts and connections even 
though I do not make them the centre of my narrative in the thesis. In other words, I avoid 
placing contextual elements at the core of the thesis but I cannot evade their centrality to 
my reflections. This is why I end the thesis with a more explicit return to context, to 
reconcile the main discussions of the research with the issues that prompted me to 
develop the research in the first place. Hence, I examine the constitutive elements of the 
abovementioned conflicts – the practices of knowledge, regulation and intervention that 
keep the machine working.  
My approach in this research has been to start by precisely working through the conflicts, 
described above, of the socio-legal practice researcher developing poverty-related social 
projects funded by international schemes. As a preparatory stage, I traced the steps 
through which an internationally funded project is produced and implemented in order to 
visualise the industry of poverty reduction from that angle. First, the bid writing stage – 
the imperatives of funders’ guidance; the scope and thematic prescriptions; the budget 
constraints; the translation of local challenges into a comprehensive international 
development framework and language; the presentation of data that confirm the project’s 
relevance; the promises of impacts, outcomes and outputs that will both satisfy the 
funders’ interests and effectively contribute to the relevant local groups; the activities 
required to be planned as a ‘pre-emptive form of thinking in retrospect’ about the things 
to be done in the future in order to be able to deliver the right indicators to support the 
narrative of the project’s success. Then, the stage of implementing the project – facing 
delays with the fund transfers whilst the work (at this point unpaid) has already started; 
adjusting the planned timeframe without compromising the agreed deadlines for 
milestones, deliverables and outputs; strategizing around how to put into practice a 
collective, participative plan of action whilst limited to what has already been promised to 
the funders; reaching out to the community and networks; requesting permission to adjust 
plans; justifying repurposed expenditures by promising new outcomes; executing the 
revised plan; elaborating partial reports; registering every step to avoid audit problems; 
occasionally keeping off-record unmentioned activities or engagements; attempting to 
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cover more ground than officially stated in order to optimise or make good use of the 
prosperous circumstances and to support formal or informal collaborators; collecting data; 
using established data and frameworks from the international state of the art references, 
indicators and methodologies; producing publications with the so-called new knowledge; 
applying the new knowledge to feed further community engagement. And finally the stage 
of reporting back to funders – to collect (good) feedback; to produce (good) indicators of 
success; to report (good) experiences in order to support future bids;  to comply with audit 
inquiries; to present evidence of expenditures; to justify occasional inconsistencies; to 
renegotiate deadlines; to expect final approval and to keep records of everything for the 
next 5 to 10 years at least.  
Certainly, a lot more than I have listed is involved in this broad chain of practices, as they 
also include establishing interactions with third parties, establishing labour relations, 
complying with tax liability, obtaining ethics committee approvals, securing consent from 
institutions and representatives implicated by the project’s interventions, as well as 
preparing other funding applications to secure the sustainability of the work done into the 
near future. In this mapping exercise comprised in the lists above, I sought to reflect on all 
the practices that directly or indirectly impact or influence the content and the execution 
of such a project, which relate to the imperatives of knowing and of intervening upon 
poverty. This is an endless exercise as even the most down-to-earth practice of purchasing 
a notebook to register fieldwork notes needs to be recorded, justified and approved, 
establishing a particular chain of interactions that could be analysed within increasingly 
wider networks, to a point where the global divisions of labour and supply chains are also 
implicated.  
Evidently, my aim in this thesis is not to trace and describe these networks per se. I am 
rather interested in examining broader connections between practices as they form part 
of the same circuits of poverty knowledge and poverty intervention, even though they 
might not appear to be connected at first sight.7 In the process of thinking through the 
pathways of a funded project, I could see seemingly unrelated sets of practices in the 
making of poverty (as a phenomenon, as a problem, as a condition, as an existence, as an 
attitude, as a legal concern, and so on) which at times interact and combine to form 
 
7 I draw on Sally Engle Merry’s analyses of how the creation of indicators reveals a slippage between the 
political and the technical in ‘the way issues and problems are defined, the identity and role of experts, the 
relative power of the people engaged in producing and using indicators, and the power and clout of the 
sponsoring organization’. Sally Engle Merry, ‘Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global 
Governance’ (2011) 52(3) Current Anthropology 88. 
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increasingly complex operations and cascaded effects. I could see that the impact of the 
projects that I participated in led to more and more indicators about certain localities or 
certain complex circumstances which, in turn, provided more appeal for international 
funders. I could see that in regions in which there were fewer projects, there was also less 
available data and thus less ability to attract funds. But the availability of data about 
certain regions did not necessarily inform policy or State action in those regions. At times, 
it seemed that the flow was the other way around and more data about violence appeared 
to lead to more violent interventions, contrary to what ‘experts’ proposed.  
For example, I could draw broader lines – granted, tortuous lines with no clear sense of 
causation – connecting practices of data collection about violence in Rio de Janeiro 
emerging from community-based initiatives to oppose police violence and the growing 
attention such a community would get from public institutions, including in terms of 
increasing the policing apparatus in militarily occupied favelas, even though such practices 
(of knowledge and of intervention) come from different entities, produce unrelated effects 
and speak discordant languages.8 If favourable towards policing expansion, data on 
reduced crime incidence will be mobilised in a correlation to muster support for police 
practices; if unfavourable, they can be disregarded or also used to call for more policing to 
the region. Either way, increased policing will generate more data and confirm (thus co-
produce) the police relevance at that locality. Other areas of the city – often subjected to 
differentiated regimes of order and authority – could be even more violent but there 
would be neither data about it nor more policing. The initially unrelated practices turn out 
to be connected in that they both generate data through legal techniques. The legal 
operations and techniques here at play will be presented in more detail below, but it is 
important to prefigure that I am referring to a comprehensive and pervasive notion of law 
as any form of organising logic that regulates spaces and relations as well as negotiates 
collective life – from contracts, agreements, legislation and administrative orders to 
informal conflict resolution, self-managed associations that produce obligations and 
everyday life uses of communal spaces. 
Similarly, as another example, I could draw connections between Google Maps’s 
celebrated incorporation of favelas – as historically uncharted urban areas – into digital 
maps with StreetView technology adapted to the conditions of the sites, ahead of the 2016 
 
8 Ignacio Cano and Eduardo Ribeiro, ‘Old Strategies and New Approaches towards Policing Drug Markets in 
Rio de Janeiro: Police Practice and Research’ (2016) 17(4) Police Practice and Research 364.  
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Olympics in Rio de Janeiro9 and the preceding practices of private corporations investing in 
the so-called Pacification Police Units in favelas by means of public-private partnerships 
and a purpose-built equity fund in 2013.10 They are connected by the discourse on the 
social and digital ‘inclusion’ of favelas, back into the city of Rio. They also generate data to 
confirm that inclusion, through legal techniques such as those that formalise businesses, 
as well as labour and credit relations. On the other hand, other areas of the city which 
have been historically less attractive, indeed absent from the cartography and 
historiography of the city, would remain in the shadows and, thus, not reintegrated – or 
accordingly, ‘excluded’.  
I could also see connections between the issuing of an identity card (Cadastro Único) to 
every one of the millions of poor persons in Brazil who receive monthly stipends from 
Bolsa Familia or other social programmes and the World Bank’s influence – by imparting 
its accumulated knowledge and global experiences with cash transfer programmes – in the 
implementation of targeted and conditional systems in place of the universal income 
support programme launched in Brazil in 2003 (Fome Zero). The new cards, needless to 
say, generate data about all the assisted poor in the country and thus feed into further 
policy designs.11 More recently, while writing this thesis, I can also observe how the efforts 
to overcome a worldwide pandemic crisis – in which the millionaires of the world are quick 
to advertise their generous donations to science and to vulnerable populations and 
politicians worldwide capitalise on the provisions of emergency support schemes – are 
connected to more and more profiling, registrations and often the opening of more bank 
accounts for the poor. Aid and profit go hand in hand in the production of more data, 
again, through legal techniques – contracts, conditionalities, taxes, regulations and rights 
and obligations at large.  
Concurrently, it is interesting to observe how the seemingly unrelated (though allied) 
struggles of the landless workers towards agrarian reform, the indigenous fighting against 
agrobusiness and the urban slum dwellers resisting evictions in Brazil are all 
interconnected in the call for territorial integrity – or really in their opposition to landed 
property albeit often articulating strategic proprietary claims to obtain security of tenure. 
 
9 Max Opray, ‘How Google is Putting Rio’s Invisible Favelas Back on the Map’ The Guardian (London, 9 
October 2016). 
10 Lívia de Cássia Godoi Moraes, ‘Investment Funds in the UPPs: The Financial Speculation of Misery’ Margó 
Hufstetler tr RioOnWatch (Rio de Janeiro, 15 December 2013). 
11 More on the reform can be found in: Bénédicte de la Brière and Kathy Lindert, ‘Reforming Brazil’s Cadastro 
Único to Improve the Targeting of the Bolsa Família Program’ (Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 
32757, The World Bank 2005).  
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They also hold in common the ubiquitous militarised public-private responses – by which 
many activist lives have been supressed12 – which become components of the same grand 
gesture: the gaze towards the poor. This gesture is obviously a gesture of violence, but it 
also stretches into less visibly violent dimensions, such as moments of classification and 
moments of aid.  
In view of such circumstances, I interrogate what it is that makes the poor ‘poor’. What 
makes an indigenous population poor?13 The same applies to the landless movement, 
which organise itself into cooperatives for organic food production and distribution to its 
members and beyond.14 I claim that the violent gestures of knowledge and intervention 
are what turn them into the image of poverty, what merge them into a unified image of 
lack – lack of material resources, lack of means of subsistence – despite the potentials of 
self-sufficiency that their cooperative and solidarity-based production present. All the 
world’s dispossessed, today and in the past, are thus unified under that totalising 
category: ‘the poor’. The underlying condition that defines them as poor is the gaze of the 
nonpoor that observes, surveys and visualises only to intervene and modulate them as 
such. The gaze that objectifies modes of existence as ‘social problems’ to be acted upon is 
tantamount to a gesture of violence that displaces and categorises populations and 
territories.  
How can law, i.e., legal techniques and practices, be conceptualised in the articulations 
between poverty knowledge (social research, census data, development indicators, social 
measurements, social classification, quantification, crime statistics, georeferenced digital 
calculations) and interventions against poverty (aid, social policy, benefits, charity, 
donations, policing, social insurance, resettlements, banishments, militarisation)? This is 
the question I set out to explore in this thesis. In order to scrutinise the connections 
between the abovementioned seemingly unrelated practices, occurrences and 
circumstances I visualise them as part of a comprehensive whole of interconnected 
‘circuits’ of knowledge and intervention. I am interested in the mediation between both 
 
12  Arkady Petrov, ‘Brazil Ranked 4th Among Countries Killing Human Rights Activists in 2019’ The Rio Times 
(Rio de Janeiro, 16 January 2020); Conectas, ‘Brazil: Country with the Highest Murder Rate of Land and 
Environmental Defenders in the World’ Conectas (São Paulo, 31 July 2018). 
13 The Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro remarks that what they all have in common is that 
something essential has been taken away from them – their land, their bodies, their history – which 
transcendently unifies peoples in a continual transfiguration into ‘the poor’. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, ‘The 
Involuntaries of the Homeland: Praise to Underdevelopment’ [In Portuguese: ‘Os Involuntários da Pátria: 
Elogio do Subdesenvolvimento’] (Caderno de Leituras 65, Chão da Feira 2017). 
14 Marie-Josee Massicotte, ‘Solidarity Economy and Agricultural Cooperatives: The Experience of the Brazilian 
Landless Rural Workers Movement’ (2014) 4(3) Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Community 
Development 155.  
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circuits and I argue that law is an active mediator worth looking into from the point of view 
of its own making.  
By the term ‘circuits’ I mean open-ended itineraries in which parts combine – as direct 
routes of determination or indirect routes of influence – often working together as pieces 
of a machine, or indeed conductors in a circuit, with data-generating practices and data-
responsive techniques.15 The metaphor of circuits is useful precisely as it allows an analysis 
of practices as part of polycentric chains, which includes the construal of such chains as 
incidentally, or momentarily, connected to conductors belonging to other kinds of circuits 
(e.g. circuits of capital and of debt). That is to say, it would be limiting to see the circuits of 
poverty knowledge and intervention as centred around a multilateral development agency 
– say, in the World Bank – and descending all the way to the local practices of a funded 
ethnographer doing fieldwork in a remote village in the so-called ‘Global South’. It is not 
simply the streams of funds that I investigate – such as the OECD’s Official Development 
Assistance flows – although those fluxes are broadly encompassed in my research 
problem. Moreover, my main concern is not the accuracy of such streams and flows, their 
causal links, the precision of their cascaded influences, but rather what these associations 
can reveal about how knowledge, law and interventions operate to manufacture poverty 
as a thing in the world, an existing entity. 
By looking into the circuits of knowledge practices and of intervention practices 
(alternatively, the circuits of science of poverty and of politics of poverty) I am able to find 
legal techniques that are active between them. Examples of these can be found in formal 
instruments or procedures – such as international donation contracts, research and 
cooperation agreements, conditionalities of structural adjustments, law reforms, criminal 
law and the quasi-criminal administrative orders – as well as in the legal practices of 
everyday life – such as informal trade and labour market, micro-regulations of public 
space, curfews and checkpoints, hostile urban architecture, public order surveillance by 
law enforcement, community-based conflict resolution and neighbourhood associations. 
Law, thus broadly construed, can be seen to hold a relevant role in the interface of science 
and politics, and this role is what I explore and demonstrate in this thesis. For sure, law can 
be examined as a circuit itself, as system theories do. However, I am interested in the 
 
15 As will be elucidated in the thesis, I borrow this metaphor of circuits from Ananya Roy. However, differently 
from the method she applied to map poverty capital, I do not proceed with inquiring into the locally situated 
manifestations of the circuits that I examine – with empirical methods of interviews and ethnographic 
observations. Instead, as will be presented, I build on transnational and transhistorical manifestations of the 
functions of the circuits that I observe. Roy (n 6). 
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mediating role of law in a broader picture of poverty production, in how it enables other 
circuits to function rather than in its own inner functions. I will argue that it is in this 
mediating position that law itself also emerges as an entity, existing thing in the world.  
As a critical legal research project, this task consists of interrogating ‘law’ in its multifarious 
operations and its pervasive takeover of everyday life, that is to say, law’s increasingly 
dissipated role in the political, social and economic spheres. New legal forms emerge as 
effects of new modes of law’s own operationalisation. The critique of law that I set out to 
develop is one that considers the most ordinary and material elements composing that 
which we come to apprehend as ‘law’. I turn to the established scholarship of ‘law and 
aesthetics’ to situate my argument within a perspective which highlights the media and 
the techniques by which a ‘legal’ problem is articulated and answered. The recorded 
products of these media and techniques are captured as images, that is, as aesthetic 
compositions. I am particularly referring to images of poverty contained in poverty data, 
i.e. the visual assemblages, collages and associations that make poverty visible and 
perceptible in the world. Poverty data makes poverty concrete and operational, i.e. data 
hold normative functions. From this perspective, data and images are devices of 
knowledge and intervention. While I am interested in the rules of procedure that generate 
poverty knowledge, I am most interested in the techniques through which knowledge 
practices create existing entities to be intervened upon, i.e. in how the conceptualised 
poverty is materialised in the world and how that materialisation puts in motion a series of 
implications for populations and territories. In doing so, I see my research as echoing a 
similar reflexive process that critical criminologists have undertaken in the past decades, 
recognising the role of criminology’s own disciplinary history in the invention of its objects 
of investigation, i.e. crime, the criminal, and the penal state. Such movements in 
criminology display a critical self-assessment that is missing in poverty research and I seek 
to start delineating this critique by means of a critical legal investigation. 
Although I am foregrounding law in this broad picture, I do not wish to suggest that there 
is a set and linear process of implicated determinations. Instead, the flows of exchange 
between science, law and politics are more adequately construed as multidirectional – as 
implied by the language of circuits. Does this understanding imply a withdrawal from a 
Marxist analysis of poverty’s historical materialist formation? I sustain that it does not. 
Certainly, to think of poverty as a socio-technical creation entails destabilising the key but 
taken for granted concepts of capitalism, private property and society – in other words, 
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even a critique against dominant structures of knowledge that condition the material 
bases of poverty is itself immersed in a worldview that naturalises poverty as an a priori 
condition. But this destabilisation does not revoke the potency of such concepts in the 
interpretation of how things in the world are contingently combined, enabling and 
affecting each other. The destabilisation is particularly useful if we are to attempt to, as I 
do, reinterpret poverty as something which transcends its relativeness to prosperity, its 
status as a by-product, or as an epiphenomenon to the production of wealth. An assertive 
formulation of poverty, i.e. one that is not epiphenomenological, acknowledges that 
poverty is a technical-scientific formulation that is both produced and productive. But that 
does not mean to suggest that poverty is thus an immaterial formation. Once formulated, 
it enters social interactions as an entity and it co-produces a series of other interactions – 
for example, debt relations formed out of a previous demand for credit. This is why I 
combine a mundane critique of capitalist accumulation and expansion with a historical 
materialist reading of social interactions. I combine these orientations without much 
concern as to which one is to be considered more adequate to grasp the ‘reality’ of the 
world. I am rather concerned with how things come to be real in the world.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The chapters in this thesis present the results of the analysis. I report on what the research 
trajectory allowed me to find in terms of legal mediations and legal implications in poverty 
making. The chapters present different moments of interaction between knowledge-law-
intervention – or poverty knowledge, antipoverty law and interventions upon populations 
and territories classified as in poverty. While the logic of circuits that I adopt entails that 
there is no clear-cut separation between each part of this interaction, I seek to situate law 
at the forefront of each chapter to demonstrate its diverse workings in the mediating 
position in which I find it situated. I selected five legal moments to explore in five chapters, 
in which the knowledge-law-intervention compound plays out in different ways:  
1. Law arises from techniques that forge the material basis of poverty as 
propertylessness and cut through populations and territories by establishing 
standards of separation – i.e. displacements and categorisations. 
2. As a technique of visualisation, law takes form in codifications that regulate 
poverty and sets the tone for images of poverty to take shape, which, in turn, 
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establish scientific modes of measurement and calculation as well as the political 
responses to fix the ‘newly-formed’ problem. 
3. Law is presented to the eyes at the moment when quantitative indicators are 
turned into qualifications of poverty in order to activate measures of intervention 
such as policy and international programmes. 
4. Within established visual economies of poverty that take data as fact, law prompts 
the formalisation of populations and territories, i.e. their assimilation into the 
proper form of poverty. 
5. Legal-aesthetic modulations assemble gestures of violence by creating the 
conditions under which bodies and soil are configured in the urban landscape. 
 
Figure 1: Thesis Road Map: legal moments mediating of the circuits of knowledge and intervention. 
 
I start, in chapter 1, by laying out my working concept of poverty as a legal formation. I 
challenge the socioeconomic understanding of poverty – that it is a condition of 
deprivation, deficit or lack of material resources – in order to consider the legal practices 
that produce material lack in the first place. That is to say, if poverty is not to be construed 
as the antithesis of wealth and prosperity, what else can the legal history and geography of 
modern private property reveal about the formation of such antithetical 
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conceptualisation? My argument builds on what scholars describe as a legal regime of 
property as exclusive ownership, a ‘regime’ that differentiates the propertied and the 
dispossessed, the haves and the have-nots along with a series of other forms of 
differentiation. I explore the propertylessness implied in poverty and reformulate it in 
terms of an active factor (rather than passive) in the production of poverty. This mode of 
analysis is not new to critical thought: accumulation of property to one side, dispossession 
to the other. But I attempt to agitate this relationality in order to isolate its formative 
elements, with the intention of foregrounding two violent gestures at the ‘origin’ of 
poverty’s capitalistic production: territorial displacement and populational categorisation. 
As such, territory and population present the compositional elements, the material 
inscriptions – in the soil and in bodies – of social interactions of accumulation and of 
dispossession. These are the two compositional elements around which my analysis will 
gravitate throughout the thesis. By laying the thesis’ groundwork in these terms, I am 
turning away from a traditional, formalist understanding of ‘law’ as a system of rules that 
regulates the basic institutions of capitalism – the regime of property – and I am 
prioritising a view over chains of legal practices and techniques that interweave a 
seemingly natural order of things that, in turn, takes poverty for its symptoms. 
In chapter 2, I seek to demonstrate how legal modes of poverty administration have 
historically consolidated the changing images or ways of seeing poverty. I analyse four 
historical clusters of antipoverty legal codifications that produce and respond to such 
images of poverty, i.e., the typified profile of the poor, the designations of the sites of 
poverty, the scientific validating framework and the agenda of intervention. The clusters 
that I analyse are: poverty relief, criminalisation of poverty, welfare support and 
international development aid. My proposition is that the scientific and the interventionist 
frameworks require legal operations and, in turn, conform to their aesthetic implications. 
Between the science of poverty and the politics of poverty, we find law. I aim to 
demonstrate the functionality of legal techniques and their aesthetic effects. Thus, the 
chapter presents a legal-aesthetic analysis of the imageries created around poverty and 
which are derived from and are productive of legal forms of poverty regulation. The aim is 
to delineate how this profile, ‘the poor’, has been substantially transformed while the 
form ‘poverty’ has purportedly remained stable in modern history. 
This is the argument I further develop in chapter 3. The concept of poverty is presented as 
a dynamic formation (a legal-aesthetic composition) that is continually renewed and which 
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continually produces effects upon the populations and territories that are classified as 
such. I draw on the philosophy and history of science – and material perspectives on 
scientific practices – in order to argue that legal techniques mediate social quantification 
and legal qualification. I do that, as mentioned above, through reflections on the 
scholarship of ‘law and aesthetics’, particularly in relation to its recent turn to material 
approaches. I also build on discussions of scientific techniques of visualisation and 
cognition to split the production of poverty into stages: first, inscriptions of poverty occur 
through the demarcations of property that produce the propertied and the propertyless as 
seemingly a priori and pre-social categories; then, there are ascriptions of the propertyless 
as problems to be fixed – as threats to be removed, delinquents to be disciplined, 
destitutes to be aided and so on. Through these steps emerges the ontological entity of 
‘the poor’, a statistical calculation which becomes an entity. 
In chapter 4 I analyse a particular visual economy of poverty circulating in the world today. 
It refers to the abovementioned industry of global poverty reduction and the current 
trends of a financialized conceptualisation or poverty. I approach the aesthetic 
interventionism of the development agenda and examine the rights-based definitions of 
and remedies to poverty. In stating that law facilitates the passage from data to facts – or 
reads data as fact – I examine law’s normative qualification of ‘poverty’ as a gesture 
towards the formalisation of populations and territories that enables the formulation of 
rights-based remedies to poverty. Formalisation is construed as a form of assimilation, 
mirroring – or perhaps enduring – historical imperialist purges on the incomplete 
transfigurations of the righteous poor. From this perspective, the financial inclusion 
promoted by microfinance appears to replicate the divisions of the good and the bad poor 
in the renewed images of the duly banked or the obstinate unbanked. Human rights, then, 
are construed as the legal technology forged to tackle the social exclusions created by 
their own foundational principle of exclusionary rights to property. 
Finally, chapter 5 presents the culmination of my argument. I illustrate the extent to which 
the frameworks of formalisation may be connected to other seemingly unrelated practices 
of interventions that affect populations and territories of poverty. I do this by returning to 
the context of Brazilian favelas and I narrate an exemplary scene to illustrate the ultimate, 
most bodily repercussion of the violent gestures of visualising poverty. I address the legal-
aesthetic modulations of poverty from this concrete, situated perspective to sustain that 
‘law’ is what bridges the visualisation practices of previous chapters and the contextual 
24 
 
circumstances that I narrate in the final chapter. The knowledge-law-intervention 
compound becomes clearer as a machinic collaboration between seemingly unrelated 
practices that take place in favelas and in international settings. It might seem late to 
introduce contextual notes but for reasons explained above, I developed this thesis from, 
but not about, a situated viewpoint – i.e. as a participant in the circuits of poverty making. 
At last, I return to my initial questions concerning the spectator, the nonpoor who direct 
their gaze towards the poor. I frame this as the ‘problem fixer’ who attempts to fix the 
problem created by their own gaze. The violence of the gaze discloses, then, an intrinsic 
nostalgia for primitivism. 
On this account, in each chapter of the thesis I approach a legal moment by following the 
circuitous interactions between knowledge and intervention illustrated in Figure 1, guided 
by the currently predominant economy of poverty which promotes both financial and 
urban modulations of populations and territories across the world. In my concluding 
remarks I extract, from the analysis I develop in the chapters, insights to the ‘socio-legal 
practice researcher’ working in territories of poverty and violence. I do this by elucidating 
what each stage of the circuit, in fact what each identified legal moment, reveal about that 
conflictive position. I end with a reflection on praxis and an ethical consideration about the 





 The legal frames of poverty: the modern invention of propertylessness 
 
In order to start exploring the ways in which law participates in the formation of images of 
poverty, which historically support interventions upon poverty, I examine how the 
interaction between modern law and poverty has been established in reference to 
property. In this opening chapter, I turn to the legal history of modern private property as 
the base of a ‘capitalistic’ definition of poverty in terms of lack, i.e. material deprivation.1 
My purpose is to revisit poverty’s typical definition as a form of ‘propertylessness’, where 
the privation of some is directly implicated in the accumulation of wealth by others, and 
which has been contrasted at different stages of capitalism with the accumulation of 
different materials – land, money, assets, stocks, credit. Although ideas of poverty have 
certainly existed before the consolidation of capitalism, and although experiences of 
material deprivation and social hierarchy evidently precede capitalism,2 this model of 
poverty as material maldistribution – dispossession as the obverse of accumulation – has 
been a contingent innovation of the capitalist mode of production.  
Be that as it may, in observing this negative form of poverty definition under the register 
of a capitalistic understanding – negative because it is construed as the antithesis of 
wealth – an important element emerges for further inquiry: the material variability of the 
concept of poverty seems to correspond to measures taken in response to varying images 
of poverty. Poverty’s negative status in relation to wealth and the resources historically 
mobilised to respond to it, then, seem to indicate that poverty results, first and foremost, 
from normative designations rather than purely by absolute living conditions of 
deprivation. Under this light, poverty involves a legal determination of ‘the poor’ before it 
 
1 I refer to ‘capitalistic’ definitions and notions in terms of thinking through capitalism, as a concept itself, 
designed to gather and give cohesion to a multitude of elements that would otherwise appear disconnected 
and independent. But once formulated as a concept, a tool, capitalism allows an entire mode of thinking that 
can be useful for understanding the world. This mundane perspective will be clarified in chapter 3, but I 
should make it clear that I do not mean that it is all pure abstract invention; capitalism creates actually 
existing things, relations and material conditions in the world. While capitalism is a concept, it also operates 
to govern existences by a politics of subjectivity. As such, it is a form of colonial-capitalistic ‘regime’, as Suely 
Rolnik writes. Suely Rolnik, ‘The Spheres of Insurrection: Suggestions for Combating the Pimping of Life’ 
(2017) 86 e-flux. 
2 The social function of poverty has also drastically changed in the transition to capitalism, according to 
Bronislaw Geremek, Poverty: A History (Blackwell 1994). 
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translates itself as material deprivation.3 This is the poverty that I am concerned with in 
this thesis, i.e., the legal-aesthetic configuration of poverty which surpasses socioeconomic 
terms and involves the accumulation of spatial and temporal differences that frame 
populations and territories. To that effect, I claim that law’s spatial and temporal orderings 
are at the heart of the aesthetic dimensions of poverty, with sense-making and world-
making functions, as will be discuss later in this thesis. Subsequently, in chapter 2, I will 
argue that it has been the changing modes of administration of ‘the poor’ that have 
historically shaped the concept of poverty, rather than the other way around.4  
My initial caveat regarding the risks of insinuating an immaterial notion of poverty, 
disconnected from actual lived experiences of deprivation and misery, needs to be 
restated here. To turn away from capitalistic and distributional perspectives of poverty as 
a material lack, is a necessary move to strategically open the way for another kind of 
approach to poverty: one which considers the legal practices that co-produce the concept, 
feed intervention strategies and modulate the lived experience of poverty. Hence, to begin 
with, I will demonstrate in this chapter how historical narratives about the formation of 
private property, as a legal regime that inaugurates modernity, engender the capitalistic 
versions of the concept of poverty as well as other legal techniques of division, 
categorisation and hierarchy. I propose that the part played by law in the production of 
poverty is more than ancillary, and that it is rather a creative role. In section 1.1 I will refer 
to the legal history of modern property, which establishes poverty as propertylessness. 
This history refers to the European transition from feudalism to capitalism and centralises 
the acts of violence that facilitated this transition and which are often disregarded by 
liberal narratives of the birth of capital. Pauperisation, populational dislocation and 
urbanisation are foregrounded as effects of the violent (and resisted) developments of a 
regime of exclusive ownership. Furthermore, in section 1.2 I stress the planetary 
magnitude of this historical formation and discuss how the colonial roots of capitalism are 
by no means an incidental occurrence but indeed a key factor for the consolidation of 
capitalism and the geopolitics of poverty. Private property, individual ownership and 
territorial formations are not European institutes which have been merely transplanted 
into colonies. Colonial territories themselves were terrains where innovations have been 
shaped throughout history – a geopolitical dynamic that is most certainly not left in the 
 
3 Similarly, Jane B Baron developed the concept of ‘no property’ to inquire into homelessness in proprietary 
terms rather than as a problem of poverty per se. No property is, thus, a legal category with its own sets of 
duties and liabilities. Jane B Baron, ‘Homelessness as a Property Problem’ (2004) 36 Urban Lawyer 273. 
4 A point inspired by Georg Simmel, ‘The Poor’, Claire Jacobson (tr) (1965) 13(2) Social Problems 118. 
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past and that continues to be re-enacted in the present, though often reshaped. Finally, in 
section 1.3 I focus on the violent gestures of poverty production as technologies of 
visualisation that continually modulate territories and populations. I draw on critical legal 
geography scholarship to refer to property (or propertylessness) as a mode of seeing and 
governing space – or as I will discuss later, a mode of knowing and intervening upon 
poverty. From this reading of poverty production – and to prefigure the argument – law is 
integral to this technological operation and poverty can be construed as a legal 
production.5 The discussion presented in this chapter aims to demonstrate how characters 
of ‘the poor’ have been formed in relation to property, inaugurating entire new explicative 
systems of poverty as a material lack, a problem of distribution that can be fixed by 
material provisions.  
 
1.1 Propertyless poverty  
‘Enclosures have appropriately been called a revolution of the rich against the poor’,6 Karl 
Polanyi famously wrote in The Great Transformation, referring to the hedging of common 
fields in England for economic and technological improvement in the sixteenth century 
and beyond. The history of the enclosures is often recounted in terms of the effects of the 
privatization of common lands, rural depopulation, urbanisation and the pauperisation of 
the masses, marking the transition from feudalism to capitalism. These effects are also 
typically raised as precursors of the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century as well 
as of the appropriation of colonial territories worldwide. Nonetheless, contemporary 
historians diverge as to the accuracy of these connections as well as to the ascription of 
enclosures as the main catalyst of the transformations of the time.7 In revisiting this 
literature, I do not enter the discussion from a historiographic perspective. My purpose is 
to retrieve a few decisive components from the history of the modern concept of private 
property in land, so as to provide a clearer understanding of the part played by law, and of 
 
5 This argument will also be further developed in chapter 2 when I situate law as a technology of visualisation, 
i.e., the propeller of knowledge and intervention upon poverty which modulates it legally and aesthetically. In 
that development, law itself will be understood as an emergent effect of its own making. I consider this to be 
my contribution to the literature that I draw on for my argument, i.e. I will treat posited, codified laws as 
succeeding the gesture of visualisation, a form of inscribing selected, framed occurrences in the world, rather 
than the primordial manifestation of ‘law’. 
6 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (first published 1944, 
Beacon Press 2001) 37. 
7 A revisionist example of the role of enclosures in the proletarianization of agricultural labour is presented in 
Leigh Shaw-Taylor, ‘Parliamentary Enclosure and the Emergence of an English Agricultural Proletariat’ (2001) 
61(3) The Journal of Economic History 640. 
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how law itself has been shaped in this course of transformations. In doing so, I revisit the 
critical consensus that modern law and private property are mutually constituted in order 
to add poverty into the equation. My argument is that property and law give rise to 
poverty not as an epiphenomenon, a negative and unfortunate by-product – i.e., as the 
antithesis of property wealth – but as an active creation. Poverty as propertylessness, I 
argue, is to be examined as a necessary legal technique, a gesture that reshapes 
populations and territories.  
There is an extensive literature in legal history that situates the advent of modern, western 
law as a result of and, at the same time, a crucial instrument for the institution of private 
property and the commodification of the soil.8 That is to say, modern law is recounted as 
having founded itself in regulating the expropriation and demarcation of land9 so that it 
can circulate in the exchange market – namely through private acts of parliament, the 
Enclosure Acts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and later through the public 
General Enclosure Acts in the nineteenth century10 – as well as in structuring criminal law 
and public order policing towards the preservation and protection of property in the 
eighteenth century against new notions (or new definitions) of crimes.11 Marxist 
scholarship is particularly assertive in situating private property at the birth of the liberal 
State, as a fundamental right that upholds the modern legal regime.12 Hence, changes in 
rights to use common lands and cooperative customs at the turn of the sixteenth century 
have engendered a new concept of property in land based on spatial exclusion and 
absolute right to individual ownership which links persona to res via contractual 
 
8 A few examples can be found in the essays presented in John Brewer and Susan Staves, ‘Introduction’ in 
Brewer and Staves (eds), Early Modern Conceptions of Property (Routledge 1996). See also David Seipp ‘The 
Concept of Property in the Early Common Law’ (1994) 12(1) Law and History Review 29. 
9 A note of caution: spatial exclusion and absolute right to property existed before enclosures. Enclosures 
applied those concepts to what was formerly common land. On the other hand, critical geographers alert us 
to a ‘mythical’ idea of the commons in which it is frequently assumed that before the acts of enclosure land 
would have belonged to the people and its use would have be free and unregulated - when in fact common 
land is the descriptor of land used in common by the granting of common rights, which legally defined who 
were the commoners. Thus, more accurately, enclosures signified the suspension of common rights and, thus, 
the exclusion of those now without use rights, prompting the emergence of modern private property rights to 
land formerly held in common. See Briony McDonagh and Carl J Griffin, ‘Occupy! Historical Geographies of 
Property, Protest and the Commons, 1500-1850’ (2016) 53 Journal of Historical Geography 1. 
10 David Brown and Frank Sharman, ‘Enclosure: Agreements and Acts’ (1994) 15(3) Journal of Legal History 
269.  
11 Douglas Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’ in Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John Rule, E P 
Thompson, Cal Winslow (eds) Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England (Pantheon 
1976). 
12 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe: 1789–184 (first published 1962, Vintage Books 1996); E P 
Thompson, The Making of the Working Class (first published 1963, Penguin Books 2013); Christopher Hill, The 
World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution (Viking Press 1973); Peter Linebaugh, 
Stop Thief: The Commons Enclosures and Resistance (PM Press 2014). 
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interactions.13 This in turn, scholars recount, has enabled a continuous process of 
accumulation by landowners in the context of the development of agrarian and industrial 
capitalism. It has also objectified property as a thing in itself with major implications both 
for hoarding landowners as well as for farmers turned into waged workers. Moreover, as 
will be seen, these developments also naturalised the social relations between people and 
space and prompted a series of divisions that are seen as the foundations of modernity.14  
Certainly, the transformations assembled in these accounts, and schematically described 
here, are not so clearly marked in the literature. Michael Tigar and Madeleine Levy trace 
the transformations of law within a much longer and more gradual path from the 
prehistory of mercantilism – since at least the initiation of processes of maximising trade in 
the eleventh century – to the formation of the western industrial world.15 As Marxist legal 
historians, they construe legal change as the product of conflicts between social classes, 
with a narrative centred on a ‘bourgeois revolution’. They recount that the early 
developments of the legal infrastructures that introduced and preserved private property 
were indeed formed by the addition of new commercial and financial content into legal 
structures that long preceded the land enclosures, such as in the use of free contracts as a 
technology to secure trade.16 Rather than attributing a clear-cut role to law as serving a 
dominant ideology, the authors point to an emerging ‘jurisprudence of insurgency’, in 
which conditions of trade were the element of contention between competing ‘legal 
ideologies’ and which further pushed the boundaries for legal and social change. These 
transformations are framed as the outcome of social struggles against feudal hostility 
towards merchant interests. The figure of the merchant as a social outcast, involved both 
in violent upheavals and in legal disputes to secure free commerce, gave rise to a 
‘bourgeois law making’ favourable to the expansion of trade – i.e., the integration of rules 
of contract and property to the preceding, cumulative bodies of legal principles of natural 
law, Roman law, Feudal law, Royal law, Canon law and law merchant.17  
 
13 Michael Tigar and Madeleine R Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism (Monthly Review Press 1977). 
14 As will be discussed below with Nicholas Blomley, ‘The Territory of Property’ (2016) 40(5) Progress in 
Human Geography 593.  
Marilyn Strathern also refers to this legal development of property as crucial to the modernist foundational 
distinction between subject and object, which in turn upholds other modern analytical divisions – culture and 
nature, law and society, person and property, us and them, self and other, human and nonhuman and so 
forth. I will pick up on this in chapter 3.  
Marilyn Strathern, ‘Cutting the Network’ (1996) 2(3) The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 517. 
15 Tigar and Levy (n 13). 
16 Tigar and Levy (n 13) 6. 
17 Tigar and Levy (n 13) 313. 
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The course of events which are assembled as having given rise to the modern liberal legal 
regime were also, by no means, linear and stable. Scholars, such as Silvia Federici, report 
that conflict and organised resistance, in fact, formed turbulent waves of transformation in 
the transition to capitalism, and indeed ‘one of the bloodiest and most discontinuous’ 
process of change in history – to the extent that the expression ‘transition to capitalism’ is 
misleading.18 Violence, force and illegalities are widely described throughout this historical 
process as constitutive aspects of the legal methods of the emerging order.19 The 
eighteenth-century wave of enclosures in England were marked by intense resistance, 
shaping radical movements, with incidents recorded across centuries in England,  from 
hedge-breaking leading to invasions of land by landless populaces, to the organisation of 
mass movements of occupation.20 Nevertheless, historiography also indicates that not all 
resistance movements were opposing the accumulation of private property. Briony 
McDonagh and Carl Griffin, for example, retrace this history of land privatisation from the 
perspective of occupation movements, such as the Diggers and Levellers, as well as 
smaller-scale squatters' settlements formed by the landless populace, many of which 
overlooked or even encouraged by landowners.21 In fact, the authors remark that 
resistance was manifested both by the dispossessed and the accumulators, with 
occupations and counter-occupations, to suspend and reassert common use rights. The 
typical polarisation between the propertied few and the propertyless masses, as if they 
unequivocally reflected clear-cut polarised interests between economic improvement and 
reactionary movements, is not only historically inaccurate; it also simplifies the role played 
by law and emerging legal institutions at the time as a facilitator of changes. To illustrate 
the ambiguity of law, Polanyi contended that anti-enclosure legislation, widely construed 
as legal efforts to ‘oppose progress’, is more accurately interpreted as a series of 
endeavours which slowed down the rate of change in a way that precisely enabled it, by 
avoiding an unsustainable and self-destructive pace. 
Such legal practices progressively regulating the course of change have increasingly taken 
shape as a legal framework, and thus have increasingly been recognised as a proper ‘legal 
regime’. As a fundamental right in this framework, the concept of modern property paved 
 
18 Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation (Autonomidia 2014) 
62. 
19 Roger Manning, Village Revolts: Social Protest and Popular Disturbances in England, 1509-1640 (Clarendon 
Press 1988). 
20 Christopher Hill, as is widely known, also wrote about movements such as the Diggers, the Ranters, the 
Seekers and the Quakers as radical movements at the root of the English Revolution. Hill (n 12). 
See also Linebaugh (n 12). 
21 McDonagh and Griffin (n 9).  
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the way for the entire social contract tradition and natural law theories of John Locke, 
Thomas Hobbes and their liberal contemporaries who forged a ‘liberal-economistic model’ 
of the public-private divide.22  Premised on the idea of one’s labour added to the land, the 
labour theory of value by Adam Smith underwrote the emergent market economy by 
ascribing freed-up labour as the source of wealth of societies.23 However, its historical 
roots disclose forcible and illegal acts at the foundations of capital, many of which were 
eventually legitimised by active State intervention and legislation – a contradiction to be 
sustained throughout the history of capitalism.24  
As we shall see in chapter 2, the typically punitive measures recorded in legislations from 
different places and times – and often remaining today – hold a crucial role in portraying 
the poor as the outlaws, transgressors of a contract of orderly sociability. A recurring 
example to mention from that point in history are the ‘Bloody Laws’ introduced in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century and effective up to the early nineteenth century. 
Aimed at prescribing severe punishment and executions to transgressors, rogues and 
vagrants, the punitive cycle of class suppression worked, as Silvia Federici explains, at 
turning ‘vagabonds available for local exploitation’ into regimes of serfdom, enslavement 
and work discipline.25 An epochal change in attitudes towards the poor had thus been 
initiated, with the diasporic movement of itinerary workers. The hordes of paupers that 
invaded the cities incited fear, horror, hatred and perceptions of danger in relation to the 
pernicious behaviour of crowds, which further led to the solidification of an image of the 
populace as morally degenerate, vicious rabbles – ‘an ever-growing mass of immiserated 
people hurled into hopeless poverty […] with its hostile attitude to the rest of society and 
brute sense of indignant entitlement’26. Early modern political and economic theories, 
from liberal to critical traditions, reproduced these perceptions – from Thomas Hobbes’ 
references to the threats of the multitudo to Karl Marx’s reflections on the moral 
degeneration of the lumpenproletariat. Here lies a hybrid attitude (which will be explored 
in chapter 2), embedded in a hostility to the indolent poor, the fear of the dangerous poor, 
the fascination with the exotic poor, and ultimately hatred towards the ungrateful poor. 
 
22 Jeff Weintraub, ‘The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction’ in Jeff Weintraub and Krishan 
Kumar (eds), Public and Private in Thought and Practice (University of Chicago Press 1997). 
23 David Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital (Verso 2010). 
24 The intrinsic bond between state and private property, contained in the logic of a free market is one of the 
foundational contradictions analysed by David Harvey in Seven Contradictions and the End of Capitalism 
(London: Profile Books 2014). 
25 Federici (n 18) 11. 
26 Frank Ruda, Hegel's Rabble: An Investigation into Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Continuum 2011). 
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By the nineteenth century the ownership model of private property had been concretised 
and had transformed poverty into an increasingly urban problem. But what happened to 
the bulk of the population which lived from the soil? We hear about them from Marx 
himself, when he established the elements to be taken into account in his analysis of the 
process of accumulating capital for its continuous valorisation, i.e., the concentration and 
centralization of wealth towards growing productivity on the one side and an increasingly 
impoverished and superfluous working population on the other.27 Landed property turned 
into industrial capital, as the model of enterprise of the time, has formed ever-larger 
industrial towns populated by manufacturing workers, with mechanisation establishing 
specialisations and divisions of labour, and indeed new forms of class antagonism with 
poor workers and rich capitalists cohabiting the same urban landscape.28 In this urban, 
industrial setting, the masses of paupers have been either proletarianized by managing to 
take up industrial work, or left to form the surplus population that is excluded from 
productive relations but certainly not left without a social function, as will be argued. 
Engel’s observations of the situation of the working class in England also illustrate the 
population concentration as an effect of the centralising tendency of manufacture, the 
territorially separate slums and the degrading conditions of starvation, insalubriousness, 
disease and the self-righteous charitable attitude of the bourgeois towards the poor.29  
Although none of this is to suggest, from my part, a historically factual and uniform 
account of the origins of capital;30 Marx’s primitive accumulation – in fact, his response to 
the Smithian version of an idyllic capitalist origin – unravels a fundamental element that 
sets the process of accumulation in motion: its originary violence. The violence exemplified 
in Scotland’s ‘Highland clearances’, the displacement of landless rural populations, the 
illegal acts against people’s rights to the means of subsistence and production, the critical 
rates of urban growth, the livelihoods dependent on wages, the immiseration of living 
standards and the unemployment of the urban poor in general, are to be found in many 
other instances of expropriation and privatisation of land across the globe and in different 
periods of time. This is particularly relevant to this thesis, as I shall work with the 
 
27 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume I (first published 1867, Penguin Classics 1990). 
28 On the industrial urbanisation, see: Rosemary Sweet, The English Town, 1680-1840: Government, Society 
and Culture (Routledge 2014). 
29 Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working-Class in England (first published 1845, Progress Publishers 
1977). 
As will be described in chapter 2, many other writers at the time took up the task – indeed forming a literary 
movement – of observing, surveying and taking lodge amidst the poor to depict their living conditions.  
30 David Harvey is also categorical in stressing that Marx’s narrative of the increasing trend towards 
impoverishment of the working class is contingent on Marx’s assumptions about a ‘normal way’ of capital 
accumulation. Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital (n 23). 
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continuous re-instantiation of violence in poverty making as a premise, particularly the 
violence of knowledge, classification, regulation and intervention.31 In order to do this, I 
draw on Federici’s interpretation of the concept as assembling the ‘historical and logical 
conditions’ of capital which endure in continuing practices of primitive accumulation in 
any given phase of capitalist globalisation, as its precondition.32 David Harvey’s notion of 
accumulation by dispossession also frames this continuity in a useful way as it 
decentralises the proletarian, urban and industrial aspects as the sole or main sphere of 
capital production (and resistance).33 It also decentralises the sphere of production as the 
moving force of capital, and sides it with other circuits of accumulations and 
dispossessions such as that of trade and of finance. Finally, by conceiving the formation of 
poverty as detached from the production process and labour relations, it can also work at 
destabilising the differentiations between the working poor and the wretched poor, the 
proletariat and the lumpenproletariat, the deserving and the underserving poor. I will be 
evoking these gestures of violence in poverty’s production throughout the thesis by 
signalling that it is in the violent gesture of dispossession towards accumulation that 
entirely different modes of living come to be unified as the general designation of ‘the 
poor’ of the world. The production of poverty is here seen as a positive/active injustice 
upon populations and territories. Again, Silvia Federici’s historical investigation of the 
social position of women is relevant to this point as she demonstrates how capitalism is 
mostly productive of scarcity and accumulative of differences and divisions. 
In spite of the element of violence having been exposed very early on in theories of the 
origins of capital, ‘epiphenomenological’ interpretations of poverty predominated in the 
twentieth century social sciences, where poverty became a consolidated object of 
scientific inquiry. Various theories have been forged attempting to explain poverty, its 
causes and its required responses, and forming the conjuncture of the circuits that I am 
investigating in this thesis – to know and to fix poverty.34 As a rule, these theories 
taxonomize populations and territories into variables to explain poverty, namely in terms 
of people’s needs versus the environment’s resources. On the one hand, within the 
population-centred theories that have thrived as both scientific and common-sense 
 
31 As will be discussed, with critical geography, property is continually enacted and enforced through violence 
which, far from being exceptional, is fundamentally articulated and justified by law. See Nicholas Blomley, 
‘Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the Survey, and the Grid’ (2003) 93(1) Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers 121. 
32 Federici (n 18) 63. 
33 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press 2005). 
34 On how the fixing poverty has become a challenge shared by science and politics, for example: Jeffrey 
Sachs, The End of Poverty (Penguin Group 2005). 
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consensuses, Thomas Malthus is the most prominent precursor, with his theory that 
population growth in the face of limited food supplies will eventually necessitate measures 
of demographic control. Other widely accepted explanations consider issues of 
demographic explosion, overpopulation, rural exodus and migration as causes of hyper-
urbanisation, where cities are unable to support the population increase and the labour 
market is rendered unable to absorb such flows of population.35 Needless to say that these 
approaches have been criticised for laying the blame of the ‘urban crisis’ on the 
impoverished ‘masses’ themselves.36 The territorial emphases, on the other hand, examine 
poverty in terms of its milieu. They have been expressed in terms of geographic and 
climate factors, contrasting abundance and scarcity, as well as biological predisposition, 
contrasting diligence and idleness. They also concern cultural conditions of poverty,37 
degradations of urban life, and later on a global scale, socioeconomic dualism with which 
the poor resist progress and economic improvements.38 These approaches have typically 
been criticised for their deterministic and moralising views which portrayed poverty as 
demoralisation and, at an extreme, supported scientific racism. 
Instead of revisiting such theories, tracing a history of ideas that has already been so 
deeply investigated,39 I would like to review the variables of population and territory not 
as causes but as effects, that is in terms of how they are continually affected by the legal 
regime of property and modulated into in the ‘image and likeness’ of poverty. The so 
called proletarianization of populations creates the paupers, rogues, vagabonds, vagrants, 
tramps, beggars and robbers. The expropriation of the soil and continual expulsions form 
slums, ghettos and informal settlements. It is in these affected shapes and forms, taken as 
pure or natural samples, that the abovementioned theorisations try to find in them 
general and causal explanations of poverty. I will later argue (in chapter 2) that legal 
responses to poverty facilitate and consolidate such images of poverty, gathering around 
consensuses, turning scientific formulations into ontological realities – what will later 
(chapter 3) be termed a shift from quantification to qualification. What is relevant at this 
 
35 For example, see in John Friedman and Tomas Lackinton, ‘Hyperurbanization and National Development in 
Chile: Some Hypotheses’ 1967 2(4) Urban Affairs Quarterly 3. 
36 Milton Santos, Urban Poverty [In Portuguese: Pobreza Urbana] (first published 1978, Edusp 2013). 
37 Oscar Lewis, ‘The Culture of Poverty’ (1966) 215(4) Scientific American 19. 
38 Examples of which are: Julius H Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified by 
Indonesia (Institute of Pacific Relations 1953); Richard S Eckaus, ‘The Factor Proportions Problem in 
Underdeveloped Areas’ (1955) 45(4) The American Economic Review 539. 
39 Martin Ravallion, The Economics of Poverty: History, Measurement and Policy (Oxford University Press 
2016); Pete Alcock, Understanding Poverty (Palgrave Macmillan 2006); Alice O'Connor, Poverty Knowledge: 
Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History (Princeton University Press 2002); 
Santos (n 36). 
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early stage of the argument is to demonstrate how the concept of modern property and 
the corresponding modern legal infrastructures effectively produce poverty. Surely the 
political socioeconomic interpretation of poverty as a by-product of wealth – the 
accumulation of misery that corresponds to the accumulation of wealth, as Marx wrote – 
is crucial for understanding the machinery of capital.40 What I am arguing does not dispute 
this perspective but refutes readings that turn poverty into a secondary construction, a 
mere consequence of the accumulation and concentration of wealth. Integrating poverty 
as an active formation, one that plays a distinctive role in how social interactions are 
organised, allows for a series of other insights about the legal implications of poverty as an 
injustice upon populations and territories. What is the ‘nature’ of such injustice? I describe 
it in terms of the spatial and temporal configurations that frame populations and 
territories in a way that will later be discussed as legal-aesthetic modulations. 
 
1.2 Global expansion of poverty 
Yet, a substantial part of this legal history of property and propertylessness is missing. The 
origins of modern property law, thus far told with Europe situated at its centre is, 
nonetheless, a global history. The European historiography – both classic and critical – 
often presupposes an understanding of the colonial enterprise as a model of assimilation 
and transference, opening up new frontiers for accumulation through the transplant of 
European modernity (and private property) into new territories.  The English-pioneered 
transformations recounted in the previous section are frequently suggested to be a 
‘hotbed of the making of the tools of colonial governance’.41 This narrative accounts for a 
version of colonialism which established the geopolitical divisions of the world still in place 
today: the centres and the peripheries, or perhaps more problematically the ‘Global North’ 
and the ‘Global South’. Although this narrative plays an important role in the project of 
demystifying the brutal binary that installed a supposed European universality and its 
subaltern world, it is nonetheless a simplification.42 It conveys a linear and unidirectional 
chain of causation which undermines the complex threads of imperial expansion and 
colonial conquest, and misguides an interpretation of what is commonly termed ‘capital 
expansion’ in the world today.   
 
40 Marx (n 27) 798. 
41 As is the case in McDonagh and Griffin (n 9) 10. 
42 Important critics of the European universality in these terms are Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, In Other 
Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (Routledge 2006); Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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Instead, the history of modern private property, and of Western modernity for that 
matter, is inherently colonial. Rather than an expansion simply resulting from an overflow 
of enlightened, sovereign power and of capital requiring new territories and markets, 
colonies and empires were mutually constructed as history unfolded. The formation of 
nation-states, of liberal law and of colonial rule are fundamental and mutually implicated 
components of what came to be called modernity and capitalism. For example, the 
elementary process of demarcating borders of both nation-states and of extended 
territories in the early modern period was never assertive and unambiguous, as Tamar 
Herzog describes in the case of Iberian empires.43 Territorial delimitations in both colonies 
and in metropoles – in the ‘new’ and the ‘old world’ – were gradually defined by land 
appropriations and the rites of conflict for land possession, instead of what is commonly 
believed to have predominantly been a fixture by state treaties and papal bulls within 
sovereign and expansionist ventures.44 That is to say, like the fences enclosing property in 
land, it all started with a disputed and negotiated trace on the map, or more precisely a 
meridian line of demarcation cutting the world in half in 1494.45 From then on, the world’s 
borders and territories continued to be redesigned, disputed and reclaimed.  
It goes without saying that violence is a key component of the global formation of property 
and propertylessness. The conflicts and treaties which led to the Westphalian system of 
sovereign nation-states along with the long history of dividing territories in colonial lands 
have long been narrated as an indisputably violent history of exploitation, appropriation, 
domination, genocide and enslavement.46 The point here, however, is that the violent 
gestures transcend conflicts and unilateral authority and indeed reveal a process of mutual 
determination which not only defined the overseas dominated territories but also the very 
centres of their production. Therefore, this history of violence is one of knowledge 
production and world-making. It has been established by critical scholarships that former 
colonies have been (and indeed continue to be) largely administered as legal, economic 
 
43 Tamar Herzog, Frontiers of Possession:  Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas (Harvard University 
Press 2015). 
44 This use of Herzog’s legal history, which presents territorial claims to property as a prevalent force defining 
the nation-State is not to undermine that later partitions of the middle east and of African countries were 
arbitrarily and normatively defined by imperialist powers and its bureaucrats, disregarding territorial 
occupations by different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. On this point, see Alberto Alesina, Janina 
Matuszeski and William Easterly, ‘Artificial States’ (2011) 9(2) Journal of the European Economic Association 
246. 
45 The Treaty of Tordesillas initially divided the New World between the Portuguese Empire and the Spanish 
Empire. See: André Gunder Frank, World Accumulation, 1492-1789 (Palgrave Macmillan1978). 
46 See Alexis J A Nakagawa, ‘Cannibal Laws: The Juridical Forms of Conquest and the Emergence of 
International Law’ (PhD Thesis, University of London 2019). 
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and technological laboratories.47 In the next chapter I attempt to raise this two-way flow 
of determination by indicating that definitions of poverty (knowledge and intervention), 
typically attributed to Europe and North America as centres of production, are more 
adequately viewed as historically formed by using the rest of the world as a laboratory for 
experiments, methodological refinement and not-so-randomised controlled trials which 
may or may not rebound on the populations and territories of these very centres. Hence, it 
is important to recognise how experiences in colonies have shaped the world and set the 
tone for modern sociotechnical innovations. 
Many studies demonstrate how legal innovations have been tested in colonial territories 
before being implemented in Europe. For example, by highlighting the role of colonial 
formation in the origin of the consolidation of modern property rights, Sarah Keenan 
explicates the innovation of the Torrens System of land title registration in the late 19th 
century, initiated in colonised territories under the system common law (Australia, New 
Zealand and then Canada) before being incorporated into the metropolis (England). In fact, 
Keenan remarks, dominium of colonial territories was a factor which created the urgency 
to change land property titles, whereas the British aristocracy relied on the system of title 
deeds (based on the retrospective history of physical possession of land) and resisted the 
change to acts of registration. It was the need to secure ownership of ‘new’ land, deemed 
empty and with no history of possession, that propelled a new management system 
beyond the Common Law – thus legally erasing local ownership histories.48 Grounded on a 
legal fiction, title registration is premised on future values of land being treated as present 
facts, enabling trade’s acceleration. Important insights arise from this configuration, of 
which two are particularly valuable in this thesis.49 First, titles seemingly represent reality 
but actually manufacture reality as seemingly natural, i.e., they create what they 
purportedly describe. Second, the Torrens system only reflects the objects that are 
brought to the registry, rendering unregistered relationships with land inexistent on 
records, invisible to the ‘legal view’. The Torrens system also exemplifies how legal orders 
work to produce differentiated categories of populations and territories. By establishing a 
 
47 For example, Adam Moe Fejerskov, ‘The New Technopolitics of Development and the Global South as a 
Laboratory of Technological Experimentation’ (2017) 42(5) Science, Technology, & Human Values 947. 
Also, with a more specific emphasis on legal history, Nasser Hussain, Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism 
and the Rule of Law (University of Michigan Press 2003).  
48 Sarah Keenan, ‘Smoke, Curtains and Mirrors: The Production of Race Through Time and Title Registration’ 
(2017) 28(1) Law and Critique 87. 
49 Although they are not the focus in this chapter, these insights inspire the discussion that I develop in 
chapter 3, where I explore poverty quantification as effecting qualification, and chapter 4, where I discuss the 
legal uses of poverty inscribed data as poverty facts. 
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temporal order, which effaces history and looks forward to a ‘colonised future’ of 
speculative market transactions, the operations of title registry produce social categories 
in terms of backwardness and progress, primitive and advanced, which ‘materialise as 
race’.50  
Private property and property rights have thus historically been inaugurated in the context 
of both liberal state formation and colonial expansion, establishing temporal-racial 
divisions.51 In that regard, it is often taken for granted that European claims to universality 
developed in the colonial era – and the establishment of a modern narrative of progress 
relegating occupied territories and peoples as backward – was an operational effect, 
rather than a cause, of the idea of progress and development, i.e. a linear spectrum in 
which ‘moderns’ are naturally situated in the lead.52 Social categorisation and racialisation 
are thus intimately connected to an evolutionist perception of time and history which 
assigns primacy to certain categories in contrast to the primitivism of others by means of 
legal techniques.53 To prefigure the argument that I will develop in the next chapters, legal 
techniques, as such, operate in the mediation between knowledge and the concrete 
manifestations which confirm the knowledge. In the practices of knowledge production 
and the visualisation of poverty, legal techniques do the work of selecting (I will call this 
sampling) in the material world that which fits the general, pre-established concept of 
poverty and eliminating that which has been left out of the frame, thus activating a binary 
code to ascribe that which is seen and that which is not, that which will be acknowledged 
by law and that which will be deemed illegal or indeed inexistent. 
It is also within the capitalist-colonial temporal ordering that the correlation of race and 
poverty is substantiated. As established above, the regime of property is premised not 
only in the accumulation of wealth but also in the accumulations of difference,54 but these 
are not limited to the distinction between property owners and the propertyless 
dispossessed. Such differences affect the territorial and populational configurations of the 
world by separating (or ordering into spectrums) the civilised and primitive; cultured and 
 
50 Keenan (n 48) 
51 What Brenna Bhandar defines as ‘racial regimes of ownership’. Brenna Bhandar, Colonial Lives of Property: 
Law, Land and Racial Regimes of Ownership (Duke University Press 2018) 
52 See also Emily Grabham, Brewing Legal Times: Things, Form, and the Enactment of Law (University of 
Toronto Press 2016).  
53 For example, Nadine El-Enany analyses British immigration law as sustaining a global racial order in the 
contemporary colonial space, based on race as an ordering principle. Racial ordering, in that regard, is a 
process of legal categorisation that renders entire populations ‘readable as inferior’ to the Western world. 
Nadine El-Enany, Bordering Britain: Law, Race and Empire (Manchester University Press 2020). 
54 An expression I take from Silvia Federici as she addresses gendered differentiation in primitive 
accumulation by raising its inherent accumulation of differences and divisions. Federici (n 18) 63. 
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native; enlightened and savage; white and non-white, to name a few markers of 
differentiation.55 The inscription and arrangement of difference is at the heart of the 
emergence of the modern episteme, as Michel Foucault notoriously excavated – the early 
formative practices of human sciences inherited from the classical taxonomic formalisation 
of categories which remain operative to measure and manage difference.56 In that light, 
Denise Ferreira da Silva defines raciality as an onto-epistemological frame of ordering, a 
‘political-symbolic toolbox’ that ‘produces the racial subaltern’ as well as the ‘the juridical 
architectures and procedures of the global present’ which distinguishes the persons and 
places of the proper economic subject.57  
In a similar vein, Oscar Guardiola-Rivera remarks on the role of economic imperatives in 
determining parameters of human regulation, by which the northern, western legal–
political tradition is the unique referent – the very standard of humanity in contrast to 
which other normative cosmologies are measured. In reference to Claude Levi-Strauss’s 
recounting of the investigation into the nature of the Amerindians, Guardiola-Rivera 
indicates how ‘fact-finding commissions’ determined their incapacity to live as 
autonomous economic agents – based on their reported lack of work ethics, absent 
notions of private property, not to mention cannibalistic tendencies – thus establishing a 
preponderant factor in their proclaimed status of (non)humanity.58 Similarly, the 
anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro recounts the formation of the category ‘natives’ 
from the interruption of the organic relations between indigenous peoples and land. In 
that account, the ‘experts of generalisation’ – Europeans, whites, yankees, westerns, 
moderns – transcendently unify peoples into a general category of native in order to 
situate them within a continuum of transfiguration into ‘poor’. The conceptual figuration 
of native, in other words, enables their posterior figuration as citizens, as poor citizens.59 
This is what I meant in the introduction to this thesis by stating that all the poors of the 
world, today and in the past, are nothing but an essentially unified entity under the 
 
55 As is the case, from Federici’s own perspective, of gender differentiation, or what today is termed the 
feminisation of poverty. Federici (n 18). 
56 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (Vintage Books 1994). 
57 Denise Ferreira da Silva, ‘No-Bodies: Law, Raciality and Violence’ (2014) 9(1) Meritum 132. 
58 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, ‘Human Rights and Latin American Southern Voices’ in Upendra Baxi, Christopher 
McCrudden and Abdul Paliwala (eds), Law’s Ethical, Global and Theoretical Contexts: Essays in Honour of 
William Twining (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
59 Viveiros de Castro uses, for this argument, the term ‘indians’ (Índios) as per the mythology of the 
conquistadors who encountered the new world on their way to India. I translate the term as ‘natives’ in 
reference to one of the terms used in English which carries a similar derogatory tone. ‘Índios’ are not simply 
indigenous, as in originary, autochthone peoples, but ‘natives’ – a historically charged totalising category. 
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, ‘The Involuntaries of the Homeland: Praise to Underdevelopment’ [In Portuguese: 
‘Os Involuntários da Pátria: Elogio do Subdesenvolvimento’] (Caderno de Leituras 65, Chão da Feira 2017). 
40 
 
totalising marker of ‘the poor’. The unifying moment is indeed that of the gaze, the 
perspectivist encounter in which the nonpoor sees and modulates the poor as difference. 
Here lies a crucial point that inspires the peculiar approach that I adopt in this thesis. To 
challenge the epistemic violence of Western, modern thought – that which frames poverty 
as an inherent lack – is to bring forth a perspectivist reading of encounters that organise 
worlds.60 That is to say: rather than stable identities (poor and rich), in this thesis I speak of 
mutually implicated positionalities, i.e., the position seen as poor and the position of the 
nonpoor who gazes at the poor. This encounter, I argue, is fundamentally aesthetic, 
guided by a foundational gaze. This is the argument to which I will get in chapter 5. 
Thus, it is from the colonial encounter that modern property law has been shaped to 
secure exclusive ownership – exclusive to a determined modern economic subject and 
excluding a very well defined unsuitable economic subject (unfit, indolent, work-shy, 
frivolous, subprime persons and nations). In no time, the subprime would become the 
precise target of profitable economic investments predestined to failure and unpayable 
debts.61 Again, that the colonial encounter formed modern private property and property 
rights is not a loose statement meant to redress the discursive injustice of the colonialist 
narrative of history – which is a valid project nonetheless. Instead, it refers to the concrete 
ways in which the legal and political structures of both colonies and empires were 
historically formed. Marxist scholars have long made this point, under the indication that 
capitalism is a global project, which is to say, capital’s planetary expansion is the factor 
which allowed it to coalesce as a mode of material, cultural and intellectual production in 
the first place.62 Instead of a consequence, it is its originating drive. In other words, 
without an international division of labour, i.e., if left limited to the western-European 
world, it would not have been conceivable for this mode of production to advance and 
reproduce itself. I have explained that I do not set out to narrate this history through the 
lenses of capitalism because capitalism itself is, here, construed as historically emergent, 
 
60 The contrast between this logic and the Amerindian perspectivist and multinaturalist approach formulated 
in Viveiros de Castro’s anthropology, is usefully explored in Bethânia A Assy and Rafael Rolo, ‘The Inventive 
Embodiment of Oneself from the Perspective of the Other: Notes to a Decolonial Anthropophilosophy in 
Viveiros de Castro’ [In Portuguese: ‘A Concretização Inventiva de Si a partir da Perspectiva do Outro: Notas a 
uma Antropofilosofia Decolonial em Viveiros de Castro’] (2019) 10(4) Direito e Práxis 2367.  
It is based on a ‘radical performative ethics’, proposed by these authors against a transcendent ‘logic of lack’ 
in Western thought, that I build my argument here, seeking to deconstruct the essentialising 
conceptualisation of poverty. 
61 Paula Chakravartty and Denise Ferreira da Silva, ‘Accumulation, Dispossession, and Debt: The Racial Logic of 
Global Capitalism—An Introduction’ (2012) 64(3) American Quarterly 361. 
62 David Harvey, ‘Globalization and the “Spatial Fix”’ (2001) 2 geographische revue 23. 
Also in Federici (n 18). 
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rather than a motor of history.63 A much more interesting endeavour seems to be to 
inquire what the global perspective of such historical unfoldings can offer in terms of 
critique. As Frantz Fanon famously remarked ‘In the colonies the economic infrastructure 
is also a superstructure. The cause is effect: You are rich because you are white, you are 
white because you are rich. This is why a Marxist analysis should always be slightly 
stretched when it comes to addressing the colonial issue’.64 
Poverty manifests in the territorial and populational aesthetic distribution at the same 
time that it involves the distribution of material means. Whilst the material grounds of 
poverty are widely explored in the literature of poverty research, I would like to explore 
the aesthetics of poverty, its formative configurations, it’s appearances and 
disappearances in space and time. To that effect, I claim that law’s spatial and temporal 
orderings and imaging are at the heart of the aesthetic dimensions of poverty. The same 
meridian trace that in the late fifteenth century split the world between two empires and 
inaugurated a whole new era of colonial occupation – despite its permanent redefinition 
into curves, cuts and nodes – continues to draw today new territories and new frontiers. 
The most meaningful global divisions at present divide north and south, west and east. 
Yet, as we know, these are fluid in order to redress the ‘geographic injustices’ of nations 
awkwardly positioned on the globe. The ‘Global South’, euphemism for the peripheries of 
global capitalism, manifests in the most inescapable ways the abovementioned sustained 
historical and logical conditions of capital. Continuities between past and present surpass 
any sense of legacy of effects and are, in fact, active and operative instantiations. For 
example, Torrens-like titled land registration systems continue to be persistently 
promoted by multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF in the 
name of a model of prosperity, wherein property ownership becomes the key to opening 
up land markets to international investments – and thus generating further global 
problems that such institutions will themselves attempt to tackle.65  
Indeed, in the more recent history of globalisation and market integration, the proprietary 
gestures of enclosure are continually restaged as another ‘great transformation’ that takes 
place in the world today. Kari Polanyi Levitt termed it ‘the great financialization’, as 
 
63 Which is not to say that it cannot be both. However, as I have indicated above, my attempt is precisely to 
eschew a perspective of capitalistic poverty from within the capitalist frame of analysis as my own 
contribution to the literature that I work with and which largely develops such analysis. 
64 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (first published 1961, Penguin Books 2001) 31. 
65 Keenan (n 48). 
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continuation of Karl Polanyi’s aforementioned account of the birth of market economy.66 It 
is a distinctive feature of financial capitalism, as David Harvey says, that rent extraction 
supersedes productive capital surplus value.67 Under this model of accumulating wealth, 
i.e. the unproductive rentier capital of speculative profit, individual ownership is still the 
fundamental force of dispossession and territorial exclusion. Broadly speaking, 
financialization is the term used to designate the ongoing expansion of the financial 
market into domains of everyday life, which includes the financial inclusion of populations 
and territories hitherto ‘unbanked’, by means of social policy and international 
development aid provided by multilateral financial organisations or corporate foundations 
(with pension schemes, security funds,  microloans, microcredit and micro-insurance).68 I 
will address this reorientation of microfinance as a response to global poverty in chapters 
2 and 4. For the time being, it suffices to indicate that in the so-called ‘age of finance’, new 
models of global dispossession, displacement and social categorisation are also reinvented 
– for example by the facilitation of rent-seeking practices and debt dependency. If, on the 
one hand, novel practices of expropriation are configured primarily through financial 
operations, on the other hand, old classificatory and space-distributive dynamics continue 
to be active, as new forms of the same logic open new frontiers of investment.  
It is here that the economically dispossessed – deemed high-risk when measured against 
the rational, self-interested, industrious economic subject – becomes a profitable target of 
finance. Denise Ferreira da Silva and Paula Chakravartty address the ‘unpayable debt’ as a 
profitable investment in segments made unable to pay back their debts, by means of high-
interest microfinance loans, what Silvia Federici termed the ‘debt economy’ and the 
production of mass indebtedness.69 By assimilating the propertyless and subprime 
borrowers into renewed versions of categorisation and displacements – regimes of debt, 
foreclosure, austerity, profiling, redlining – the colonial logics of finance reveals itself as, 
once again, taking racial differences as an ordering measure and determinant factor in risk 
calculations.70 This logic was made brutally evident in the so-called subprime crisis in the 
USA, which disproportionately affected black and Latino populations at the same pace that 
it blamed such populations for the crash. It is the same logic that has operated in 
 
66 Kari Polanyi Levitt, From the Great Transformation to the Great Financialization (Zed Books 2013). 
67 David Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism (Oxford University Press 2014) 241. 
68 What Servaas Storm characterised as ‘the financialization of everything’, in Servaas Storm, ‘Financialization 
and Economic Development: A Debate on the Social Efficiency of Modern Finance’ (2018) 49(2) Development 
and Change 302. 
69 Silvia Federici, ‘From Commoning to Debt: Financialization, Microcredit, and the Changing Architecture of 
Capital Accumulation’ (2014) 113(2) South Atlantic Quarterly 231. 
70 Chakravartty and Ferreira da Silva (n 61).  
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‘structurally adjusted’ Africa, Latin America and Asia since the 1980s – profiting from 
‘lending money to persons and nations precisely because they would not be able to pay it 
back’.71 Profiting from those deemed economically unsuitable indeed seems to be an 
operative and overarching norm of global capital.72 It is present in the predatory lending 
addressed by Ananya Roy, which charges high interest rates and enforces repayment upon 
the world’s poorest73 and under which financial failure often incurs more than 
displacement, but indeed violence and expulsion. ‘Racial banishment’ is the concept 
coined by Roy to describe a legally-sanctioned violence of ‘expulsion from everywhere’ 
which permanently marginalises black, brown and poor bodies and communities from the 
urban landscape, as a historical foundation to property.74  
As will be discussed, financialization is also the leading-edge principle behind international 
agendas to alleviate poverty, having upgraded ‘financial inclusion’, particularly via 
microcredit to promote ‘inclusive economic growth’, to the status of a human right. Philip 
Mader examined the mechanism through which microfinance translates poverty into 
financial relations, which ends up reshaping the very concept of poverty as lack of 
finance.75 In other words, financialization of poverty entails an interpretation of it as a 
financial problem – again, to be fixed – and its alleged solution would rest in renewed 
models of extraction and accumulation of wealth. The upgraded ‘satanic mill’ of our times 
is informed by a global policy model that promotes purchase via credit, micro-finance and 
the intervention of international financial institutions. Rather than a historical fact in the 
origins of capitalism, a form that enabled the unfolding of global history as we know it, 
property is a continuing technological operation, a logic that sustains the continuing 
process of its own reproduction and expansion despite its wide-ranging transformations. 
Besides the colonial logic that is continually re-enacted (rather than simply remaining or 
leaving a legacy), another point of historical clarification that needs to be raised in this 
section refers to the formation of urban poverty. The typical formula available in the 
historical narratives above, is that industrialisation led to urbanisation, along with the 
formation of the masses of the ‘urban poor’ who migrated from rural areas.76 It is common 
 
71 Chakravartty and Ferreira da Silva (n 61) 364.  
72 Guardiola-Rivera (n 58), recounts of Amerindians’ said incapacity of living as autonomous economic agents. 
73 Ananya Roy, Poverty Capital: Microfinance and the Making of Development (Taylor & Francis 2010). 
74 Ananya Roy, ‘Racial Banishment’ in Antipode Editorial Collective (eds) Keywords in Radical Geography: 
Antipode at 50 (Willey Blackwell 2019). 
75 Philip Mader, The Political Economy of Microfinance: Financializing Poverty (Palgrave Macmillan 2015). 
76 This is a typical albeit not undisputed narrative of the ‘modern’ European city, as can be found in Kirsten 
Campbell, ‘The City of Law’ (2013) 9(2) International Journal of Law in Context 203. 
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to see this narrative adapted to the postcolonial world which, despite an alleged historical 
delay, also faced processes of urbanisation related to private property regimes of land and 
growing industrial labour. Thus positioned in a line of progression (or civilisation or 
evolution), the massive contingent of poor communities settled in precarious, 
overcrowded, self-built and informal settlements in cities across the ‘Global South’ – 
‘slums’ to use a term which is now in decay – are construed as performing their very own, 
though tardy, urban revolutions, following Europe’s lead centuries ago. Nonetheless, 
urbanist Raquel Rolnik observes that intensive urban growth – accompanied by precarious 
housing conditions and indeed housing deficit – in peripheric countries in the 1980s and 
1990s is not quite connected to industrialisation but indeed to a trend of retracting public 
spending, particularly affecting social housing policies across the ‘Global South’. Much of 
this trend has been driven by international programmes of economic restructuring based 
on fiscal adjustments and austerity in close connection with financial and rentier capital 
expansion premised on land speculation.77 Although informal, irregular and often 
criminalised, such settlements have been the norm in accommodating the urban poor 
since the birth of the first industrial towns in Victorian England to today’s ‘urban boom’ 
and sustained rural exodus.78 Yet, differing from industrial town slums – which have had 
their own share of clearance and annihilation – Rolnik explains that the transformation of 
private property into financial assets engenders a new role for the land occupied by the 
poor, that is to function as reserves for rent extraction, permanently at risk of being taken 
up by financial capital. This, in turn, engenders renewed dynamics of continual territorial 
displacement of impoverished populations, via a global model of urban development 
premised on evictions, social cleansing, stigmatisation of territories and incarceration or 
extermination of people. The advancement of a global model of land and housing 
financialization that prioritises individual, private, registered freehold property over other 
forms of tenure is premised both on the economic value of land and on the expectation of 
future revenue that a property title secures for speculation. As mentioned above, this 
model engenders renewed dynamics of tenure insecurity – if one happens to be a non-
owner in a world of owners79 – and a state of ‘permanent transience’ of informal 
settlements occupying urban land with the constant risk of the territorial asset being 
despoiled.80 
 
77 Raquel Rolnik, Urban Warfare: Housing Under the Empire of Finance (Verso 2019). 
78 Mike Davis, Planet of Slum (Verso 2006). 
79 Baron (n 3). 
80 Rolnik (n 77) 114. 
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The periphery of global capitalism, however, is seen as still struggling to catch up with the 
incomplete project of modernity, and in this view lies the self-asserted mission of 
international organisations (multilateral financial institutions and corporate foundations) 
to sponsor modernising projects in the ‘developing world’, by re-instantiating a colonial 
governance which has been rebranded as state-building. The position I sought to convey in 
this section, however – following important scholars from those corners of the world81 – is 
that the peripheries of global capitalism are part and parcel of the Western modern 
developmentalist project. Again, in the contrasting view of the obverse side, the so-called 
‘Global South’ is the mirrored flipside of the ‘Global North’, i.e., the dispossession of one 
matching the accumulation of the other. Ultimately, my argument here is that property is 
indeed the organising principle of poverty in global capitalism. But property as such is to 
be understood in its aesthetic terms which evoke sense-making and world-making 
components: spatial, temporal, geopolitical, economic, racial, gendered, exclusionary, 
segregational, and violent gestures. Poverty, in that light, is not simply the negative effect 
of property (a pure lack or misdistribution of material resources). Poverty is a positive 
construction, a positive ‘wrong’ which accompanies the modern, liberal conception of 
property and enables its production. A reiteration of displacements and social 
categorisations takes place – from the enclosures of the sixteenth century; the 
colonisation of the ‘new world’ which formed the peripheries of the world; the 
industrialisation of the eighteenth century which formed masses of urban poor; all the way 
to the financialization of the cities and of its ‘unbanked’ masses. I will now loon into the 
spatial configurations of urban poverty from this perspective of an active and violent 
injustice that modulates and territorialises poverty at the margins of the city. 
 
1.3 The violent gestures of poverty production: modulations of territories and 
populations 
I have established that the ‘capitalistic’ explicative system of poverty is built on the 
modern concept of property, the causes of which diverge according to interpretations and 
selections of predominant variables, as established above. Poverty research, it has been 
introduced, predominantly refers to poverty as a form of propertylessness and its 
variations of lack of individually and exclusively owned material resources (lack of income, 
lack of savings, lack of credit, and so on). As a consequence, responses to the ‘problem of 
poverty’ go so far as to promote transference of resources in various forms – ranging from 
 
81 In reference to fn 2 in this thesis’ introduction. 
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direct material and food provision to monetised forms of social benefits, cash transfers 
and, more recently, microcredit to help the poor to find their own way out of poverty. As I 
shall argue now, these responses are attributed to the modern objectification of property 
into a thing of possession, a material object that either one owns or one does not.82 Under 
this token, even for critical approaches, poverty stands as a constitutive outside to 
property, its epiphenomenon as discussed above, which typically evokes moral theories of 
fair distribution in response.83 But if we take property to be a social relation mediated by 
legal techniques – formed by a series of social preconditions and formative of a series of 
concrete effects – it becomes clear how the notion of ‘lack’ naturalises dispossession in 
the image of ‘poverty’ as a problem of misdistribution. In this thesis as a whole, I am 
particularly interested in the effects of such a naturalisation that maintains an ‘ontological 
structure of a pure I, and a pure other’ and works towards assimilation, integration, and 
depoliticised inclusion84. Yet, instead of revisiting the important debate on political 
subjectivity embedded in experiences of injustice, I analyse the abovementioned effects of 
naturalisation (or ontologisation, essentialisation) as, first and foremost, aesthetic effects, 
which subsequently lead to a series of other kinds of social, economic and political effects 
– that is to say, the latter depend on how poverty is seen in the world in the first place.  
In order to lay the groundwork for this investigation, in this chapter I aimed to reconstitute 
the link between poverty and property in regard to the other aspects that compose 
property and, accordingly, also compose poverty. I am referring to the abovementioned 
‘historical and logical’ preconditions concerning property’s originary violence.85 In that 
case, rather than a passive lack, poverty ascription works as an active function of 
propertylessness. But, then, what is propertylessness if not simply a material lack? I 
underlined two elements that are active in the continual enactment and enforcement of 
property: displacement and categorisation. These elements encapsulate a series of acts of 
violence typically found in accounts of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, such as 
evictions, expulsions, deprivations, segregations, alienations, demarcations and 
classification. It has been established that these acts are not secondary in the formation of 
private property. They are, rather, constitutive and active components of property. 
 
82 On the objectification of property relations, see for example: Blomley, ‘Territory of Property’ (n 14) 599.  
83 A notorious example being Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Penguin Books 2009).  
84 Bethânia A Assy, ‘The Subject of Discrimination: Factual Life, Empowerment, and Being Political’ (2018) 13 
La Revue des Droits de L'Homme 2. 
85 Federici, Caliban and the Witch (n 18). 
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Moreover, they are not historical events, left in the past. Instead, violent gestures are 
constantly re-enacted in every proprietary dynamic occurring in global capitalism today. 
Thinking in aesthetic terms, displacement and categorisation mobilise two compositional 
elements: population and territory. Poverty’s displaced spatiality (its territorial 
composition) and classificatory scheme (its populational composition) combine as 
complimentary features irreducible to each other. Drawing from critical legal geography, 
territories and populations present the material inscription – in the soil and in bodies – of 
immaterial social relations.86 The culmination of the argument that I develop in this thesis 
will bring us to these mundane materialities in chapter 5. As such, immaterial social 
dimensions are materially implicated and become materialised by being carved into soil 
and bodies. As such, populations and territories of/in poverty are created and modulated 
at the same pace as poverty emerges as an existing condition in the world – the condition 
materially displayed and evidenced precisely by such modulated populations and 
territories. This is the point at which knowledge practices transition into intervention 
practices, with a particular contribution from legal techniques that will be explored in the 
next chapter. Population and territory provide the material base of poverty upon which 
law further deploys its techniques of visualisation.87 Whilst the workings of legal 
techniques entail compositionality and governance – with both sociotechnical and 
biopolitical effects, as Brighenti remarks – I am interested in compositionality, as it evokes 
legal-aesthetic modulations of territories and populations of poverty.88 I will later explore 
how this legal composition is instrumental to the tasks of knowing and intervening upon 
poverty in the world – i.e. to the crafts of science and politics. 
Thus, poverty comes to be the result of a legal ascription of a poverty form and content. As 
a legal composition, poverty is formed through legal techniques that shape, arrange and 
contain populations and territories. Nicholas Blomley’s work on the violent geographies of 
property is useful to elucidate this point.89 Property follows what Blomley describes as a 
topographical logic that delineates shapes into surfaces, mediated by visual inscriptions 
 
86 To develop this point, I draw on Andrea Mubi Brighenti’s definition of territory as the point of convergence 
between the material and the immaterial, between spaces and relationships. Andrea Mubi Brighenti, ‘Lines, 
Barred Lines. Movement, Territory and the Law’ (2010) 6(3) International Journal of Law in Context 217. 
87 In that regard, law works as an imaging technology that enables visualisation of unified objects for 
impending interventions. This understanding of the visual role of law will be examined in chapters 2 and 3. 
88 Governance, as we shall see, concerns the circuits of intervention which law enables by means of its noting, 
recording and writing. The workings of law in intervention tend to be overlooked, by making them one and 
the same thing. In this thesis, I attempt to advance beyond this elision by formulating a more unique role 
played by law. As I have indicated already, it is commonplace that law’s inscriptions serve the interests of the 
propertied, a point already consecrated in the critical literature, and one which I do not wish to restate. 
89 Blomley, ‘Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence’ (n 31). 
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(maps, grids, surveys, title registration) and indeed visual materials (fences, hedges, 
huts).90 Through the drawing and policing of boundaries, property is territorially and 
populationally organised, or in Blomley’s terms, property renders spaces and bodies 
orderly, ‘legible and actionable’.91 The cartographic technique of inscriptions, for example, 
forms new modes of visualising space through a linear perspective, stabilising the modern 
subject as the spectator positioned at the vanishing point. Removed from social context, 
the individuated subjects and objects of property, the foundations of modernity as we 
have seen, appear as a priori, pre-social categories of rights-bearing possessive individuals 
(legal subjects) and the objectified ‘things’ of property that are imagined as separate units. 
The ‘troubling presence’ of others who threaten the fixed and bounded object of property 
with their mere physical presence as well as the identity of the ‘spatialised self’ is to be 
continually removed.92 Exclusive ownership requires that others are to be excluded, which 
in turn, entails a right to exclude.93 
The seemingly natural order of things within the liberal property regime in fact requires 
constant efforts to assert one’s position by visualising and responding to the propertyless, 
as ‘legible and actionable’ positionalities.94 Sociotechnical inscriptions are such acts of 
drawing and tracing95 which produce effects – concrete effects as will be seen in chapter 3. 
One set of such techniques is that which demarcates – i.e., designates a form of spatial-
temporal containment to – populations and territories which are to be categorised as 
‘poor’. The classification of the poor and nonpoor emerges as a result of this ascription, 
which then enacts material distributions based on exclusive ownership. Poverty is then 
regarded as the same as its symptom of material lack by means of legal techniques of 
ascription (which designate who are the poor) followed by scientific techniques of 
inscription (which classify seeming attributes of the poor). In other words, these 
techniques couple visualisation and intervention (the abovementioned legibility and 
action), and cement poverty as material lack. This is the active gestures of the production 
of poverty as propertylessness. Property entails a classificatory scheme based on a binary 
 
90 Nicholas Blomley, ‘Cuts, Flows, and the Geographies of Property’ (2010) 7(2) Law, Culture and the 
Humanities 203. 
91 Blomley (n 90).  
92 Blomley (n 90). 
93 Blomley, ‘Territory of Property’ (n 14). 
94 As indicated before, I refer to positionalities in terms of the relational arrangement of the gaze of the 
nonpoor towards the poor. To be poor is to be in the position of being looked at as poor. I will deal with this 
arrangement in chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
95 Brighenti (n 86) 225. 
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that orders the world,96 a frontier that separates the positive pole (the propertied) and its 
antithesis (the propertyless). As will also be discussed in chapter 3, these aesthetic 
categories soon become ontological entities. Yet, the crucial point that I am making now is 
that if poverty is to be construed as the active production, then wealth is the actual by-
product. Which is to say, economic growth is framed as an effect of the production of 
poverty. First the poor are produced, then wealth is accumulated. 
In this chapter, we have seen how the drawing of lines to organise bodies and landscapes, 
composing populations and territories, has been operative since the early formation of the 
market economy and its global expansion. This observation will be reiterated in other 
moments in this thesis, to evoke the changing spatial configurations of urban poverty in its 
connection to practices and techniques of poverty knowledge and intervention. In the 
coming chapters, this argument will be further developed to situate law as a technology of 
visualisation, i.e. the propeller of knowledge and intervention onto poverty. Reality is thus 
a visual arrangement of things which are reified in space in which property (or 
propertylessness) configure a mode of seeing and governing space proper to modernity.  
Yet, the modern gaze surely has its internal contradictions and occasionally revives and 
prefigures diverse logics. In a genealogy about modern and premodern ways of seeing and 
managing urban disorder, Mariana Valverde identifies a series of overlapping, polysemic 
legal tools in operation. ‘Epistemological eclecticism’ is then more fitting with 
heterogeneous micro-regulatory interventions than a central state-led, or market-oriented 
sense of top-down order. That is to say, a city’s landscape reflects knowledge practices of 
different orientations which visualise and govern, rather than a built-in ‘political 
essence’.97  
This point is effectively articulated in Kirsten Campbell’s City of Law, which, following a 
Latourian approach, traces the urban terrain and city life as entwined by legal associations 
that circulate through the landscape, and simultaneously ‘order urban life through 
domination’ and ‘build new forms of urban life’.98 Although I build my argument in terms 
that are less centred on assemblage urbanism and more directed to sociotechnical legal 
formations, Campbell’s ‘assemblage analysis’ informs the articulations of the urban and 
the legal in this thesis. Contrary to a somewhat formalist-institutional register of ‘law’ as a 
traditional system that regulates the basic institutions of capitalism – which might be 
 
96 Blomley, ‘Cuts, Flows, and the Geographies of Property’ (n 90). 
97 Mariana Valverde, ‘Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern Ways of Seeing in Urban 
Governance’ (2011) 45(2) Law & Society Review 277. 
98 Campbell (n 76). 
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misguidedly presumed as the chapter starts precisely by revisiting a legal history of the 
modern property legal regime – I also aim to situate law as resulting from chains of legal 
practices, obligations, rights claims, entities, technologies and diverse legal forms that tie 
up legal associations in time and space, i.e. into a ‘city of law’.99  
Likewise, the city is not restricted to the built environment simply contrasted to the rural 
environment, but it is rather a specific (urban) form of social organisation that alludes to 
the (urban) arrangement of populations and territories. In that regard, Irus Braverman 
analyses how urban spatial design is taken for granted as static built environment but is in 
fact a fabric of technological devices.100 Geolegal technologies act through the visibility of 
physical space and make themselves invisible. As ‘geolegal sites’, then, the territories of 
poverty – slums, peripheries, outskirts, margins – are subjected to a ‘dual project of seeing 
and concealing’, being at once pushed away, further to the margins of the urban 
landscapes, and being simultaneously highly surveilled and policed. As an effect, it seems 
natural or inevitable that territories of poverty happen to be at the margins, or 
circumscribed as breaks in the urban grid, often covered up with walls or other devices of 
architectural hostility, and with different flows of people and conditions of circulation.101 
On the other hand, such territories are also active generators of dynamic modes of urban 
life which, in turn, propel new forms of legal association, as Campbell remarks in relation 
to Victorian London’s slums which ‘saw the rapid development of new forms of municipal 
government, labour and housing laws, and, of course, the development of modern 
company and tort law’.102  
In view of this, I frame the discussion in the previous sections of this chapter as part of this 
‘legal urban association’. As the result of social relations, for example, the urban landscape 
is assembled into social, political and economic interactions and, therefore, the industrial 
and financial transformations are historically associated within the city composition. The 
urban landscape and the territorialisation of poverty to which I will refer in the succeeding 
 
99 Campbell (n 76) 208. 
100 Irus Braverman, ‘Hidden in Plain View: Legal Geography from a Visual Perspective’ (2010) 7(2) Law, Culture 
and the Humanities 173. 
101 Such territories certainly carry ideological projects, as Braverman describes in the Israeli/Palestinian 
landscape. The same applies to the segregation of favelas in Brazil, as I will discuss in chapter 5. For sure, not 
all the setup of a slum is defined by a pre-existing motive. The designs can often reveal improvised 
arrangements and Braverman concedes that the landscape production is also influenced by other ‘forces’ 
beyond ideological projects, as would be the case in Assef Bayat’s perspective on the ‘quiet encroachment of 
the ordinary’. But, as I have been reinterating, beyond the domination-resistance dialectics, I am interested in 
technological functions and what they produce as effects, rather than their hegemonic, ideological projects, 
and I will limit my analysis accordingly. Assef Bayat, ‘From “Dangerous Classes” to “Quiet Rebels”: Politics of 
the Urban Sub-altern in the Global South’ (2000) 15(3) International Sociology 533. 
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chapters reflect this understanding. I will then argue that legal-aesthetic modulations 
determine the conditions of poverty’s appearance and disappearance in the urban 
landscape. Rather than a container of ‘natural modes of ordering’, the urban landscape 
must be seen as ‘relational, produced through diverse, networked processes’.103 It is in this 
sense that I argue in this thesis that poverty is a legal composition. As such, poverty is 
effective in demarcating populations and territories and targeting ‘morally and 
aesthetically objectionable’ types and making them known and intervenable by the 
‘governing gazes’, or in Valverde’s terms visible and governable.104 Yet again, the 
populations and territories ascribed to poverty are also the sites of new modes of life that 
are incompatible with such gaze. Here is a point of perpetual conflict, inconformity and 
indeed informality, as will be discussed. 
To conclude and return to the initial interrogations of this chapter, as an active formation, 
property is continually enacted and enforced through violence. The structural inequality of 
contemporary society is, thus, part of a long history of violence which, far from 
exceptional, is fundamentally articulated and justified by law.105 The key components of 
property are prefigured in the historical processes retraced earlier in the chapter, and 
endure in preserving the so-called liberal regime of property. This perspective enables a 
reformulation of the notion of propertylessness as an active gesture in the production of 
poverty and to propose that poverty is a frame of reference which operates both as sense-
making and as world-making functions. Legal modes of the governing gaze of private 
property forge new social categories by providing the founding principle dividing 
proprietors and the dispossessed. The construction of poverty as a social problem is thus 
connected to legal processes which cement social positions in a legal, proprietary 
relationship. It is through law that poverty is created and then isolated from structural 
explanations of society. The classificatory gaze over populations and territories – the gaze 
that sees poverty (the nonpoor gaze) – is normative: it describes and prescribes poverty. 
As a ‘gaze’, the scientific gesture of perceiving and examining poverty as a social 
phenomenon is forged in a rather recent history of dominant understandings of and 
material effects on populations and territories thus classified. Production of knowledge 
about poverty also produces a naturalised and calculable version of poverty which 
‘appears’ in the world – henceforth perceived through the identification of a set of visible 
 
103 Blomley (n 90) 204-205. 
104 Valverde, ‘Seeing Like a City’ (n 97) 308. 
105 Blomley, ‘Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence’ (n 31). 
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elements despite a series of other components which are rendered invisible. For the time 
being, this point of perception is relevant for the identification of a series of other legal 
mechanisms which respond to (form part of) the classificatory logic of the regime of 
property, here construed as components in the legal machinery of pauperisation and 
dispossession. In the next chapter, I will examine four such components as trends in 
legislation that regulate poverty. I will demonstrate how, through legal techniques, visual 
economies are formed by legal-aesthetic compositions in which ‘profiles’ of the poor are 






Legal codifications of poverty: the technical-analytical gaze upon the poor 
 
What happens to ‘the poor’ when law regulates poverty? Depending on the viewpoint, law 
can be seen to aid, to punish, to civilise, to normalise, to discipline, to rehabilitate, to 
enfranchise, as well as to equip the poor to find their own ways out of poverty. While it is 
true that there are as many possibilities for the legal regulation of poverty as there are 
interpretations of what poverty is and how it should be dealt with; I argue in this chapter 
that an overarching role is played by law within the history of shifting modern attitudes 
towards poverty. By examining the practices which enable innovative legal treatments of 
poverty – i.e. the practices that continually produce and refine law’s operations upon the 
poor – a stable underlying gesture can be found: the gesture of a gaze that visualises 
poverty and makes it materially visible according to the expectations of the originating 
gaze. As such, I propose, law operates as a technology of visualisation that effectively 
modulates populations and territories. In order to identify this overarching role, one needs 
to adopt a comprehensive perspective across temporal and spatial, as well as disciplinary, 
borders. A long-term pattern can be detected by means of an overview across a series of 
diverse legal branches, moments and practices which, on the surface, may seem isolated. 
It has been discussed in chapter 1 how legal forms and techniques shaped the history of 
modern private property and manufactured conceptions of poverty as propertylessness. 
By reconceptualising propertylessness as an active gesture, I pointed to an imaging or 
visual function performed by law without providing much detail on how this function plays 
out. I will now present a selection of four types or clusters of legal codifications that 
enable me to trace parallels and to illustrate how this underlying function can be seen to 
operate in different times and places. Such clusters – as broad epochal legislative trends 
which accompany the history of poverty knowledge and intervention – are presented as: 
poverty relief, criminalisation of poverty, welfare support and development aid. They form 
allegorical models of poverty administration as they establish paradigmatic legal 
techniques – ways of seeing and governing, reading and acting, knowing and intervening – 
typically evoked in poverty law scholarship. I construe them as attitudes towards poverty 
originating from technical-analytical gazes, which operate and vary in different times and 
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spaces but which do not eliminate or replace each other.1 They might change qualitatively, 
but often revive older trends and techniques. My aim, by laying out these gazes, is to 
analyse law’s aesthetic operations which produce ‘the poor’ as legal profiles – with stable 
forms and contents – and which modulates populations and territories accordingly. 
Ultimately, the modulated populations and territories of poverty work at confirming 
precisely that which law dictates, thus coming full circle in the circuits of poverty’s socio-
technical production.  
The ways in which I consider these legal operations ‘aesthetic’ will be presented in chapter 
3, particularly in reference to law’s functioning through images. For the time being, it 
suffices to indicate that this chapter looks into the interactions of law in the circuits of 
knowledge and interventions through the medium of changing ‘images’ of poverty. I 
explore certain ways in which law regulates poverty2 and, concomitantly, generate 
particular ways of visualising the poor. In that undertaking, law is construed as bridging the 
circuits of poverty knowledge and interventions in a way that goes beyond enabling 
exchanges between social research and social policy, but rather by generating images and 
ways of seeing poverty. Such images and modes of seeing can be found, like snapshots, in 
epochal instruments of antipoverty legislation. In other words, legal codifications of 
poverty simultaneously respond to and enable knowledge practices and intervention 
techniques in a very particular and creative way. On the one hand, legal codifications are 
formed around poverty and, on the other hand, by making poverty knowable and 
intervenable, those codifications create and shape the very problem they aim to fix. 
Poverty only exists as an entity – a problem – to be examined and acted upon after it is 
(legally) made visible. In that regard, my argument is that a series of visual practices and 
imaging techniques, operated by legal technologies, makes epochally and contextually 
intelligible forms of ‘poverty’. They take effect through practices of profiling, recording, 
classifying, documenting, ordering and executing that are typical of the administrative 
craft of law. 
 
1 As Mariana Valverde characterises what she terms ‘governing gazes’. Mariana Valverde, ‘Seeing Like a City: 
The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern Ways of Seeing in Urban Governance’ (2011) 45(2) Law & Society 
Review 277. 
2 A point of clarification: although the overall approach to ‘law’ in this thesis refers to a wide-ranging sense of 
normativity that is put to practice and produces effects in varying forms, this chapter works with posited legal 
infrastructures. By investing in this excavation, I am signalling that the general terms through which I refer to 
law in the thesis are not to suggest that I am addressing an abstract, ethereal normative force/authority that 
cannot be determined. Instead, it is because I would like to connect distinct legal regimes in this analysis, to 
show a pattern, that ‘law’ appears broadly constructed in this thesis. This chapter, however, demonstrates 
the concreteness of the arguments that will be developed in the succeeding chapters.  
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But what does it mean to claim that law operates through (producing and responding to) 
images? What are the images mobilised in such legal mediations between the science and 
politics of poverty? For sure, law is not a pictographic technology which produces pictorial 
representations as the necessary outcome of its craft. The extent to which law produces 
and acts on images is more nuanced. It involves mediums that are not necessarily 
immediately grasped as visual but may activate visual dynamics, such as descriptions, 
testimonials, illustrations, cases, files and, most importantly in this thesis, data. But to 
describe it as nuanced does not make it into a mere metaphorical suggestion. In fact, law 
does quite effectively operate through symbols, emblems, representations, forensic 
evidence, courtroom sketches, mugshots, to name a few of law’s visual media.3 In a wider 
sense, law also interacts by influencing and being influenced by design compositions – 
arts, literature, film, photography and, most importantly here, urban design and policy 
design. By tracing a history of the trends in gazes upon poverty, I aim to identify the visual 
elements which they evoke in terms of profiles, places and techniques.  
For this task I revisit the literature covering the modern history of ‘dealing with the poor’. 
Since different branches of law are typically treated as having separate objects of which 
generate separate fields of scholarship – property law, criminal law, administrative law, 
international public and private law, human rights, to name a few that are directly 
implicated in poverty regulation – I proceed in retracing this history by following 
pioneering studies which are attributed prominent roles influencing or reflecting trends in 
legislation that concern ‘the poor’. For initial guidance, I used two dense compendiums – 
one by Martin Ravallion and another Pete Alcock – which present a detailed history of 
poverty in economics, econometrics and policy frameworks.4 From these narratives I 
extracted the influential studies and landmark legislation that I highlight in this chapter, 
with the addition of others that I found in alternative secondary sources.5 I shall now 
briefly describe the terms which informed my selections and my analysis. 
While concerning mostly localised objects of study, the ‘influential studies’ (reports, books 
and other types of publication) that I reference are widely quoted in the literature as the 
core foundation of poverty studies worldwide, and they articulate, with little adherence to 
 
3 The literature on ‘law and aesthetics’ and ‘law and image’ will be reviewed in chapter 3. 
4 Martin Ravallion, The Economics of Poverty: History, Measurement and Policy (Oxford University Press 
2016); Pete Alcock, Understanding Poverty (Palgrave Macmillan 2006). 
5 In contrast to the style of presentation that I follow in other chapters, in this chapter I present references 
exclusively in the footnotes to indicate the hints that I followed to trace the history that I now narrate. I do 
this in order to keep the main text ‘clean’ from scholarly divergences and disagreements, although such 
debates certainly permeate the construction of this narrative about the history poverty administration.  
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geographic or academic boundaries, the different branches of law. They provide the 
benchmarks that allow me to revisit a few centuries of international history without being 
distracted or overwhelmed by the diversity of orientations that poverty law tends to 
reveal locally. Of course, the history that I re-narrate from these benchmarks is not the 
whole history of poverty thinking. It is an indicative collection of the most prominent and 
influential studies within the relevant literature. Not only do these sources not provide the 
comprehensive history, but this method also leads me into effacing other very important 
milestones that, had I focused on them, might have produced a different historical 
narrative. But having acknowledged this reservation and clarified that the purpose is not 
to trace ‘the’ but ‘a’ history of poverty thinking – one that reveals ideas that produce 
resonances and impacts beyond their times and places – I can also recognise how this 
selective overview provides me with the advantage of understanding the broader context 
in which certain ideas were able to emerge and receive recognition from wider networks 
of intellectuals, administrators, philanthropists and other specialist agents. With that 
established, I then review the different sets of scholarly work which discuss the changing 
legal trends in depth. Essentially, I apply a new and synthetized lens to explorations that 
have already been undertaken from multiple standpoints and disciplines, by indicating 
how things like philanthropy, social work, policing, social rights, social policy, income 
support, public order management, militarisation, urban development, international aid, 
and microcredit work together rather than constitute separate types of attitudes towards 
poverty; they are here construed as variants of poverty administration. The contribution of 
this chapter is, first and foremost, one of compilation, laying the grounds for the analysis I 
develop in the rest of the thesis. Moreover, I am resituating this history as a global history, 
rather than as context-specific experiences and occurrences that have simply travelled, i.e. 
that have been exported and imported elsewhere.  
I also look for historiographical revisions which suggest that the link between social 
research and policy are not so clear-cut as informed decision making. Since very early on in 
the history of empirical social research, contemporary accounts show that there are 
discrepancies. The validity or accuracy of these revisions is something for the historians to 
deliberate. From my point of view, however, as a legal researcher, these discrepancies are 
useful and important enough to indicate that there is a gap to explore between research 
and policy, or the circuits of science and politics. The task I undertake is to redefine the 
role of law in targeting poverty, by retracing law’s multifarious connections with these 
circuits. The history of social policy followed the course that it did but the extent to which 
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we can explicate that history simply through the advancements of social research is 
questionable. In fact, the historical narrative that I compile in this chapter demonstrates a 
gradual transformation in the exchanges between science and politics over the course of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. From the use of theory in policy to a paradigm of 
technical experiments, in other words, from an emphasis on scientific discoveries of the 
‘nature’ of social problems to pragmatic knowledge practices testing theoretical 
propositions to solve social problems – this shift formed the models of what today are 
termed ‘practice-oriented research’ and ‘evidence-based intervention’. This point will be 
picked up in chapter 3, when I draw on the history and philosophy of science to address 
how empirical social research and quantification became tools for informing management 
rather than supporting theory. However, in this chapter I seek to interrogate what do 
these historical transformations mean for law and what can be identified as the stable 
legal role. This is what I am pursuing: not to add to the historical revisionisms, but to use 
them for legal critique. I then build on this identified role of law in the succeeding 
chapters. 
With that purpose in mind, a few caveats are important. These clusters are commonly 
found in historical accounts of poverty research, although they are usually presented as 
separate and self-contained, temporally and spatially specific framings of poverty, defining 
the problem group of each time and place. I aim to present them, instead, as cumulative 
and often co-occurring, affecting populations and territories worldwide. In what follows, I 
attempt to scrutinise each cluster with a distance. I do not investigate them as formative 
modes of knowledge production which may inform my own views and points of critique 
about how poverty is conceptualised, but rather as media-technological modes of poverty 
production. That is to say, I observe how, from techniques of inscription (census, surveys, 
maps, photography, ethnography, biometrics, physionometrics, graphs, digital data among 
many others), poverty becomes a delineable thing in the world. But as previously indicated 
a dimension of ascription determine such inscriptions. Thus, I examine how modes of 
ascription and classification organise material compositions. Then, by inscribing sets of 
ascribed factors as visual markers – characteristics, features, indicators, spatial 
distribution, interrelations – poverty becomes a visible, determinable and treatable 
occurrence. What technical-scientific practices in general are producing, rather than 
discoveries of facts about poverty, are in effect modes of poverty visualisation originated 
in legal practices. Continual technological innovations to deal with poverty reflect 
corresponding reconfigurations of poverty. Moreover, such inscriptions, in the form of 
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images of poverty, end up confirming the foundations on which they are premised and 
which condition their very creations. 
Furthermore, I do not address codified legislation as standing for ‘law’. The codifications 
are the result of law, its positing in time and space. Law itself, as will also be clarified in 
chapter 3, is broadly construed as an emergent effect of its own practices. In other words, 
law is the result of a series of practices that continually refine legal operations. They are 
legal practices to the extent that they carry legal implications, which may include practices 
of knowledge and intervention, as well as those involved in codified legislation, legal 
institutions and law enforcement. For example, the operations around the codification and 
the implementation of the poor laws (including surveys and the daily functioning of 
workhouses) are legal practices, meant to refine law in its making of poverty. The practices 
of incarcerating subjects who are seen as criminals and in turn, producing new data which 
supports this previous image of poor-as-criminal are also legal practices that refine legal 
reasoning, language, interpretation, doctrine, codes, procedures, institutions, and so forth. 
The changing emphases of legal codifications trace a thread through the history of 
poverty, rather than reflect it in totality. Just as I use the influential reports as 
methodological coordinates, my reference to codified legislation serves the purpose of 
laying out benchmarks while I navigate the wider transformations of which they are 
merely partial and temporary documentations. As will be seen, I do not intend to analyse 
the legislation per se, but to use it as evidence of complex changes in course. 
For my stated purposes in regard to codified legislation, I am less concerned with their 
internal logics, the institutional architecture they form and the effectiveness of their 
founding principles. What is relevant to stress is that an underlying modulating effect is 
inflicted upon populations and territories that are seen as poor and that the components 
of knowledge-law-intervention are continually rearranged in what appear to be entirely 
new approaches to poverty. Yet what is actually transformed are the means through which 
different epochs are defined by different perceptions, attitudes and practices regarding 
poverty. This is a history of increasingly bureaucratic and documented poverty 
administration models. To use in broader terms what David Garland describes in relation 
to the formation of the welfare state, the administration of the problem of poverty ‘is not 
some kind of historically embedded idea or teleological essence that was always in the 
process of emerging. Nor is it an essentially unified conceptual whole. It is, instead, the 
name we give to a distinctive set of practices that emerged at a specific historical 
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moment.’6 They present shifts in orientation of policy and bureaucracy. I retrace these 
shifts with no claims regarding rationality or ideology, but simply investigating the 
practices and techniques employed and the effects they bring about. 
Thus, in the relentless rearrangements of historically emergent means of poverty 
administration, I aim to isolate law’s stable role. I shall demonstrate that on different 
fronts, law continually creates populational categories by profiling, qualifying and/or 
regulating the eligibility of figures such as vagrants, criminals, benefit recipients, clients, 
microentrepreneurs and so on. In addition, building on the discussion from the previous 
chapter, law also continually shapes the territoriality of poverty by regulating spatial 
distributions, entitlements and conflicts. In a nutshell, law continually plays a role in 
establishing the conditions for poverty to be seen – here lies the legal aesthetics of 
poverty which entitles this research. To foreshadow the argument, it is interesting to 
consider that, in contrast to what would seem like a normal flow of things, it is not 
inevitably science that finds, examines and formulates what poverty is based on an 
essentially empirical reality of poverty. In this light, it is law that creates poverty by 
providing the material basis of its conceptual formulation, i.e. the populations and 
territories modulated into an image of poverty. Science measures and inscribes the 
symptoms, the indicators of a legally-formed poverty design, rather than objective traces 
of poverty. Through law, profiles are registered, particular meanings are educed and 
narratives are created. This formation is construed as a circular mechanism: law works as 
the executive branch of social policy; in doing so, documentation is produced contributing 
to the formation of quantitative and qualitative data about the poor; this data feeds 
scholarly production, especially in the field of social sciences, where intellectuals build 
theoretical archetypes to explain traces of destitution, degeneration, criminality, and so 
on; in turn, public policy and law are reorganised based on such new studies, potentially 
reformulating the outreach of the legal devices that will further sample territories and 
populations by profiling, qualifying and/or regulating ‘the poor’. Thus, law’s production of 
images and narratives feeds and is fed by social research; theoretical and philosophical 
conceptualisations; and social policy design. 
That being said, there is little systematicity in existing legal scholarship to address a global 
legal history of poverty. In fact, there are few sources that enable a comprehensive, long-
term view of how poverty’s legal administration has been transformed throughout history 
 
6 David Garland, ‘The Welfare State: A Fundamental Dimension of Modern Government’ (2014) 55(3) 
European Journal of Sociology 334. 
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and across legal branches. In order to start my investigation, as already indicated, I 
reconstituted such a history by clustering four trends in legislation, conceptualisations and 
interventions which are commonly recognised in the relevant literature but are seldom – if 
at all – put together to be analysed in parallel. By consolidating these trends here, I aim to 
convey the themes or patterns that loosely group together collections of practices. These 
practices are not bounded by particular locations, historical moments, legal spheres or 
other such parameters, but rather by their shared emphasis on poverty relief, 
criminalisation, social provision or international development aid. These are the clusters I 
refer to in the four sections that follow in this chapter and which I have set out in the 
following Table: 
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A final caveat before proceeding: as I set this discussion in the context of the practices of 
specialist institutions and of intellectual traditions, it strikes me that I ended up reinforcing 
a western European and northern American narrative of the world’s history. This is 
something I came to terms with by acknowledging that the history of the global agenda of 
poverty reduction has deep-roots in modern European formations of poverty production 
(in fact, the entire idea of poverty by which we operate today comes from such a western, 
modern European formation of poverty as a concept and as a phenomenon – as a problem 
to be fixed7). As will become clearer, this narrative accounts for a mode of knowledge and 
intervention that became increasingly global, in tandem with capitalist global expansion by 
the end of the twentieth century. The conceptual constructions of poverty are an integral 
part of that expansion. To attempt a counter-narrative that avoids poverty’s social and 
intellectual centres of production would fail the purposes of this thesis. As a trade-off, 
regrettably, omissions of varied and contradicting experiences around the world are 
inevitable within the limits of this research.  
If poverty research is an American invention, as Alice O’Connor indicates,8 surely it is 
expected that a lot of the available scholarship on poverty law would concern an English-
speaking lineage. However, there are certainly many other lineages of public 
administration history from other parts of the world to be excavated and the compilation 
of which would bring a more comprehensive insight about how poverty became a modern 
administrative problem.9 On the other hand, the American-British lineage is undoubtedly a 
central one when it comes to the contemporary global configuration of poverty 
 
7 See for example: Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty (Penguin Group 2005). 
8 O’Connor is referring to the body of technical expertise and experts which flourished in the last decades of 
the twentieth century, as a legacy of Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty agenda of the 1960s. It is interesting 
to note that although the infrastructures of poverty research can be clearly traced in the USA based on the 
country’s institutional formations at the time, it is perplexing to find the bulk of poverty research scholars 
ignoring the long-standing traditions of poverty investigation elsewhere. Still, for the purposes of this chapter, 
I follow this literature as my guiding sources and, although redressing this narrative goes beyond the scope of 
my research, I attempt to add occasional markers of how the rest of the world is implicated in most of the 
advancements registered in the institutional history of poverty knowledge and policy in the USA and the UK. 
Alice O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. 
History (Princeton University Press 2002). 
9 Both Bronislaw Geremek and Silvia Federici recount European experiences as antecedents to public 
assistance in the context of the passage from medieval feudalism to early modern capitalism. See Bronislaw 
Geremek, Poverty: A History (Blackwell 1994); Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and 
Primitive Accumulation (Autonomidia 2014). 
Also, for an exploration into the Grand Bureau des Pauvres – the body for the management and 
administration of the poor in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Paris – through an analysis of the notion of 
duty and office concerning the “dangerous classes”, see: Serene Richards, ‘Life, Language, Law: The Invention 
of Dangerous Classes’ (PhD Thesis, University of London 2019). 
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knowledge, law and intervention. This is the case not only because of the colonial history 
that formed the contemporary international configurations, even with regards to former 
non-British colonies – not to enter into the discussion of the extent to which the British 
empire has exercised its influence in non-British colonies and how today the USA plays this 
influential role in policy across the globe10 – but also because of how the USA and the UK 
were leading agents in the formation of the Bretton Woods system that dominates global 
poverty management today. These two countries are, thus, analysed as the historical and 
contemporary centres of the production of poverty knowledge and its worldwide 
influence. Yet, I must insist that scholars often fail to recognise that this is not an American 
or British history, but rather a world-history in which the USA/UK-defined ‘third world’ 
often participates as a laboratory for experiments – a point that I presented in chapter 1 
and which I shall continue to highlight as I constitute the history in this chapter. It is in the 
context of this transnational, cross-cultural and multi-sited perspective that, in the 
sections that follow, I outline the shifts and trends in poverty knowledge, law and 
interventions.  
 
2.1 Poverty relief  
It is a common cliché to start with the English Poor Laws, which, much like the enclosure 
movements, have already been deeply explored and are extensively documented by 
historical research. Although less well known, it has also been documented how the model 
and effects of poor relief have coalesced and been reshaped in other contexts. That is to 
say, not only have poor laws effectively been tested in other countries in Europe11 and the 
archetypical workhouse or similar houses of correction can be found beyond the British 
colonial territories,12 but also the English poor themselves have travelled far: since early on 
in the seventeenth century the overseas operation of the Old Poor Law included 
 
10 On this point, see for example: Gregory A Barton, Informal Empire and the Rise of One World Culture 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2014). 
11 As narrated by Peter H Lindert, ‘Poor Relief Before the Welfare State: Britain versus the Continent, 1780–
1880’ (1998) 2(2) European Review of Economic History 101; Sharon Farmer, ‘From Personal Charity to 
Centralized Poor Relief: The Evolution of Responses to the Poor in Paris, c. 1250-1600’ in Anne Scott and 
Susan Broomhall (eds), The Experience of Charity in Medieval and Early Modern France and England (Ashgate 
2015). 
12 Harald Fischer-Tiné, ‘Britain's Other Civilising Mission: Class Prejudice, European “Loaferism” and the 
Workhouse-System in Colonial India’ (2005) 42(3) The Indian Economic & Social History Review 295. 
Additionally, and beyond the British empire: Silvia Marina Arrom, Containing the Poor: The Mexico City Poor 
House, 1774-1871 (Duke University Press 2000). 
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subsidising the emigration of the pauper to the colonies.13 However, I examine 
historiographical accounts (and revisions) not in reference to the historical heydays of the 
Poor Law system but for how it propelled, mostly in the process of its decline, the 
advancement of scientific poverty knowledge by building on techniques of social surveys 
and statistics. That is to say, my emphasis is on how the nineteenth century Poor Law, 
itself designed in reference to an extensive survey,  prepared the ground for the 
impending development of empirical social investigations at the end of the nineteenth 
century, which later propelled the ultimate termination of the Poor Law by its own 
mechanism of monitoring and reporting.14 In this excavation I question the early 
connections between empirical research and social policy that are present in the legal 
responses to the problem of poverty. 
To contextualise the main elements found in the prolific historical resources available on 
this topic, the so-called Elizabethan or Old Poor Law from 1601 – originally the 1598 Act 
for the Relief of the Poor – was the first unified, secular and statutory response to 
pauperism, and it regulated the provision of decentralised, tax-financed relief to the poor 
by local parishes. While the industrial revolution was drastically changing the general 
understanding of poverty as an increasingly urban problem, up to the nineteenth century 
poverty was concentrated in the rural areas and the relief system was very much designed 
to attend to the needs of populations facing shortages of basic subsistence, and thus to 
mitigate rural-urban migration.15 Supplemented by the Speenhamland system of income 
support, the Old Poor Law established a parochial-based public charity system, by making 
it compulsory for parishes across England and Wales to provide means-tested relief for 
their parishioners by way of a poor rate collected and distributed to those in need – in 
parish workhouses or in outdoor relief, assisting the able-bodied to work and punishing 
the work-shy.16  As a local and decentralized system, parishes had the autonomy to 
 
13 Gregory Clark and Marianne E Page, ‘Welfare Reform, 1834: Did the New Poor Law in England Produce 
Significant Economic Gains? (2019) 13(2) Cliometrica 221. 
See also: Howard Mackey, ‘The Operation of the English Old Poor Law in Colonial Virginia’ (1965) 73(1) The 
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 29. 
14 Empirical social research became an intellectual discipline in the nineteenth century, providing 
informational support to government offices and social reform movements. This is the period in which many 
national associations were founded, such as: the French Académie des sciences morales et politiques (1832), 
the British National Association for the Promotion of Social Science (1857), the US Social Science Association 
(1867), the German Verein für Socialpolitik (1873). See Johan Goudsbloma and Johan Heilbron, ‘History of 
Sociology’ in Neil J Smelser and Paul B Baltes (eds), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral 
Sciences (Elsevier 2001) 14574. 
15 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (first published 1944, 
Beacon Press 2001). 
16 It is worth noting that historical accounts also report on other co-existing initiatives during the early 
modern period – private-professional charities, such as Catholic, Protestant and Quakers charity schemes with 
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oversee the local poor and tailor the amount of relief provided for each family. On the 
other hand, this was also a highly punitive and stigmatizing system and, in tandem with 
the aso-called Bloody Laws mentioned in chapter 1, forged the categories of the 
industrious deserving poor and the depending objectionable pauper.17 That is to say, 
whilst earlier conceived as a unified category of the ‘labouring poor’, with poverty being 
seen as a normal condition of the propertyless who had to work to obtain sustenance, the 
views of poverty radically changed by the nineteenth century through a split into binary 
classifications of the poor and the pauper, the involuntarily and the voluntarily poor, the 
working and the indolent poor, the deserving and undeserving poor.18  
The posited legal framework at the time was also supplemented by the 1662 Settlement 
Act which further limited eligibility to poor relief for those who were recognised as settled 
in a parish by ties of birth, marriage or work. It promoted fixity to one and parish and 
sought to exclude travellers or strangers, who were vilified in the figure of the vagrant and 
associated with malicious attempts to defraud the more generous parishes.19 In fact, it was 
well aligned with the deep-rooted succession of legal instruments designed to repress the 
archetypal figures of the vagrant, vagabond and beggar – from the Vagabonds and Beggars 
Act 1494 to the Vagrancy Act 1824 – and also served as legal methods for controlling 
populational circulation. While the vagrancy laws listed various acts to be read as public 
order offences, historians describe the body of legislation against vagrancy as measures to 
contain workers within their parish of origin, as they were typically deployed against a 
large variety of migrating social groups.20 Control of mobility has historically been 
connected to the legal formation of profiles of poverty – the archetypical figures of the 
rogues, tramps, nightwalkers, vagabonds, beggars, highwaymen, wonderers – loosely 
framing individuals who act by predefined disorderly behaviours. In other words, legal 
measures worked at processing populations which embody the stereotypes of ‘mobile 
lives’ within a system that aims to contain the territoriality of poverty and its urban-rural 
distribution. From the early stages of modern law, the definitions of the poor appear as 
much more effective in legal rather than economic terms. Legal definitions work as a 
 
their own institutions, funds, schools, hospitals and workhouses, as well as growing cooperative movements 
at local levels – which formed a rather ‘mixed economy’ of welfare provision and indeed a division of labour 
between the public and voluntary sectors. See Johanna Innes, ‘The “Mixed Economy of Welfare” in Early 
Modern England: Assessments of the Options from Hale to Malthus (c. 1683-1803)’ In Martin Daunton (ed), 
Charity, Self-Interest and Welfare in the English Past: 1500 to the Present (UCL Press 1996). 
17 Federici (n 9). 
18 David Englander, Poverty and Poor Law Reform in Nineteenth-Century Britain, 1834-1914: From Chadwick to 
Booth (Routledge 2013). 
19 David Hitchcock, Vagrancy in English Culture and Society, 1650-1750 (Bloomsbury Academic 2016). 
20 Hitchcock (n 19). 
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processing mechanism through which one is to be declared vagrant, not the other way 
around: law was not responding to a populational type, law was processing populations 
(both outsiders and local populations) into such categories and, in effect, creating such 
‘types of people’ (deemed idle and disorderly) by modulating populations and territories. 
But legal measures were also taken to administer the mobility of the populace and to 
organise urban spaces by removing vagrants, by means of overseas emigration.21 
Increasingly, in the context of industrialisation, there was a change to a pattern of vagrant 
removal rather than punishment in London. 
Critiques of the relief system, increasingly seen as lenient for promoting indolence and 
moral hazard, as well as for encouraging pauperism, gained strength particularly among 
classical political economists. Thomas Malthus was a prominent voice repudiating relief as 
‘hand-outs’ due to a supposed effect of disincentivising industriousness and encouraging 
unsustainable populational growth. Other important classic political economists at the 
time were critical of the Poor Law, such as David Ricardo, Adam Smith and, most notably, 
Jeremy Bentham, for whom the Poor Law worsened the problem of poverty instead of 
alleviating it, by producing dependent paupers.22 Indeed a degree of poverty becomes not 
only natural but also necessary for modern societies to thrive. In 1832 a commission of 
inquiry was appointed to investigate the utilitarian effectiveness of the Old Poor Law and 
to inform the reform of the poor relief practices by means of a wide survey and based on 
the practical political economic expertise of its members. This investigation is frequently 
narrated as one of the first technical-scientific works of social research – including major, 
nationwide surveys that developed fieldwork and undertook questionnaires in 3,000 
parishes in England and Wales.23 As a precursor to the late nineteenth century social 
survey movement which facilitated the second thrust of reform of the Poor Laws in the 
early twentieth century, these endeavours consolidated the disciplines of political 
economy and empirical social research through the practice of gathering data about the 
poor and their governance. The commission’s 1834 report pointed to the social costs of 
the old relief system in terms of its ‘reduced work incentives’, ‘reduced labour mobility’, 
 
21 Eric Richards, ‘How did Poor People Emigrate from the British Isles to Australia in the Nineteenth Century?’ 
(1993) 32(3) Journal of British Studies 250. 
22 Kevin Bales lays out two predominant camps of those who ‘busied themselves about poverty’: the 
Benthamite camp attributed poverty to a supposed ‘natural tendency to prefer indolence to industry’ and 
saw assistance as worsening the problem; the religious camp saw poverty as ‘the inevitable outcome of vice’ 
and provided direct charitable relief to the poor. Kevin Bales, ‘Early Innovations in Social Research: The 
Poverty Survey of Charles Booth’ (PhD Thesis, University of London 1994) 242. 
23 Englander (n 18). 
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‘reduced investment’ in land improvement and ‘increased fertility by the poor’.24 However, 
contemporary accounts revised these calculations by the commission and reassessed the 
expected impact of the reform at the time to find mistaken conclusions and no clear gains 
in economic growth. In fact, as is often indicated, the report is disconnected from the data 
that was collected as it was organised prior to the completion of the actual empirical 
research.25 
The Victorian, New Poor Law was enacted in 1834 to amend relief practices by targeting 
the localism of relief administration and seeking to tackle the indolence of the able poor 
by reviewing the provision of outdoor relief (i.e. relief not requiring admission to an 
institution such as a workhouse). The new centralised system of relief prescribed national 
uniformity of standards and an institutional structure, with councils, regional unions and 
boards of guardians. The Poor Law Commission, and later Board, oversaw and 
administered the Poor Law’s implementation and issued periodic reports on its 
proceedings, regulations, expenditure and outcomes having inaugurated an accounting 
and accountability system for the local authorities.26 By prioritising workhouses over 
outdoor relief as the main form of aid, the paupers were to be sheltered and put to strict 
work, combining punitive, coercive and charitable purposes. The new workhouse-based 
relief system was designed to discourage the pauper from seeking support by providing 
less favourable conditions than those provided by poorly-paid work. It included separation 
of family, imposition of uniforms and compulsory heavy work as tactics to reduce 
pauperism by making any work a better option – the so-called Workhouse Test. That it 
might also have made prison seem like a better alternative might have backfired on the 
nineteenth century reformers.27 As a panopticon-inspired environment of surveillance, 
purpose-built union workhouses provided a disciplinary environment towards correcting 
the poor. The new poor law marks a reframing of the idea of poverty as a matter of 
individual failure, i.e. from the idle and morally vicious poor sponsored by relief practices 
to the volitional pauper with criminal and corrupt inclinations. It was widely believed that 
those who were poor were indeed unwilling to work, despite the intensifying scarcity of 
 
24 Clark and Page (n 13). 
25 Englander (n 18) 13. 
26 Stephen P Walker, 'Accounting, Paper Shadows and the Stigmatised Poor' (2008) 33(4-5) Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 453. 
27 Laura Foster examines the diverse and contradictory representations of the workhouse in literary and 
cultural works. She indicates that comparisons of the workhouse to the prison were present in nineteenth 
century periodicals and that there were reports of paupers damaging workhouse property so as to be sent to 
prison. Laura Foster, ‘The Representation of the Workhouse in Nineteenth-Century Culture’ (PhD Thesis, 
Cardiff University 2014) 133. 
67 
 
work at the time;28 the notion of unemployment was only to be acknowledge as a social 
problem in the second half of the nineteenth century.29 In this respect, the new poor relief 
practices were forged to promote a change of posture and work ethics. Although the 
system has been transformed throughout the years, responding to scandals and criticism, 
as well as becoming more flexible about outdoor relief than it is commonly believed, 
historical revisitations also point out that the new system was unsuccessful in reducing 
relief costs as originally promised. As a legacy, the poor relief system is frequently 
described as a hotbed for twentieth century welfare policy by having initiated a modern 
administration of social provision. Such technical development, on the other hand, is often 
recognised as composing a vilified version of poverty, inscribing elements of fear and 
shame into stigma – not to mention containing revolts.30  
Although the Poor Law was only officially extinguished in 1948, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, the meaning of poverty had already been significantly reframed. The 
idea of providing localised relief, even if administered centrally, began to be lose support 
as technologies of production and food distribution underwent a revolutionary change and 
the problem of poverty also began to appear as much more of an urban calamity – despite 
the fact that poverty itself is, still today, primarily a rural rather than an urban 
phenomenon –  with slum formations providing visible indicators in cities across the world. 
The notorious traces of squalor, vice and immorality in the images of slums were the 
determining factors by which such areas were seen as infectious perils in need of remedy 
and containment – the most infamous of which was London's East End.31 Its way of being 
seen embodied its way of being remedied: as something that was misplaced, slums were 
relentlessly displaced and remade until they disappeared completely.32 The objectionable 
presence of slums in Victorian cities was to propel the formation of a series of historic 
urban planning strategies that were then rehearsed and re-instantiated worldwide, most 
 
28 Samantha Shave, Pauper Policies: Poor Law Practice in England 1780-1850 (Manchester University Press 
2017). 
29 Bales (n 22). 
30 Walker (n 26); Shave (n 28). 
31 Slums were, at the time, mostly seen as ‘an amalgam of dilapidated housing, overcrowding, disease, 
poverty, and vice. […] a place where an incorrigible and feral social "residuum" rots in immoral and often 
riotous splendor.’ Davis (n 78) 22. 
32 Although not without conflict, resistance, scientific and political disputes, advancements and retreats, 
negotiations, defeats and, most importantly, shifting ways of seeing slums, as shown in James A Yelling, Slums 
and Slum Clearance in Victorian London (Routledge 1986).  
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notably the first legally prescribed slum clearances and later the peri-urban resettlement 
strategies.33  
As industrialisation and urbanisation transformed industrial towns in terms of population 
and daily life, problems of public health and chronic disease gained attention – especially 
cholera and typhoid in the 1930s. The association of poverty with insanitation entailed a 
pathologizing view of social problems at large, with much attributed to (im)moral 
behaviour. A 1842 report by Poor Law Commission member Edwin Chadwick, on The 
Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain,34 describes the filthy and 
disease-spreading conditions in which the poor lived. The correlation between disease and 
degeneracy embedded in theories that conflate ‘physical and moral dirtiness and ill health’ 
formed the basis of the agenda of early sanitary reforms.35 Such early reforms focused on 
the (hygienic and moral) clearing up of the densely populated areas of slums, much like 
the regimes of cleanliness by which workhouses operated.36 These ideas were also fuelled 
later in the century by social Darwinism and eugenics as scientific claims that sustained the 
perceived heredity of the pathological conditions of the poor, the criminals and the 
racialised, as will also be seen in the next cluster of poverty administration.  
It is in this earlier climate, though, that a growing interest to understand (and reform) 
social malaise had developed. Knowledge practices by the mid-nineteenth century 
constituted first-hand observations and the use of ordinary people as informants.37 
Immersive observations and small-scale surveys were popular, an example being Engels’ 
aforementioned The Condition of the Working-Class in England.38 Another important 
investigation often mentioned is Henry Mayhew’s London Labour and the London Poor, a 
journalistic observation and description of the state of working people on the streets of 
London, originally written as a series of newspaper articles.39 But the conditions of the 
poor and urban populations were also of wide interest and ‘a topic of public discussion’ 
inciting curiosity and appeal for the middle-classes. While workhouse visits were iconic at 
 
33 Landmarks on this point are the Artisans' and Labourers' Dwellings Improvement (Cross) Act 1875, which 
enabled compulsory purchases, and the Housing of the Working Classes Act 1885 and 1890, which penalised 
landlords of unhealthy tenements and mandated the purchase of land for the construction of housing estates, 
consecutively. 
34 See Edwin Chadwick, ‘Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain’ 
(Michael W Flinn ed, first published 1842, Edinburgh University Press 1965). 
35 Alison Bashford, Purity and Pollution (Macmillan 1998) 117. 
36 Foster (n 27). 
37 Bales (n 22) 95. 
38 Engels (n 29). 
39 See Henry Mayhew, London Labour and the London Poor; Cyclopaedia of the Condition and Earnings of 
Those that Will Work, Those that Cannot Work, and Those that Will Not Work (Griffin, Bohn, and Co. 1861). 
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the time, immortalised by literary movements, the fascination with the poor also included 
experiences such as ‘slumming’ expeditions and personal, first-hand experience of rough-
sleeping and taking up lodgings in the East End.40 Of course, the resulting narratives of 
poverty as anomie – one evoking affects such as fascination, disgust, hatred, curiosity, 
fear, condescendence, altruism – reflect a conventional take. But there were other 
dissenting voices, including those of growing trade unions which emphasised problems of 
unemployment, as well as socialists dedicated to critiquing the economic structures and 
liberals who would soon lead social reforms with an emphasis on welfare provision.41  
 
Figure 2: Illustration from Henry Mayhew’s London Labour and the London Poor (1861).42 
 
Meanwhile, the relief system remained much more focused on rural poverty, but it was 
also gradually altered by successive legal innovations43 or simply by administrative changes 
in Poor Law practices.44 In 1905, another Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of 
Distress was appointed to investigate changes to the relief system. This commission also 
conducted an extensive investigation, with statistical work, interviews and cross-country 
 
40 Foster (n 27) 133-134. 
41 Bales (n 22). 
42  Figure 2 attribution: Image from Wikimedia Commons, Internet Archive Book Images, original illustration 
from Henry Mayhew, London Labour and the London Poor (n 39). The copyright is in the public domain, 
licensed under the terms of no known copyright restrictions. 
<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7d/London_labour_and_the_London_poor%3B_a_cycl
op%C3%A6dia_of_the_condition_and_earnings_of_those_that_will_work%2C_those_that_cannot_work%2C
_and_those_that_will_not_work_%281861%29_%2814740863296%29.jpg> accessed 29 June 2020. 
43 Examples cited are the 1846 Act of Parliament and the Irremovable Poor Bill 1861, which protected from 
removal certain profiles such as the ‘irremovable pauper’; and the Union Chargeability Act 1865, which made 
the Poor Law Union the site of settlement and further reduced removability terms. 
44 Englander (n 18). 
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field work. Internal disputes were marked by different perspectives and agendas and the 
commission ended in 1909 with two notorious reports – the majority and the minority 
reports, with the latter receiving much attention in the following years as ‘the first rough 
blueprint for the establishment of the Welfare State’.45 At the time, a series of social policy 
innovations were already being driven by legislation, such as the Workmen's 
Compensation Act 1897 and 1906, the Old-Age Pensions Act 1908, the National Insurance 
Act 1911 and the Labour Exchanges Act 1909. It was a time of rapid and combined change 
in thought, policy and legislation. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, scientism was increasingly incorporated into the 
social survey movement and, as a result, it gradually shifted the perception of poverty as a 
social problem. Reform-oriented researchers could observe symptoms of industrialisation 
in the urbanisation of poverty, in fluctuations in employment levels, the organisation of 
workers and so on. Indeed, empiricism in poverty research has played a crucial part in 
shifting poverty perceptions towards structural considerations of the contexts surrounding 
poverty – squalor, delinquency, disease, vice, substandard housing. The prevailing 
perception of poverty gradually came to embrace systemic explanations, rather than 
emphasising individual responsibility.46  
 
Figure 3: Gilbert Wheatley, charged with loitering with intent  
to commit a felony, North Shields Police Station (1904).47 
 
45 Bales (n 22) 318. 
46 Bales (n 22) 13-14. 
47 Figure 3 attribution: Image from Wikimedia Commons, Tyne & Wear Archives & Museums, ‘Gilbert 
Wheatley, arrested for loitering with intent to commit a felony’ (1904). The copyright is in the public domain, 




Increasingly rationalised, empirical and positivist methodologies propelled the emergence 
of the modern social sciences. Influential studies at the time, in particular those using the 
ground-breaking, large-scale social survey method developed by relevant names such as 
Charles Booth and his contemporaries, revolutionised poverty measurement through a 
societal approach and by means of quantifiable data. The many editions and volumes of 
Booth’s The Life and Labour of the People in London,48 resulting from seventeen years of 
research, gave rise to a scientific milestone in studies of society now based on empirical, 
quantitative, positivist survey methods and destined not to formulate grand philosophical 
theories but to inform social policy.49 Booth’s investigation relied both on official 
documents, such as census and records, and on first-hand methods of observation, 
accompanying School Board visitors and policemen in addition to conducting interviews in 
households, factories, asylums and workhouses,50 in order to calculate standards of 
household minimal needs and to create a class stratification system. The study is 
influential for many reasons and I highlight here its ambition to determine empirically the 
definitions of poverty – first, by categorising levels and modes of living into eight social 
classes above and below a set poverty line; and, second, by stablishing a spatial 
distribution of poverty through a visual-cartographic method. The make-up of the poor 
and the very poor – classes A, B and C below the poverty line – took into consideration 
income as well as questions of circumstances (e.g. family composition, illness, age), 
underemployment (e.g. irregularity of work, low pay), and habits (e.g. drinking, idleness). 
Progressively, moral causes of poverty as resulting from vice were demystified – Booth 
himself changed his view in the process of his research – and state interventions were to 
be pressed, for example, with pension and allowance schemes for those who are unable to 
provide for themselves (the old, the young and the sick).51 
 
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gilbert_Wheatley,_arrested_for_loitering_with_intent_to_commi
t_a_felony_(23627265035).jpg> accessed 29 June 2020. 
48 See in Charles Booth, Life and Labour of the People of London 17 vols (Macmillan 1889-1903). 
Also in LSE Library's digital archive ‘Charles Booth's London Poverty maps and police notebooks’ available at 
<https://booth.lse.ac.uk/about> access 15 April 2018 
49 Although reacting to the trend of slum inquiry by composing a scientific investigation of poverty prior to 
developing his research methods, Booth himself ‘experienced first-hand the lives of his research subjects by 
taking up lodgings in the East End soaking up the ‘feel’ of the place, making notes, following the lives of other 
lodgers, and getting a notion of their life-styles and life histories’. Bales (n 22) 111. 
50 Michael Gordon, ‘The Social Survey Movement and Sociology in the United States’ (1973) 21(2) Social 
Problems 284. 
51 Bales (n 22). 
72 
 
The use of maps to present research findings is also an innovation that has influenced 
many other researchers thereafter, initiating a spatially nuanced perception of urban 
poverty that would soon also incite views of environmental determinism as well as urban 
renewal strategies.  
 
Figure 4: Booth’s ‘Map Descriptive of London Poverty’ (1898-1899). 52 
 
 
52 Figure 4 attribution: Image from London School of Economics and Political Science, Charles Booth, ‘Map 
Descriptive of London Poverty 1898-1899’, Sheet 1 (Eastern District). The copyright is in the public domain, 





Along with Booth, several other social surveys in England marked the turn of the twentieth 
century. Seebohm Rowntree’s study of the living conditions of the poor in the city of York 
in 1899-1901 is a recurrent mention in the literature, with the succeeding 
reimplementation in 1936 and 1950 providing an overview of the rapid variations in 
poverty levels over a period of major changes in policy.53 Rowntree further innovated the 
methods of calculating a poverty line and established a concept of poverty based on low 
income, i.e. insufficient earnings to maintain physical efficiency. He was also innovative in 
measuring the threshold that separated primary and secondary poverty by contrasting a 
household’s food budget and wasteful spending as well as in establishing a life-cycle of 
poverty standards  variability in relation to a fixed poverty line.54 Later on, Arthur Bowley 
and Alexander R Burnett-Hurst’s Livelihood and Poverty is another influential study, this 
time conducted in various towns of England in 1912-13. Here, the researchers revised 
Rowntree’s standards of measuring poverty with more advanced statistical methods of 
calculation.55  
Fewer studies are mentioned in accounts of the history of poverty knowledge outside of 
the UK at the time. In the USA, Jane Addams and Florence Kelley’s 1895 Hull-House Maps 
and Papers on Chicago’s settlement houses mapped and described demographic profiles 
and social patterns of diverse resident groups.56 More widely known today, WEB Du Bois' 
1899 The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study is considered the main early sociological and 
empirical study of the conditions of a black community in the United States.57 Du Bois was 
also a pioneer in producing empirical, statistical data visualisation using methods of 





53 Seebohm Rowntree, Poverty: A Study of Town Life (Macmillan 1901). 
54 Howard Glennerster, ‘The Context for Rowntree’s Contribution’ and ‘Poverty policy from 1900 to the 1970s’ 
in Howard Glennerster et al (eds), One Hundred Years of Poverty and Policy (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
2004). 
55 Arthur Bowley and Alexander R Burnett-Hurst, Livelihood and Poverty: A study in the Economic Conditions 
of Working-Class Households in Northampton, Warrington, Stanley and Reading (G Bell 1915). 
56 Jane Addams and Florence Kelley, Hull-House Maps and Papers (Crowell 1899). 
57 WEB Du Bois, The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study (fist published 1899, University of Pennsylvania Press 
1996). 





       
 
Figure 5: W.E.B. Du Bois’ Infographics, prepared for the ‘American Negro Exhibit’ 
at the Paris Exposition Universelle (1900).58 
 
Du Bois’ work is particularly relevant in this thesis in which the aesthetic feature of poverty 
knowledge and the spatial distribution of poverty are mutually implicated. Du Bois’ work 
can be seen as inscribing a new visual economy of African Americans – as well as being a 
precursor to spatial understandings of poverty – as a way to challenge the common 
association of blackness with innate degeneracy. Du Bois articulates an ‘environmental’ 
view of poverty, whereby criminal behaviour is created by disadvantageous social 
conditions which black populations inhabit, rather than being an inherent predisposition 
to antisocial behaviour. Poverty is, thus, framed as the environment itself, the material 
setting that people inhabit of run-down houses and unpaved streets which shapes social 
character.59 Differently from what today is framed as an ‘environmental determinism’ – 
which nurtures ideas of a determinable ‘culture of poverty’, as will be seen – Du Bois’s 
challenge to the mode of thinking of social problems of his time was to indicate that 
 
58 Figure 5 attribution: Image from The Public Domain Review, ‘W. E. B. Du Bois’ Hand-Drawn Infographics of 
African-American Life (1900)’. The copyright is in the public domain. 
<https://www.flickr.com/photos/publicdomainreview/albums/72157678269237891/with/32610916582/> 
accessed 1 August 2020. 
59 Shawn Michelle Smith, Photography on the Color Line: W. E. B. Dubois, Race and Visual Culture (Duke 
University Press 2004) 93. 
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people are a product of their environment. It is important to take notice of the prevailing 
biological deterministic thinking at that time which – also scientifically – enabled a very 
detrimental and long-lasting correlation to be drawn between poverty, crime and race. 
The process through which poor populations have historically been associated with 
criminality had been powerfully sustained by eugenicist, social Darwinist views of the 
criminal, as biologically stricken by a ‘genius of crime’.60 The social environmental 
perspective from Du Bois was in contention with scientific racism and indicated that any 
inclinations, behaviours or impulses held by populations subjected to poverty were 
responses to the conditions under which such populations had to strive. This is very 
different from ascribing a behavioural cause to poverty, as will be forged in mid-late 
twentieth century theory.61 I will pick up on this point in the next section. 
To conclude this first cluster, at the turn of the twentieth century, political, economic and 
social studies of poverty were widely established as fields of research. Not only was this a 
moment of innovative research, as poverty researchers were part of commissions or 
organisations that pressed for legal reforms and innovations in social policy design, it was 
also a historic period for political and institutional change. Booth himself was a member of 
the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress in 1905 and, before that, the 
Royal Commission on the Aged Poor, among many other public positions. The century to 
come would witness an academic consolidation of poverty research and a model of social 
policy-making to meet measured needs.62 It also propelled the international expansion of 
an institutional industry of experts by means of the professionalisation of policy and 
philanthropy. 
However, contrary to what this narrative seems to imply in terms of scientific ventures 
informing legal reforms and building up a public responsibility to face the problem of 
poverty (even when this very link is put to question when law commissions formed of 
experts seem to report their findings in often-questioned terms), I have instead 
demonstrated how it is law – i.e. broadly construed legal practices – that creates 
categories in the first place which will then be used to inform the empirical experiments of 
social research. The centuries-old figure of the vagrant, legally drawn to assemble 
objectionable behaviours of diverse kinds, is the guiding principle behind scientific 
 
60 Peter J Hutchings, The Criminal Spectre in Law, Literature and Aesthetics: Incriminating Subjects (Routledge 
2014). 
61 The most controversial example being Oscar Lewis, Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of 
Poverty (Basic Books 1959). 
62 As described in Bales (n 22).  
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investigations that – even if not explicitly so – attempt to map out the populations bearing 
the traits of idleness, criminality, atypical familial composition and substandard health, 
housing and sanitary conditions. The objectionable image of the poor still refers to the 
mobile vagrant, the insalubrious slum dweller, the indolent pauper. It is also through 
diverse and perhaps seemingly disconnected legal practices that the territorialisation of 
poverty is established – for example, in the formation of the slums of the early industrial 
towns – and then successively transformed through slum clearances and reconstructions. 
Law’s role in the formations, removals and remaking of slums is an important insight to be 
emphasised in this thesis, rather than considering the marginalised territories of poverty 
as excluded from the urban landscape. This is also a point made in chapter 1 where I 
indicated how poverty is not to be simplistically construed as the negative pole in relation 
to wealth, as an exclusion. Rather poverty, and its territories and populations, are actively 
made as such. Law establishes the conditions for poverty to be seen and/or concealed and 
it is such conditions of visibility that knowledge practices later seek to apprehend. Science 
measures and inscribes the symptoms, the indicators of a legally formed poverty design – 
not objective traces of poverty, as if there was such a concrete and essential materiality. It 
is to these symptoms, the legally established behaviours, cultures and inclinations of lives 
in poverty that science tries to explain.  
 
2.2 Criminalised poverty 
In tandem with the history of Victorian poor relief, another very important history 
unfolded: the gradual path towards the global abolition of slavery in the nineteenth 
century, along with the so-called New Imperialist expansion at the turn of the twentieth 
century.63 What has been presented above as a pathologizing scientific mode of practice in 
regards to poverty – i.e. where poverty was seen as an innate trait of the abnormalized 
figure of the deviant, crime-inclined poor, forming the basis of the science-based 
justification of early reforms in England regarding treatment and correction – gets 
aggravated when race is added to the equation, as is clearly evident in relation to the 
practices of scientific racism and eugenics. As the formerly enslaved and racialised 
 
63 Whilst the English experience with race and poverty is usually associated with its imperialist control in 
Africa and Asia in the late nineteenth century, there is substantial historical investigation documenting the 
earlier black and poor presence in Britain, including measures of ‘resettlement’ or ‘repatriation’ undertaken 
as a matter of policy. For example, Norma Myers, ‘The Black Poor of London: Initiatives of Eastern Seamen in 
the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries’ (1994) 13(2-3) Immigrants & Minorities 7; Stephen J 
Braidwood, Black Poor and White Philanthropists: London's Black and the Foundation of the Sierra Leone 
Settlement 1786-1791 (Liverpool University Press 1994). 
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populations of the world joined the poor populations as the labouring poor, complexity 
was added to the appraisal of poverty. Poverty, race and crime emerge as the inescapable 
variables forming the urban problem of poverty in the nineteenth century, a triangular 
consensus that, still today, seems unbreakable. Particularly in the United States of 
America, the element of raciality in poverty and crime is acute and has been central since 
the early stages of social research. The ‘racial breakthrough’ in poverty knowledge, termed 
‘the Negro Problem’ and pushed in studies such as the abovementioned work of Du Bois, 
was particularly acute during the post-reconstruction era and as a reaction to the 




Figure 6: Freedman's Bureau Poster, reads: ‘An Agency to Keep  




64 O’Connor (n 8) 74. 
65 Figure 6 attribution: Image from Library of Congress, unknown author, ‘The Freedman's Bureau! An agency 
to keep the Negro in idleness at the expense of the white man. Twice vetoed by the President, and made a 
law by Congress. Support Congress & you support the Negro. Sustain the President & you protect the white 
man’. Published in: American political prints, 1766-1876 / Bernard F Reilly. Boston: GK Hall, 1991, entry 1866-




In order to understand how the tripartite association of poverty-race-crime plays out it is 
crucial to recognise that the history of the science of crime developed in parallel, and at 
times intersecting, with that of poverty research. While remaining separate, as specialised 
fields, both worked together to innovate methods of inscription, abstraction and 
visualisation in the study of social problems. Together they produced systematic 
connections between the scientifically-created categories of crime, poverty and raciality, 
i.e. the supposed typical modern social problems around which the social sciences 
advanced. As a modern discipline, criminology is relevant to examine in this chapter not 
only for the concrete effects of its undertakings but also because contemporary critical 
criminology recognises the role of its own disciplinary history in the invention of its object 
of investigation, i.e. crime. Besides offering a critical self-assessment that is missing in 
poverty research, the history of criminology allows me to demonstrate another step 
towards the shift from a scientific approach to social policy to a technical expertise 
approach, which I am outlining in this chapter. Here is how this disciplinary history is 
generally told: 
In its early formulations, classical criminology set out to investigate crime and punishment 
premised on a liberal, humanist and utilitarian critique of the sovereign’s right to punish. 
Prominent names like Cesare Beccaria and, again, Jeremy Bentham established the 
rationalised perspective of penology and crime deterrence.66 The circumscription of 
criminology’s object of inquiry raised debates from the outset. In the absence of an 
independent category of crime with inherent properties, criminologists – much like 
poverty investigators later on – set out to investigate the acts and behaviours that law 
defined as criminal. An inherently tautological definition is therefore present from the 
early stages of criminology. In the context of the pathologizing tendencies of the 
nineteenth century, positivist criminology, concurrently, set out to investigate the subject 
of crime, i.e. the criminal type, as a deviant clinical condition with detectable physical 
indicators and behavioural patterns. With prominent investigators, such as Cesare 
Lombroso and Alphonse Bertillon, the study of human differences, anthropometrics and 
physiognomy, thrived under a growing consensus on social Darwinism. Taking 
physiological and mental faculties to the centre of scientific scrutiny, the aetiology of crime 
would draw the primary correlation between poverty and criminality from a biological 
scientific perspective.  
 
66 On the prominent names that built criminology and its various schools of thought: Nicole H Rafter, The 




Figure 7: ‘Photographs Depicting Anthropometry’,  
the Second International Exhibition of Eugenics (1921).67 
 
It is telling that early criminologists investigated the determinants of crime by taking the 
prison population as the universe of study, disregarding methodological problems related 
to penal selectivity – that the prison population is not a universe of criminals but a 
universe of criminalised subjects. The so-called ‘dark figure of crime’ term, which explains 
how only a fraction of crimes are registered, elucidates the difference between the 
perceived and the actual crime rate.68 The dark figure is the reality of crime which is left 
unseen, unregistered, off the records. It is that which traditional, positivist criminology 
would overlook while measuring criminality and examining the statistics of crime to 
deduce conclusions about crime and criminals in society (e.g. by interpreting the profile of 
carceral populations as a pure reflection of the profile of the criminals in society instead of 
 
67 Figure 7 attribution: Image from Wikimedia Commons, ‘A Set of Photographs Depicting Anthropometry - 
the Measurement of Humans’. Exhibit photograph scanned from: Harry H Laughlin, ‘The Second International 
Exhibition of Eugenics held September 22 to October 1921, in connection with the Second International 
Congress of Eugenics in the American Museum of Natural History, New York’ (Baltimore: William & Wilkins 
Co, 1923). The copyright is in the public domain, licensed under the terms of no known copyright restrictions. 
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Anthropometry_exhibit.jpg#file> accessed 29 June 2020. 
68 See Edwin Sutherland, ‘White-Collar Criminality’ (1940) 5(1) American Sociological Review 1. 
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only those who are the most criminalised in society). Of course, measures to overturn this 
methodological problem have been attempted, for example with victimisation surveys. 
Such surveys are a mechanism first introduced to socio-legal theory by means of critical 
criminology scholarship, deflating statistically grounded truth claims by revealing a major 
gap: the underreporting of crimes. Thus, ‘penal selectivity’ is the concept that explains 
how the partial and apparent crime rate and the resulting statistics around it have been 
forged by the operations of a penal system that punishes selectively. Hence the evident 
conclusion that the totality of the prison population does not correspond with or reflect 
the universe of a so-called criminal population. Unsurprisingly, scientific connections were 
also drawn between the profiles of criminals and the traits of colonised, racialised and 
abnormalized peoples, establishing the grounds of scientific racism. 
The development of such scientific practices was also accompanied by legal practices, as I 
have been emphasising in this chapter, with both determining and determined by one 
another. The ways in which legal practices have accompanied these ideas, can be 
illustrated by the so-called rationalisation of punishment. It is again with Bentham’s 
aspirational prison reform in the image of the panopticon that, like the workhouses, 
institutional internment became a mode of discipline, surveillance and/or treatment. 
Foucault’s influential work on this topic demonstrates the rationalisation of crime and 
punishment through an optical and technological shift – from the spectacle of punishment 
to more pervasive forms of surveillance, from public exhibition of corporal punishment to 
secluded confinement and increasingly leading to biopower permeating through the fabric 
of social life. The optical reference is particularly relevant for the analysis I develop in this 
thesis, particularly in the next chapter. The ‘panoptic gaze’, the visuality of surveillance in 
the disciplinary society, entails the deployment of social control to increasingly diverse 
spaces, monitoring behaviour and producing classifications of the normal and the 
abnormal, deviant, criminal.69 
As social sciences advanced in the twentieth century, structuralist interpretations became 
prevalent, particularly in regard to the Durkheimian functionalist approach to deviance 
and crime as inevitable and indeed functional conditions of social life.70 Similarly, and 
against the essentialised association of poverty and race, Du Bois can be seen to have 
 
69 The visuality of legal techniques is an insight by Foucault, which greatly influenced critical criminology. 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Random House 1977). 
70 Émile Durkheim, ‘The Rules of Sociological Method’ in Scott Appelrouth and Laura D Edles (eds), Classical 
and Contemporary Sociological Theory: Text and Readings (Pine Forge Press 2007) 95. 
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attempted a new portrayal of the black population in the USA, by showing ‘nonpoor’ 
depictions of blackness at the same time as he promoted social surveys that attributed the 
preordained misery of black lives to an external injustice.71 
 
Figure 8: W.E.B. Du Bois’ ‘American Negro Exhibit’  
at the Paris Exposition Universelle (1900).72 
 
To be sure, notions of deviance – pathologizing and attributing responsibility to the poor – 
have never been as entirely overcome by sociological perspectives as it tends to be 
believed. In fact, the notion of deviance is continually revived in the history of the social 
sciences and is present – although not always overtly – in the mid-twentieth century 
widely accepted theory of the culture of poverty, which was initially developed by Oscar 
Lewis.73 Having developed an ethnography of poor Mexican families, Lewis attributed 
multigenerational poverty to values and behaviours passed down from generation to 
generation and which perpetuated the ‘cycle of disadvantages’ – including apathy, 
dependency, marginality, lack of shared values with society at large, deviant sexual 
practices, etc. In a nutshell, socially rather than individually constructed poverty was seen 
 
71 Smith (n 59). 
72 Figure 8 attribution: Image from Wikimedia Commons, WEB Du Bois,‘Isaiah Mays, Medal of Honor 
recipient. This photograph was part of the material prepared by W.E.B. Du Bois for the Negro Exhibit of the 
American Section at the Paris Exposition Universelle in 1900 to show the economic and social progress of 
African Americans since emancipation’ (1900). The copyright is in the public domain, licensed under the terms 
of no known copyright restrictions. <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Isaiah_Mays.jpg> accessed 29 
June 2020. 
73 Lewis (n 61). 
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as formed by the poor themselves, and therefore as a phenomenon resistant to external 
interventions. Another important study supporting associations between crime, race and 
poverty is Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin's Delinquency and Opportunity Theory, which 
attributed youth delinquency and the gang phenomenon to the community pathology and 
the social anomie of slums.  
As I mentioned, the USA presents a unique environment in which we can see how the 
notion of a science-informed social intervention can be twisted and revealed as 
intervention-driven science. This task of exposure is what contemporary critical 
criminologists and abolitionist scholars have taken on. They show how poverty and race 
are tellingly engrained in the legal structures of the American criminal system, pointing to 
the history of slavery and the persistent narrative of racial difference as key features 
upheld by law’s authentication of such engrained associations of poverty, race and 
crime.74 Since the abolition of slavery, the containment of racialised populations has been 
perpetuated through systematic criminalisation by means of what today have been 
historically revised as non-violent crimes, such as vagrancy and loitering. Scholars have 
pointed to the effect of such practices as foremost economic. That is to say, in the 
aftermath of the US civil war, the formerly enslaved and their descendants have been 
systematically criminalised and have continued to provide free labour via convict leasing.75 
Moreover, as is widely known, legal forms have openly normalised racial segregation, as in 
the so-called Jim Crow system, through which civil rights activists were also framed as 
criminals – and terrorists – up to the late 1960s for violating the segregation laws.  
In the aftermath the Civil Rights Act of 1964, within a context of sustained racially-based 
institutional violence and urban unrest, two federal policy orientations were introduced in 
the 1960s. First, the ‘War on Poverty’ was initiated by the 1964 Equal Opportunities Act, 
which aimed to promote socioeconomic mobility in low-income areas as a measure of 
urban intervention. Subsequently, the ‘War on Crime’ was initiated by the 1965 Law 
Enforcement Assistance Act, ultimately resulting in federal involvement in local police, 
courts and prisons.76 Soon after, the 1970s marked the advent of what has been termed 
 
74 Notably Angela Davis, ‘Race and Criminalization: Black Americans and the Punishment Industry’ in 
Wahneema Lubiano (ed), The House that Race Built (Vintage Books 1997); See also, in the UK: Paul Gilroy, 
‘The Myth of Black Criminality’ in Martin Eve and David Musson (eds), The Socialist Register (Merlin Press 
1982) 19. 
75 Michele Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (Penguin Books 
2019). 
76 Another landmark in codified law which conveys the clear anti-urban disorder intention of the time is the 
Safe Streets Act 1968, passed in the aggravated context of unrests in the aftermath of Martin Luther King’s 
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the era of mass incarceration by means of the Law and Order legislation trend77, which is 
typically framed as part of the backlash against the civil rights and anti-war movements.78 
The prison industrial complex was then formed as a military-corporate model, 
incorporating technology originally created for overseas warfare and then applied to 
internal, domestic problems, and with increasing private sector involvement.79 The 
explosion in imprisonment rates at that time as well as the overrepresentation of 
racialised populations within the prison population have been widely reported. So have 
the effects of public-private investment in equipping police forces and corporate 
surveillance in public spaces.80 Again, a legal history perspective reveals how legislation 
has reiteratively delineated the contours of the criminal and selected profiles to be 
criminalised. As a result, new data to be produced thereafter would confirm empirically 
the criminal inclination of the black and poor urban populations, thus confirming the need 
for action which resulted in escalating imprisonment – hence producing a continued 
increase in crime rates that circularly validated its own legislative and policy causes.81  
An important source of data repeatedly raised is the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Uniform Crime Reports, which in the late 1950s initiated a nation-wide data gathering 
practice that compiled the crime rate statistics mostly composed of urban police 
department arrest rates. That is to say, as a compilation of criminal statistics from law 
enforcement agencies, this federal reporting practice was criticised for correlating rates of 
arrest, not convictions, to publicise rises in crime.82 The challenges of measuring crime, in 
fact, are reportedly used as a rationale to further inflate budget allocation and expand 
 
assassination. For an illuminating analysis of the combination of these gestures of anticrime intervention 
against urban, black and impoverished populations, and as a concurrent cause of the carceral explosion in the 
USA, see Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration 
in America (Harvard University Press 2016). 
77 Mona Lynch outlines four different forms of legal change that have been catalysts to the rise of mass 
incarceration in the USA: ‘legislative and other statutory changes to penal codes that have increased the 
likelihood and lengths of prison terms in jurisdictions across the country. The second form is found in federal 
case law, particularly 8th Amendment jurisprudence on conditions of confinement and related issues. The 
third aspect of legal change is in the area of post-sentencing law and policy (especially related to parole 
release, supervision, and revocation). Finally, the fourth form of legal change has to do with the myriad 
changes to on-the-ground legal practices related to sentencing and punishment in local courtrooms around 
the country’. Mona Lynch, ‘Mass Incarceration, Legal Change, and Locale: Understanding and Remediating 
American Penal Overindulgence’ (2011) 10(3) Criminology & Public Policy 674. 
78 Tony Platt, ‘U.S. Criminal Justice in the Reagan Era: An Assessment’ (1987) 29 Crime and Social Justice 58; 
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punitive practices in the criminal justice system,83 leading to increasingly specialised and 
computerised forms of data processing and cross-referencing, which, as will be seen, came 
to dominate the end of the twentieth century. Another relevant study often cited as being 
influenced by the abovementioned culture of poverty perspective, was Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan’s The Negro Family: A Case for National Action from 1965 (also referred to as 
the Moynihan Report).84 It situates cultural deprivation and a tangle of pathology as the 
root cause of poverty, and poverty, in turn, as the root cause of crime. At the time, it was a 
very influential report, Moynihan himself being a public servant and the report being 
published as a policy paper of the US Department of Labor. Thus, the ‘culture of poverty’ 
perspective was consecrated as an institutional agenda, particularly with regards to so-
called ‘matriarchal families’. Likewise, Edward Banfield and James Q Wilson’s City Politics 
emphasised personal choice and cultural norms as contributing to urban poverty and 
criminality – with black cultural pathology particularly figuring as a cause of crime via 
‘ghetto culture’ – and thereby reinforced the common wisdom view that welfare policies 
produce the problem of the ‘underclass’.85 
In the 1980s, further emphasis was placed on criminal policy with the so-called ‘War on 
Drugs’. Although narcotics control had been initiated earlier in the twentieth century, the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 198486 officially launched a counterdrug offensive 
which would be added to by a series of other legal instruments to advance punitive 
measures – including mandatory minimum sentencing, mass arrests, forfeiture practices 
and property confiscation – as well as a punitive urban policy and crime prevention 
measures – which involved the surveillance and policing of segregated urban 
neighbourhoods, patrolling of borders, the suspension of welfare benefits and reductions 
in social expenditure, particularly affecting housing projects, while increasing drug 
enforcement resources.87 The effects on the image of the urban landscape have been 
visible, with rates of poverty, crime, street violence and drug abuse having each been 
recorded as increasing.88 Advanced by the 1981 Military Cooperation with Civilian Law 
Enforcement Agencies Act, through which tactical police fused with defence agencies to 
enhance counterdrug (and counter-terrorism) operations, the militarisation of the police 
 
83 A point made by Hinton (n 76) 7. 
84 See in Daniel P Moynihan, ‘The Negro Family: The Case for National Action’ (Office of Policy Planning and 
Research, US Department of Labor 1965). 
85 O’Connor (n 8). 
86 Other landmark legislation in the USA includes the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, known as the 
‘Drug Free America Act’, which increased funds to drug enforcement and drug control programmes. 
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also promoted transnational cooperation. Indeed, the war on drugs quickly expanded into 
international territories, particularly in Latin America, many of which had been ruled since 
the 1960s by military dictatorships closely allied to and sponsored by the USA.89 The 
interventionism against the racialised poor within ‘bad neighbour’ countries was fuelled by 
a crusade against a purported security threat, which resulted in escalated violence and 
militarisation in the region – a conjuncture of urban violence that endures today, as will be 
seen in chapter 5.90 
These are the general circumstances of a de facto ‘war against the poor’, which illustrates 
the second trend in poverty administration (spanning knowledge, legislation and policy) 
that is associated with combating crime and affirming racial difference and is propelled by 
factors which are distanced from scientific-statistical evidence. Indeed, contemporary 
analyses show that the policy and legal practices which worked at criminalising and 
stigmatising black and Latino populations in the wars on poverty, crime and drugs were 
unsupported by the available data.91 In contrast to the research agenda that inaugurated 
classical criminology, in the late twentieth century, critical criminology emerged to 
examine the process through which crime and criminals are formed, establishing 
‘criminalisation’ as its revised object of study. The abstract definition of crime and the 
practical implications of crime repression for poor and racialised populations and 
territories were brought to the forefront of the discipline’s raison d’être. Under the 
paradigm of penal abolitionism, useful concepts have been forged to understand the 
connections of poverty and raciality to crime as sociotechnical constructions.  
Critical criminology describes how the scientific approach to such constructions have 
revealed problems in terms of the objectification and quantification of social interactions 
as naturalised social phenomena and/or social stratification within political dynamics. The 
profiles of ‘the criminal’ are reframed as the profiles of ‘the criminalised’, revealing how 
the latter have been scientifically materialised into an entity, an existing subject, by the 
selectivity of the penal system and associated legal practices. The visualisation of the 
criminal in terms of deviation appears as the direct result of legal operations in light of the 
modern mode of differentiating between normality and abnormality. Like pathologization, 
the process of criminalisation derives from an undisputed definition and classification 
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enacted by knowledge practices and anchored in legal framings of the criminal as a genius 
of crime, now a conditioned subject rather than the volitional individual.92 
The image of the criminal is thus revealed as both a frame and a modulation operating 
upon populations and territories – the ‘dangerous poor’ is but a profiling artifice pressed 
onto people and places. As such, contemporary critical and abolitionist scholars 
demonstrate how entire populational segments are archetypally and collectively made 
into images of criminality. They are not simply framed as criminals, rather the populational 
labelling process (as, for example, in racial profiling) produces the marker by which crimes 
are defined in the first place.  Factors such as race, gender, age, origin, environment, 
occupancy, place of residence – in a pervasive intersection with contemporary definitions 
of poverty – become the features that provide presumptive evidence of dangerousness 
and criminality. As new crimes are established in new epochs, it seems increasingly 
manifest that they work as sampling techniques that frame pre-emptively determined 
populations.  
Likewise, entire environments and areas are turned into spaces of crime and violence by 
territorial stigma. The stigma is ultimately confirmed by higher crime rates resulting from 
intensified policing and processing of such areas. I have mentioned how concealment of 
the poor seems to be a persistent continuum, whether in terms of early vagrant removals, 
pauper foreign emigration, concentration in slums, confinement in workhouses and, most 
notably now, incarceration in modern prisons far removed from inner cities. But this 
concealment also takes place through urban segregation and marginalisation into poor, 
overcrowded and racialised ghettos which have ‘mantained the color line’.93  
Thus, a sense of a continuity between the two (at first sight very different) modes of 
poverty administration scrutinised so far can be verified in the urban planning which they 
facilitate. As indicated above, the early social survey movement gradually gave rise to the 
spatial distribution of poverty as matter of a scientific and social concern. This, in turn, 
gave rise to perspectives on environments of poverty as determining crime-prone or vice-
prone profiles, i.e. that the proliferation of criminal behaviour was prompted by 
disadvantageous social conditions which racialised and poor populations inhabit. Soon 
enough, ‘environmental determinism’ came to replace the earlier dominant explicative 
system of ‘biological determinism’ by focusing on aspects of culture and its background – a 
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classic example being the so-called ‘broken windows theory’ and its ensuing ‘zero 
tolerance’ policing practices in ghettoised urban areas. As a consequence, racialised 
divisions and urban segregation themselves work to support the continued containment 
(seclusion or vanishment) of populations and territories and towards activating ever 
harsher (and more targeted) penal repression. In chapter 5 I will explore some of the 
implications of this intricate correlation between intervention strategies and subsequent 
data production that ends up supporting or validating the interventionist trends, but it is 
important to stress here that, like in the case of the nineteenth century slum clearances, 
more recent urban redevelopment and upgrading projects are typically pressed by the 
need to cleanse and beautify stigmatised areas and therefore to push certain populations 
further away from the range of vision. This works both at a local level and the global level, 
as I have mentioned the case of Latin American reverberations of the framework of wars – 
on poverty, on crime, on drugs, on terror. In fact, Latin America has long been a sort of 
laboratory for neoliberalism and militarisation, and especially for trialling national security 
doctrines and strategies against domestic enemies.94 
The inverted perspective propitiated by critical criminology has been extensively explored 
in the recent history of hyper-incarceration in the USA in the context of the war on drugs. 
The rapid rise of the prison population propelled and resulted from an increasing 
privatisation of the prison system, as well as militarisation of law enforcement in order to 
provide the infrastructures for the mass imprisonment expansion. These developments, 
largely accompanied by the late twentieth century retrenchment of welfare institutions, as 
will be seen next, is often recounted as a transmutation of ‘welfare’ into ‘prisonfare’, 
revealing the penalising responses to growing rates of people falling under the poverty 
line.95 Exposed as a global trend that some scholars termed ‘neoliberal penality’, this has 
involved a widespread context of expansion of the penal apparatus along with punitive 
welfare policies in the context of a so-called deregulation of the economy and the labour 
market.96 Rising rates of incarceration and expansion of the penal state can indeed be 
verified worldwide as a continuous trend of carceral inflation.97 Construed as a ‘poverty 
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policy’ rather than an institution that punishes crime, the prison expansion is thus 
understood as managing the growing social insecurity occasioned by the increasing 
informalisation of workers, which purportedly includes being pushed to criminalised 
economies – that is, an insecurity created by the precise measures of the neoliberal 
thrust.98  
Other critics warn against framing a so-called neoliberal punitive and imposing project as 
though essentialised notions of ‘State’ and ‘neoliberalism’ held a unified and material 
existence, rather than being abstractions formed by multiple contingencies.99 Although 
this is a caveat that I have also signalled from the outset in this thesis, I would remark in 
this case that what is commonly framed under the marker of ‘neoliberalism’ can often be 
verified as having been effectively pushed as a very explicit and integrated agenda. This is 
particularly evident within the geopolitical interplay between countries at the centre and 
those at the peripheries of another essentialised but also quite operative phenomenon, 
i.e. ‘global capitalism’, of which the Washington Consensus is just an obvious example of 
how an imposition can be seen to manifest.  To claim that a project is imposed does not 
need to be an essentialising stand pointing to ideological manipulations in an arena of 
immanence, but can also suggest a way to conceive of the agonistic nature of 
contingencies, in which practices of negotiation also include mustered influence, even if 
temporarily, which is not restricted (or reduced) to institutional politics but also extends to 
knowledge practices and legal practices that inform or validate policy. The fact that 
multilateral financial institutions implement such agendas and enforce conditionalities 
upon its debtors continually re-enacts such impositions, as in the case of the infamous 
structural adjustment programmes for countries facing economic crisis.100 Also, to return 
to the example of the global expansion of the war on drugs, pointing towards an 
interventionism in Latin America by USA foreign policy can be quickly dismissed as an 
ideological reading of what is, indeed, a much more complex and multilateral flow of 
occurrences. But if one decides to approach this ‘imperialist interventionism’ by means of 
tracing the networks and chains of funds, it is also detectable how ‘generous foreign aid 
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packages’ have been effective in enabling such a warfare.101 Taking this point to an 
extreme, corporate lobbying assumes a role, within the configurations here under analysis, 
that is as relevant or as productive as that of knowledge practices which negotiate 
agonistically and from which policy or institutional agendas derive. 
With these reservations in mind, though, in the next section, I will draw on such nuanced 
narratives of transformations since the 1970s in which, rather than displacing the welfare 
state, the neoliberal thrust has transformed it, re-regulating rather than deregulating.102 
To restate my argument and how it translates into this section: law creates categories and 
parameters for detecting the criminal poor by establishing the typical conducts, 
populations and territories to be criminalised. Law is continually in this role of making 
poverty seen and establishing the conditions for poverty to be widely seen. Contrary to 
what we tend to think, this means that it is not science that finds, examines and 
formulates what poverty is. It is first and foremost law which creates it and then detects it 
within a sample of the populations and territories that meet the profile. Science measures 
and inscribes the symptoms, the indicators of a legally formed poverty design. 
Furthermore, criminology marks a relevant move towards the shift from a scientific 
approach to a technical expertise approach to policy that I am outlining in this chapter. It 
illustrates a crucial change of thinking within a single discipline in the twentieth century, a 
shift that was also verifiable (indeed intertwined) in social policy. We will now move on to 
the post-World War II welfare state in order to analyse how the use of theory in policy 
shifted to a paradigm of testing ‘what works’. 
 
2.3 Welfare support 
Another direction in which changing interventions in populations and territories of poverty 
were configured in the twentieth century was that of social welfare reforms, accompanied 
by increasingly specialised social sciences, legislation and policy. In contrast to the earlier 
poor laws and labour protection measures, the so-called welfare state aims to establish 
social security or insurance for various types of social services that manage targeted 
‘insecurity’. Typically narrated within a historical line of progress from, and replacement 
of, the earlier poor relief attitude, the welfare state is an interesting mode of social 
administration to observe.103 However, it is important to note how such a narrative is 
 
101 Carpenter (n 90) 26. 
102 Garland (n 6). 
103 See David Roberts, The Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State (Yale University Press 1960). 
90 
 
disputed, with scholars also indicating that reliance on means-tested social assistance was 
never displaced by the social insurance based model.104 Also, this narrative often does not 
account for the practices of criminalisation occurring at the same time, as we have seen. In 
fact, the concurrent development of social rights and of technologies of containment seen 
above demonstrate how the twentieth century’s model of social provisions is more 
adequately construed as a hybrid ‘penal-welfarism’.105  
That being said, to continue along the segmented analysis of this chapter, for the sake of 
identifying the common threads that form the compound of knowledge-law-intervention, 
this separation of seemingly self-contained models of action is methodologically required 
to start with. The focus here is on the forms of interaction between welfare policy, law and 
science. I will address the welfare strand of change to demonstrate the ways in which it 
also presents a marked shift away from early century scientism and towards an end of 
century prioritisation of technical expertise, or a technical knowledge-based approach 
aimed at informing policy. It is in a context of experimentations that I frame welfare 
modes of practice as precursor to what today is the relatively unchallenged method of 
evidence-based policy‐making. It is also under this mode of practice, not contrary to it, 
that we have seen the contemporary welfare reforms that retrench social expenditures – 
and indeed the rejection of what is now often reframed as an ideologically motivated 
(socialist inclined) policy-making.106 Whilst early social surveys had been reportedly aimed 
at pressing for reforms and for public policy designs to adequately deal with the ‘true 
nature’ of ‘social problems’ – revealed as such by means of scientific discoveries – the mid-
twentieth century idea of welfare has been presented in less scientific and more pragmatic 
terms, as an interventionist innovation that mobilised knowledge practices by employing 
experimental approaches to demystify the liberal economic consensus of laissez-faire.107 
To be sure, the model is effectively informed by the consistent collection of data via 
recognised methods of social measurement – I am not suggesting otherwise. However, its 
inventiveness is the work of strategic policy making and pragmatic planning, fostering 
approaches that would later be designated as practice-oriented research and evidence-
based intervention. To this effect, policy appears in a novel position of testing theoretical 
propositions and finding cost-effective alternatives to solving social problems. Its 
increasingly recorded social indicators, developed to sustain policy adjustments and 
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reorientations, in turn propelled a growing data-production industry to support further 
analysis of social mobility. 
To recount the historical elements that propitiated the formation of governmental 
arrangements that amount to a ‘welfare state’ across the so-called advanced industrial 
nations, scholars typically return to the aftermath of the financial crisis of the 1920s and 
30s and the first world war. The interventionist welfare practices initiated by the New Deal 
in the USA and the post-war European reconstruction plans soon expanded across the 
globe and became a characteristic – yet widely varied – administrative organisation of the 
twentieth century. Whilst there are important prefigurations to mention, such as the early 
century social reforms mentioned above108 – and, in fact, a more classical origin typically 
mentioned by historians is the Bismarckian model of the social state in 1880s Germany – 
the fully consolidated welfare state experience was patently adopted from the 1940s 
onwards.  
A typical and prominent study to mention is that of William Beveridge, who was 
commissioned to investigate the abolition of poverty and want in the UK and who, in 1942, 
presented to parliament his report titled Social Insurance and Allied Services.109 Addressing 
the five giants (squalor, ignorance, want, idleness and disease) the report outlined a social 
plan which included the extension in coverage of the then existing insurance schemes to 
the population at large along with a supplementary safety net provision for an expectedly 
small share of the population that was most in need. Beveridge is thus recognised as 
having laid the foundations of the modern welfare state, regardless of commentaries 
acknowledging that the terms of his plan were never fully implemented. In the context of 
Keynesian economics of reconstruction, state intervention and development, the report 
found a promising atmosphere for implementing social welfare reforms. Premised on the 
notion of a social security net for all citizens, beyond the household means-tested 
provisions that had earlier characterised public social protections, the welfare policy 
presented specialised instruments to target specific areas of social deterioration. 
Innovative legislation of the time included the National Insurance Act and the National 
Health Service Act of 1946 along with other legal instruments that covered increasingly 
more specialised areas of intervention (children, elderly, health, education, food, to 
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mention a few).110 With this legal infrastructure – because of it or despite of it, analysts 
disagree – there flourished a stable period of growth and reduced inequality in the UK.  
A similar history of innovative legislation and policy design of social insurances is told with 
regards to other European and North American countries.111 Although they followed 
diverse liberal and social emphases, continental Western Europe largely adopted post-war 
social welfare reforms of different scales and institutional architectures. Thus, the broad 
picture presented here amalgamates varied types and histories in order to extract some 
common factors that are markedly welfarist, that is: social protection, social rights and 
social assistance. In that regard, it is important to recognise that the term ‘welfare state’ 
itself is misleading because very different models of social services are grouped together 
under this name, such as financial services such as pensions and cash transfers, social 
services like healthcare, housing and education, as well as other nonmonetary benefits.112 
To that effect, I refer to welfare practices in general in order to address the wide spectrum 
of social policy and, in particular, ‘the distinctive methods and instruments that it deploys 
to pursue its multiple and various ends’. 113 But because I am concerned with broader 
global connections traced from the centres of global poverty production (poverty research 
and intervention), my focus inevitably falls to one side of this spectrum. In contrast with 
the rest of continental Europe, Britain and the USA share a common liberal emphasis and 
scholars point to a growing approximation by means of timely changes in the trajectory of 
the British welfare state towards ‘Americanization’ and to the detriment of European-style 
social policy – i.e. the deflation of public welfare practices and their increasing 
subordination to the private market.114 
It is interesting to think broadly of welfare states, for a start, as systems of social 
stratification, of the division and categorisation of populations which social policy will 
target but also, consequently, cultivate.115 The segmentations by which welfare 
programmes operate, as such, sustain shared conventions and inform what it means to be 
poor. Structures of welfare practices work towards social mobility by meritocratic 
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achievements but also increasingly provide justifications for inequality based on 
insufficient efforts. Social stratification here refers to the classifications of social classes 
that have been initiated and increasingly specialised by the early social surveys. The 
progressively meticulous separation of classes by distinctive attributes was a strategy to 
determine an accurate poverty threshold and informed modes of intervention according 
to actual needs. The twentieth century poverty research has developed continually revised 
standards of poverty measurement, actualising preceding standards and methods of 
calculation. Nevertheless, this premise is operative still today, i.e. an absolute measure of 
poverty as defined by a calculated income level under which people are categorised as 
poor. As perceptions of poverty have been reshaped to involve more than elements of 
individual responsibility and moral degeneracy, with work effort and industriousness being 
demonstrated by social investigators as insufficient factors for prosperity and with 
unemployment affecting society at large, measures for the elimination of poverty have 
been structured around full employment, redistributive social support and tax-funded 
safety net benefits – where the previously mentioned frame of opportunities finds a lot of 
resonances. Mid-century research tries to apprehend the traps of the life cycle of poverty 
and to outline strategies on how to avoid them.  
In this context, analytic work on measuring ‘living standards’ and perfecting the calculation 
of poverty lines proliferated. Whilst Rowntree continued to apply his measures as 
mentioned above, others attempted to update the basis of his calculation. An influential 
poverty research project along these lines was Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend’s The 
Poor and the Poorest (1965),116 which, contrary to widespread belief at the time, found a 
marked increase in poverty in the 1960s. Their approach added more variables to the 
large-scale measurement and delineation of levels of living in the UK, based on data from 
the Family Expenditure Survey, which went beyond food subsidies and included previously 
unaccounted for factors (such as rent and other dimensions of social life). This study 
provided the groundwork for a relative understanding of deprivation, one which varies 
according to variations in levels of national prosperity. Also, Peter Townsend’s 1979 work 
on Poverty in the United Kingdom is a meticulous study of relative poverty as a matter 
beyond material deprivation and dietary subsistence standards, and as encompassing the 
lack of resources for broader customary living conditions.117 Hence, relative poverty is to 
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be understood as social exclusion, an exclusion from customary living patterns and 
activities. As with preceding studies, innovations in measurement revealed new realities of 
poverty – child poverty for one, in the case of Townsend.118  Another important study to 
mention is Anthony Atkinson’s Poverty in Britain and the Reform of Social Security 
(1969).119 From an econometric standpoint, Atkinson – after whom the Atkinson index is 
named – set out to measure inequality  and to prescribe policy-based solutions, especially 
by emphasising income distribution policy, as he would later advocate a basic income. His 
later work focuses on global poverty and he has chaired the World Bank's Commission on 
Global Poverty. 
In the USA, a prominent name to mention is Mollie Orshansky, who developed in 1963 
what came to be the first official nation-wide poverty measure in the USA, which enabled 
statistical planning in the context of the imminent War on Poverty. Defined in reference to 
household purchase of minimally adequate amounts of goods and services, Orshansky’s 
calculations took into account the average family’s budget for food and the costs of basic 
food items to establish a poverty line. In 1967 the US Census Bureau published the first 
poverty report based on the Orshansky Poverty Thresholds. As the first national poverty 
statistics, the report was based on data from the Current Population Survey Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement, the nation’s oldest ongoing household survey. Poverty data 
thus appeared in an increasingly numerical, aggregate and complex form, as illustrated in 
Figure 9. Yet, unlike her predecessors, Orshansky was by no means on a quest for scientific 
purity. The drive to turn poverty into numbers, a quantifiable and objective reality, was 
described by Orshansky as a subjective, value judgement task of (circular) definition: one 
counts the poor to do something about it, and poverty data becomes an artifact, a working 
tool against which the poor will be measured and classified, i.e. a threshold.120 This insight 
inspired much of the discussion that I present in chapter 3. Other influential studies 
undertaken at this time include Michael Harrington’s The Other America (1962) and John 
Kenneth Galbraith’s The Affluent Society (1958).121 These were both influential attempts to 
characterise poverty profiles, causes and systemic explanations – information that poverty 
lines cannot provide. 
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Figure 9: First statistical table of poverty estimates published by the US Census Bureau,  
based on the Orshansky Threshold (1967).122 
 
By aiming to tackle poverty as a trap – be it the cultural factors which cause 
intergenerational poverty or the social protections themselves which promote inactivity – 
the most prevalent welfare practices provide remedies for social risks, in terms of benefits 
for unemployment, sickness and pension insurance. They aim to ensure the poverty-prone 
populations against the risk of falling into poverty. Indeed, welfare practices target the 
working or middle classes at large, i.e. the mass of employed workers, as opposed to 
strictly the poor123 – for which there are, nonetheless, continued forms of poverty-relief 
such as means-tested income support to help oneself out of poverty, including food 
stamps, council tax benefits, cash benefits, housing benefits and income support of 
different kinds. Hence the mentioned premise of welfare intervention is to provide 
insurance against the social insecurities of poverty and a safety net for those who still 
need to be relieved from it. In that regard, poverty is here perceived as an economic 
misfortune inherent to modern societies that some fall into but also can get out of. It is no 
longer a sort of innate feature but a cultural, behavioural one. It is no longer a pure matter 
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of individual responsibility, but also those who do not strive to escape the trap are 
disparaged for preferring to live on benefits than to work.124 In fact, the common critique 
of welfare practices is of causing dependency, the so-called ‘welfare trap’ which in some 
instances – such as where low wages combine with high childcare costs – makes it too 
disadvantageous for a benefit receiver to find work and risk forfeiting their benefits.  
To that effect we also find a broader change in the perception of poverty, from an 
exclusively income-based view towards a more varied, aggregate and multi-factor 
socioeconomic composition of poverty, and corresponding policy models in which living 
standards are secured by public social assistance beyond supplements to labour-derived 
incomes. Indeed, the nation-based approach to the social rights of citizenship is focused 
on the advancement towards equality of status rather than equality of income, in terms of 
targeting class difference by elevating the lower strata to become civilised, educated, 
active citizens.125 Although premised on building equality of opportunity through a 
bottom-up tactic, policy-led upward social mobility does not encompass a reshaping of 
class structure. In that regard, the Scandinavian social democratic experience of the 
welfare state is reported as particularly effective in equalising opportunity without 
affecting the top social strata but also without abolishing the gap between the top and 
bottom strata.126  
Moreover, even though premised on egalitarian commitments as conditions of citizenship, 
research shows that welfare provisions often operate with unfair terms of eligibility and 
unequal access ‘patterned along class, race and gender lines.’127 Albeit very important, 
particularly because these are precisely the mechanisms through which social stratification 
is sustained, as mentioned above, these are not the analyses that I focused on. Within the 
scope of this thesis, it is useful to signal here a point of inflection of new notions of social 
citizenship rights that have been constructed around ‘social problems’, including the 
gradual introduction of the language of rights and entitlements in attitudes toward 
poverty. The rights-based approach to social security, broadly speaking, emerged as a 
global consensus relatively early on in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Yet, while 
supported by a growing international network of exchange and cooperation, this paradigm 
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was also a state-building device, having been incorporated into constitutions and national 
legal infrastructure across the world as part of nation-based aspirations to delimit 
citizenship, borders and national identity.  
In this regard, critics emphasise that ‘social security’ is embedded in imperialist affirmation 
while at the same time it precisely effaces its colonial bedrocks by making – yet again – 
claims to universality.128 Having raised this point, though, I must reiterate that the premise 
of my argument does not lie in the imperialist-domination arguments of post-development 
scholarship (though I certainly am in conversation with such scholarship), but it rather 
concentrates on the complex, multi-sited and cross-cultural exchanges that shape 
knowledge, law and intervention. In other words, trends in the formation of social 
scientific concepts, legal rights and social policy designs certainly encompass the various 
colonial and decolonial underpinnings of the differentiated forms of welfare regimes, 
particularly in regards to the suggestively termed and racialised ‘settler liberalism’ welfare 
state model.129 To that effect, colonialism is integral to the welfare state in the sense that 
both share a history of global divisions and of nation-building techniques. This shared 
history has also influenced the reversal of welfarism trends from the 1970s onwards, 
known as the ‘neoliberal dismantling’ of the welfare state, which, in the UK, coincided with 
the period of postcolonialism – even though the opposite effect has been verified in 
France’s experience, i.e., one of an inward protectionism, still affected by the same 
exchanges between welfare in the metropolis and decolonial struggles in the occupied 
overseas territories.130 
So, within the terms that I claim my focus rests, how are such transformations construed? 
As will be addressed in the next clustered developments of poverty administration, an 
increasingly international perspective on poverty – from which poverty research agendas 
have become a growing, productive and innovative field – was not simply imposed on the 
colonial world, but indeed changed domestic perspectives that have also fed back into 
governance strategies within the ‘advanced economies’. The British and North American 
influence in the rest of the world in setting the tone for the global post-war order also 
worked the other way around, i.e., by establishing the modes of administration of the 
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global poor, the increasingly refined conceptual frameworks, methodologies and ‘best 
practices’ were also brought back to what I call the centres of production. An example of 
this, although debatable according to some views, is the British 1976 ‘IMF crisis’, which led 
the UK to borrow from the International Monetary Fund and subsequently triggered a 
turning point to the retrenchments in social policy spending, which was attributed to the 
austerity measures that were imposed as a condition of such a borrowing practice.131  
Here is another illustration of how my point differs from (and adds to) the general post-
development argument typically focused on global geopolitics, by concentrating on the 
knowledge-law-intervention interaction. In the context of earlier national-international 
exchanges in thinking on welfare provisions, the legal landmarks of the UK’s Colonial 
Development and Welfare Acts 1940 and 1945 established the British Colonial Research 
Committee for sponsoring overseas development and research as an imperialist 
enterprise.132 It is particularly relevant to mention the work of the Colonial Social Science 
Research Council (1944-1962), which was dedicated to promoting investigations to inform 
policy on ‘colonial social problems’.133 A landmark report under this legal and scientific 
endeavour in colonial territories was Lord Hailey’s African Survey (1938), which reinforced 
the importance of strategic planning for interventions in the economic and social 
conditions in the region.134 From these legal and scientific milestones, a colonial research 
and administrative reform agenda was established, with administrative bureaucracy, 
fellowships and regional research institutes to provide the groundwork of a ‘rational 
development planning and spending’.135 Further to this, the Moyne Report (1945) on the 
British Caribbean islands was produced within a climate of anti-colonial rebellion, in 
response to which a Welfare Fund was allocated and the post-war national agenda of 
attending to the living and working conditions in colonial territories was consolidated.136 In 
the USA the same growing investment in foreign aid was undertaken in the post-war 
context – via institutions established in the 1950s such as the Foreign Operations 
Administration and, later, the International Cooperation Administration – although the 
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North American venture is more adequately characterised as oriented towards  foreign-
policy interests, as an emerging superpower in the cold war competitive context. A 
landmark law to mention here is the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which established the 
Agency for International Development (USAID).137 These initiatives in law, policy and 
research focused on overseas welfare were not isolated or localised. They are here 
construed as reiterations of the patterns of poverty administration visited so far, this time 
on an increasingly global scale.  
This is how the civilising, development missions in Africa are framed here – and the 
discussion of advantages and disadvantages are inappropriate to this point. This sort of 
‘laboratorial’ reiteration is also found, as I mentioned, within the so-called dismantling of 
the welfare state by a neoliberal thrust. At this time Latin America, more specifically in 
Chile under a military dictatorship in the 1970s, was the hotbed for another experiment: 
the market-oriented housing policy, i.e. the provision of cash grants tied to family savings 
to subsidise home-purchasing for targeted, means-tested, social segments, alongside the 
construction of housing units delivered by the private sector.138 As Chilean researchers 
trained in the Chicago School branch of sociology became advisors of Pinochet’s regime, 
the ‘Chicago boys’ initiated the application of the neoliberal free-market experience 
(including privatisation of state companies, liberalisation of financial markets, opening to 
international capital, deregulation of the construction sector and land market reform, as 
well as urban planning reform)  before it became a core feature of structural adjustments 
in the 1990s. The nascent financialization of social housing – based on homeownership, 
market competition for cheaper constructions and the subprime mortgage market to 
displace informal settlements – is how the global financial system penetrated the 
production of the built environment, via the effects of real estate speculation in the urban 
space. But unlike the usual narrative about the liberalisation of the housing sector, by no 
means was this a free-flowing market-led transformation; it was indeed a publicly funded, 
militarised, market-interest experiment marked by the compulsory and violent 
displacement of populations and transformation of the urban landscape. As a successful 
case-study, the Chilean experiment became an example of ‘best practice’ to solve the 
‘housing problem’ – regardless of the set of new urban problems it created, such as peri-
urban resettlement, mass evictions, spatial marginalisation and segregation, territorial 
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stigma, precarious residential units, increased urban violence and overall worsening of 
living conditions of the poor.139 A first landmark study praising the success of the 
privatisation and financialization experiment was the World Bank’s report Housing: 
Enabling Markets to Work,140 which also launched a change in housing policy direction of 
requiring structural adjustments from borrowing countries, in place of the previous model 
of prioritising upgrades to urban infrastructure and slums.  
Certainly, such ‘experiments’ were gradually taking place far and wide, including at the 
heart of the global centres of (poverty) production. Since the late 1970s, the British and 
North American pioneering experiences have also attempted to further the private 
housing market as an experiment with its own poor, passing on individual responsibility for 
one’s own welfare and security by subsidising home purchases and private renting. In the 
UK, the Housing Act 1980 introduced the ‘right to buy’, and thus enabled the privatisation 
of a large share of the public housing stock, as well as drastically reducing the construction 
of new homes. Further along, the austere Welfare Reform Act 2012 introduced the so-
called ‘bedroom tax’, an under-occupancy penalty for tenants in social housing.141 Within 
the USA, a welfare and housing experience of increasing privatisation and public budget 
cuts was also pioneered within the paradigm of homeownership, although following a 
policy path that has been much more racially charged and ghettoised, as seen in the 
previous section, including through policy practices such as the publicly funded 
suburbanisation of white workers and redlining by the banking system. The 1968 Fair 
Housing Act is a milestone in interdicting the redlining practice by prohibiting 
discrimination on the sale, rental and financing of housing. This was then followed by a raft 
of other legislation: the 1974 Housing and Community Act introduced the Housing Choice 
Voucher Programme, subsidising private sector rent-controlled contracts; the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act created the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit to subsidise affordable housing 
construction and rental; the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act concerned the allocation 
of subprime loan in a context of growing subprime mortgage products. As an effect, the 
private housing market was increasingly amplified by absorbing more and more of these 
countries’ lower segments and thus strengthening the centrality of homeownership. 
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As financial capital has penetrated housing and the provision of other social rights 
worldwide, it becomes clear how social and economic policy are far from separate 
ventures and how the welfare state (at this point exposed to increasingly privatised and 
financialized solutions) can itself be viewed as an integrated socioeconomic project aimed 
at enhancing growth and development. To the extent that tested experiences showed that 
it was possible to reduce governmental activity and infrastructure by favouring private 
sector solutions to social problems, whilst still securing control and capacity to govern, the 
so-called neoliberalisation was deployed as a set of practices that would demonstrably 
improve welfare – measured as asset-based welfare under the paradigm of 
homeownership.142 That is to say, rather than a dismantling, a pure deregulation, what we 
find is re-regulation towards a new direction.143 Interestingly, the effects of the new urban 
strategy were less noticeable in countries labelled as ‘emergent economies’, where there 
have traditionally been minimal welfare housing systems despite an acute housing need. 
The transition from a substantial public welfare housing coverage to a private housing 
market, on the other hand, established the urban regions where the impacts of neoliberal 
change were initially felt the most, and where the latest global subprime mortgage crisis 
was first to irrupt.144 
As a history which is still unfolding in our time, we are quite aware of the varied dissensus 
around the adequate, efficient and/or desirable models of welfare and social expenditure, 
including those who advocate none at all. Both at a global scale and within domestic 
politics, we have been witnessing continuous changes, particularly with regards to public 
and private alternate emphases that have propelled an increasing shift from universal 
systems of state provision to targeted and conditioned models.145 In terms of the research 
and policy debates, different national models have experimented with oscillations 
between both sides of the spectrum – public-universal and private-targeted – and a third 
way has also been forged to evade the polarised politics of policy-making approaches, as 
advocated by Anthony Giddens.146 The so-called neoliberal attack on the welfare state has 
thus also been socially-democratically passed under the guise of a third way, with 
increasing policy reforms, austerity, labour reregulation and, most importantly, welfare 
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transmutation to a form of ‘workfare’. Ultimately, the third way was aimed at reviewing 
the support extended to nonworking benefit recipients who did not take up employment. 
An example can be found in the UK’s welfare reform package of 1998, which promoted 
‘opportunity instead of dependence’,147 and the successive welfare reform which 
introduced a work-based welfare infrastructure. 
To conclude this section, two observations about this opportunity-dependence dispute can 
be usefully outlined. First, that what might seem to be a recent thrust of a so-called 
neoliberal project, can actually be seen as an integral dispute, present from the very 
outset of the post-war welfare state experience – and indeed with a thread that can be 
traced from Victorian workhouses to contemporary workfare. For example, varying 
combinations of public/private responses have always been at play in the global history of 
the welfare state.148 Throughout this history, the impulse to reform was ever present, and 
so was the use of research to support policy formulation. However, the extent to which 
statistical and empirical research findings were leading change is debatable. If, on the one 
hand, mid-twentieth-century social research revealed increasing complexification and 
diversification of methods and datasets, on the other hand, it gave rise to a markedly 
practice-oriented, technical-expertise mode of knowledge production which was, in many 
aspects, influenced by policy trends itself, and indeed turned towards indicators of 
efficiency, flexibility and cost-effective administration – i.e. turned to measuring means 
not ends. This is an important insight from meta-analyses of social research and their role 
in validating political projects.149 Since the early experiments in this trajectory, practices 
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and a decline in the public welfare activity, shifting the burden of welfare towards individually financed 
means’.  In Polina Obolenskaya and Tania Burchardt, ‘Public and Private Welfare Activity in England’ (Centre 
for Analysis of Social Exclusion, paper 193, London School of Economics 2016). 
149 For example, having surveyed 52 empirical studies on welfare in the USA in the early 1970s, Schiller 
compared evidence used to inform reforms and revealed a ‘large gap between policy assumptions and 
research findings. Fragile empiricism and bias were found in common assumptions, supposedly built on 
evidence, such as of a stable distinction between working and nonworking poor, or of welfare recipient 
demotivation to seek employment and of welfare extended dependency.’ Bradley R Schiller, ‘Empirical 
Studies of Welfare Dependency: A Survey’ (1973) 8 The Journal of Human Resources, Supplement 19. 
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seemed more effective at raising consensus about what could be done to fix social 
problems, which terms of the dispute are immediately effective or not, than scientific or 
statistical inquiry about the nature, culture and factors of poverty – particularly in a 
context of increasing inequality which, at least in theory, disproves the efficacy of such a 
policy history. A technocratic, rather than scientific, approach to social policy has become 
consolidated and involves an increasingly universal, cross-national, trans-local transfer of 
policy models and design. Rather than following the common view of policy-making as an 
empirically informed decision-making process, policy transfers are based on replicable 
‘best practices’ or managerial cases of success.150 
Finally, as an overall perceived (or propelled) need for change that was mostly framed 
under the need to reduce ‘welfare dependency’, this not-so-new emphasis has been 
largely accompanied by continuing pushes for the introduction of work requirements as a 
condition of eligibility for social provision and services that are often perceived as too 
permissive. Many studies supported this view in the USA, influencing successive welfare 
reforms,151 particularly with regard to young single-parent mothers.152 Similarly, the 
welfare-to-work paradigm in the UK, with initiatives such as the Work Programme and its 
successor Work and Health Programme, establishes mandatory work requirements that 
target unemployed people with eligibility conditions for benefits in order to encourage 
personal responsibility and to incentivise work.153 Within the ‘workfare’ framework, the 
‘malformed work ethics of the poor’ are framed as the reason why policy results are 
laggard or insufficient – with the effect of assigning work as the solution to poverty whilst 
welfare is the source of poverty. The task is to turn those living on benefits into 
jobseekers, to lead the poor towards a path of hard work and prosperity, and to put a stop 
to the ‘bad poor’ who take advantage of taxpayers’ hard work. The image of the 
scroungers, chavs and benefit cheats is reconstructed as ‘unskilled, unprepared, 
unmotivated, and work-shy “dependents” of an overly benevolent system’.154 By means of 
legal delineations of the proper and the improper profiles and behaviour of benefit 
recipients, new parameters enter the craft of counting the acceptable and objectionable 
poor. It is law which regulates social housing and dislocation, it is law which establishes 
 
150 Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, ‘Exporting Workfare/Importing Welfare-to-Work: exploring the politics of 
Third Way policy transfer’ (2001) 20 (4) Political Geography 427.  
151 E.g., the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act 1996. See Charles Murray, 
Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (first published 1984, BasicBooks 2015); Lawrence M 
Mead, Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship (Free Press 1986). 
152 Schiller (n 149). 
153 Peck and Theodore (n 150). 
154 Peck and Theodore (n 150) 433. 
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workfare profiling, renewing the conditions under which poverty will be seen or made 
visible. 
 
2.4 International development aid 
The post-war period a key moment in the development of antipoverty attitudes at a global 
scale, as has been mentioned in relation to the rise of foreign aid investments, be it as part 
of national welfarist or foreign policy agendas. Certainly, it is another misleading 
compartmentalisation to suggest that the nationally organised welfare state is somehow 
dissociated or perhaps even succeeded by a more recent trend towards globalisation. In 
fact, as I have indicated, the timeframes of national welfare systems and of international 
development overlap to an extent that it could be found that the national-western-
northern welfare states and the global-southern aid schemes were formed as 
complementary and mutually supportive projects. On the one hand, early welfare 
experiences accommodated imperialist missions which are at the root of what came to be 
the developmentalist project, sustaining colonialism as ‘a moral project’.155 On the other 
hand, as I will delineate in what follows, there are clear resonances of the same neoliberal-
financialization thrust impacting both welfare states and global development aid at 
present – or perhaps, it could be argued, the long-standing experimentations of 
globalisation and market integration in the ‘developing economies’ also worked to 
retrench national welfare states in ‘advanced economies’.156 
The connections between the welfare state and international development are not as 
incidental as it might seem. In the post-war context, the same Keynesian protectionism is 
at the source of both and John Maynard Keynes himself was a leading figure in the global 
transformations of the time as one of the intellectual founders of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, institutions that today play a dominant role in the 
geopolitics of poverty in the ‘developing world' – as the euphemism now stands. In 1944, 
towards the end of World War II, the United Nations Monetary and Financial ‘Bretton 
Woods’ Conference was convened in the USA to build international financial cooperation 
and monetary control by allied countries. Initially aimed at post-war European 
 
155 A legal milestone to this end was the abovementioned series of Colonial Development and Welfare Acts 
which supported scientific and missionary interventions in colonial territories at large. Prior to the 1940s 
much of British overseas social research had been sponsored by private philanthropic foundations, according 
to Mills (n 133). 
156 Alexander Hicks and Christopher Zorn, ‘Economic Globalisation, the Macro Economy, and Reversals of 
Welfare: Expansion in Affluent Democracies, 1978–94’ (2005) 59 International Organization 631. 
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reconstruction, the story goes, the then International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development soon shifted its lending practices to foreign development aid – i.e. to funding 
infrastructure projects in poorer countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Having 
expanded into the World Bank Group, loans to low-income countries are now 
predominantly aimed at policy reforms. In the 1970s ‘the Bank’ started to shift its 
attention to poverty eradication as a priority, reorienting development policies ‘to 
redefine the objectives and measurement of development in more operational terms 
[…moving beyond] the rhetorical statements of social objectives’.157  
In this context, a renewed conceptualisation of poverty was consolidated as a global threat 
to growth and the world’s prosperity, later to be further transformed into a global threat 
to ‘human security’ in general.158 In the face of such threat, multilateral bodies ascribed 
themselves the civilising mission of modernising underdeveloped countries. From the 
international economic growth point of view, poverty becomes an impairment to growth 
and global prosperity. That is to say, while poverty had previously been seen as a natural 
occurrence – even necessary for economic growth – which ultimately legitimised 
imperialist investments in extracting unexplored or misused resources, it was now to be 
understood as a problem for growth.159 It is also in the context of this paradigmatic shift 
that emerges the industrious efforts to closely monitor such a threat, to securitise it with 
risk assessments, and to tackle it towards a mathematically viable eradication. To do that, 
first, the World Bank takes up the task of collecting and expanding statistics on growth and 
income distribution in the developing world. In 1978, the World Bank initiated its famous 
report series, the World Development Report,160 of which three are often highlighted for 
presenting poverty and its timely challenges as the central theme: the 1980 report on 
‘Poverty and Human Development’; the 1990 report on ‘Poverty’, promising a redirection 
after a ‘lost decade’; and the 2000/2001 report ‘Attacking Poverty’, dedicated to 
dimensions of poverty and strategies of empowerment, opportunity and security. It was 
 
157 As stated in the infamous speech by the World Bank President Robert McNamara, at the 1973 Annual 
General Meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, expressing the concern with global poverty as hindering economic growth 
(apart from also not benefiting from it due to maldistribution). As proposals to proceed, McNamara’s list 
included acceleration of land and tenancy Reform and better access to credit within developing countries. See 
in: Robert S McNamara, ‘Address to the Board of Governors by Robert S. McNamara (English)’ (World Bank 
Group 1973) 11. 
158 Although long treated as a actual problem of security, in the post-9/11 context poverty was admittedly 
raised to the status of global security threat, officially unifying the war against the poor and the war on terror. 
See Akhil Gupta, ‘Is Poverty a Global Security Threat?’ in Ananya Roy and Emma Shaw Crane (eds), Territories 
of Poverty: Rethinking North and South (University of Georgia Press 2015). 
159 Ravallion (n 4) 116. 
160World Bank, ‘World Development Reports’ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr/wdr-archive> 
accessed 29 June 2020. 
106 
 
also in the 1980s that the World Bank initiated its Living Standards Measurement Study, a 
programme aimed at improving the quality of methodologies and data availability by 
strengthening household survey systems in ‘client countries’ to supplement income-based 
poverty measures.161 Another document to mention in the early strategies is the 1993 
Poverty Reduction Handbook in which the World Bank laid out the basic principles of 
poverty analysis and measurement, and of policy and regulatory framework, expenditure, 
country assessment and assistance strategies.162 
Along with the World Bank, many other multi-sector institutions have joined in the 
enterprise of understanding and tackling poverty. An industry of poverty reduction has 
formed with the joint forces of heads of states, financial institutions and corporate 
philanthropic foundations – to name a few powerful institutions: the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations Development Programme, 
the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, the European 
Development Fund; Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, the Gates Foundation… the 
list of benefactors goes on and on. The practices of this industry, often seen as unrelated 
and at times conflicting with each other, include research, case studies, diagnosis, tried-
and-tested policy dissemination, financial aid, credit operations, structural adjustments, 
international cooperation, predatory lending, policy assessment, advocacy of austerity 
measures, etc.  
In the context of instituting an international framework of monitoring and reducing global 
poverty, development is consecrated as ‘a proxy for the question of material well-being’ 
and for improvements of living standards.163 Mirroring conceptions of poverty that were 
also present in the previous clusters, this view attributes to the developing economies and 
states the responsibility for poverty, in terms of political culture, corruption, unstable 
democracy, weak institutions, poor infrastructure, and so forth. Underdevelopment is 
framed in terms such as ‘poor governance’ and ‘State failure’, where institutions failed to 
follow the modernising path.164 As a result, interventions of aid are aimed at reforming 
 
161 Ravallion (n 4). 
162 World Bank, Poverty Reduction Handbook (World Bank Group 1993). 
163 Sundhya Pahuja explains that ‘development’ is but a mode of knowledge premised on explanations of the 
causes of poverty in local and contemporary contexts, rather than global and historical causes; one which 
centralises economic growth as a promise of improvements. Sundhya Pahuja, ‘The Poverty of Development 
and the Development of Poverty in International Law’ in James Crawford and Sarah Nouwen (eds), Select 
Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, vol 3 (Hart Publishing 2012). 
164 On how the notion of ‘state failure’ has historically justified transnational state-building interventions, see: 
Jonathan Di John, 'Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the 
Literature' (2008) Crisis States Research Centre Working Paper 25: Development as State-Making. 
107 
 
underdevelopment with state-building interventions to enable their participation in the 
international market place. This includes measures to strengthen the rule of law, 
purportedly focusing on the application of norms and procedures and the advancement of 
democracy. Under the guise of state-building and good governance, the shift of attention 
to poverty as a global priority has been instrumentally moved by international law, 
although literature overwhelmingly interrogates the challenges of implementation and 
enforceability.165 Assemblies, conventions and negotiations have led the international 
community to come to an agreement on this new main target. Nations from both the 
developed and the developing worlds negotiated this, certainly with different motivations 
and interests, and as a result the current ‘common goals’ were formed. While post-
development literature focuses on the imperialist nature of such negotiation, which I do 
not reject whatsoever, the scope of this thesis prompts me to reflect on the conceptual 
and aesthetic products of such conjunctures resulting from these agonistic interactions. 
This is what I do more directly in chapters 4 and 5, where I will be mostly referring to this 
multinational system of aid and funding – namely the World Bank’s business of tackling 
global poverty within a broader industry – and, for this reason, I shall not grant too much 
emphasis to this topic here. What is important to lay out about global aid, in this chapter, 
is that in establishing the ultimate forms, standards and procedures by which an industry 
of global poverty reduction takes shape, such international practices have established 
international legal parameters and standards of practice to enable knowledge and 
intervention initiatives worldwide.  
Poverty studies in the twentieth century have advanced and proliferated at a fast pace 
within an international surge to identify and challenge global poverty, particularly from the 
1990s. Moving from local surveys to global poverty calculations, research has developed 
into increasingly more abstract and mathematical formulations, creating more complex, 
detailed and aggregated data. Poverty turned into a common identifier, a referent unifying 
all of the dispossessed in the world, as the same widespread, calculable phenomenon. 
Translated into indicators of aggregated data, poverty and its correlate concepts became 
the determining parameters by which countries are ranked into degrees of priority or 
classifications of special concern. As a result, poverty assumed increasingly quantitative, 
economist and monetised forms in order to provide international standards of 
measurement and comparison. And so did the strategic responses to the ‘problem of 
 
165 Lucy Williams, ‘Towards an Emerging International Poverty Law’ in Lucy Williams (ed), International 
Poverty Law: An Emerging Discourse (Zed Books 2006). 
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poverty’. While earlier transformations moved from a scientific episteme to a kind of 
programmatic pragmatism in the post-war context – as seen in national welfare trends in 
data – towards the end of the twentieth century economic theory has further developed 
to produce massive calculative scholarships, influenced by computer-based data 
processing, risk-calculus, cybernetics and machine learning.166 The future of poverty 
research seems likely to be increasingly innovative, digital and imagistic.167 A data 
revolution has been proclaimed,168 opening new fields of economic analysis with large-
scale, complex and often real-time administrative data or private sector data referring to 
virtual activities, communications, financial interactions and many other associations that 
allow predictive models of analysis.  
 
Figure 10: Data visualisation of the ‘Global Multidimensional Poverty Index’ (2019).169 
 
166 See also: Philip Mirowski, Machine Dreams: Economics becomes a Cyborg Science (Cambridge University 
Press 2002). 
167 As in the case of new methods using satellite imagery for detecting and mapping informal settlements, 
combining knowledge and machine learning techniques, in: Patrick Helber et al, ‘Mapping Informal 
Settlements in Developing Countries with Multi-Resolution, Multi-Spectral Data’ [2018] arXiv, Cornell 
University. 
168 Liran Einav and Jonathan Levin, ‘Economics in the Age of Big Data’ (2014) 346(6210) Science 715. 
169 Figure 10 attribution: Sabina Alkire, Usha Kanagaratnam and Nicolai Suppa (2019) based on Human 
Development Report Office and Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative calculations. Image 
extracted from the United Nations Development Programme’s and Oxford Poverty and Human Development 
Initiative’s report: ‘Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2019: Illuminating Inequalities’, p. 5. 
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/mpi_2019_publication.pdf> accessed 29 June 2020. 





Several indexes have been created to measure poverty according to different perspectives 
and emphases on what constitutes poverty in attempts to establish comparisons and 
gradings between nations and to orient strategic action. The most widely used measure 
within the developmental framework, which allows for stable international comparative 
analysis and serves as base for many other multidimensional indicators commonly used is 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The GDP was first forged by Nobel prize winner Simon 
Kuznets in 1930s USA and integrated into an international standard system of accounts in 
1968, then reformulated successively.170 It stands for the national income of a country. As 
a measure of ‘economic growth’, of the periodic flow of a country’s commodity 
production, i.e. final goods and services, it provides a comparable measure of international 
economic progress to which other aggregate indexes can be combined.171 It can be broken 
down into population per capita as means of measuring standards of living, or aggregated 
with ‘Purchasing power parity’ exchange rates in order to provide comparable indexes 
adjusted to different countries’ currencies and prices of goods. Although, or perhaps 
because, it does not enable an analysis of income inequality within countries, the GDP is 
the primary measure that organises the geopolitics of global poverty, by which other 
indicators are usually derived, such as the gross national income (GNI). Such indicators are 
applied to arrange countries into ranks and groups – most notably low- and middle-income 
countries are classified and listed as eligible to receive official development assistance in 
the Development Assistance Committee’s List, which also encompasses the classification 
of the Least Developed Countries defined by the United Nations. As such, the GDP 
provides a way of ordering the world, a technical measurement that confirms the 
superiority of advanced economies in an analogous way to how scientific racism once 
validated racial hierarchy.172  
There are ever so many Nobel prizes behind indicators, examples of which include the 
World Development Indicators, the Human Development Index, the Gini coefficient of 
income inequality, the Human Poverty Index, the Gender-related Development Index and 
the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index. These indicators are periodically calculated 
and, most importantly, are operative of geopolitical flows and interactions. To the extent 
 
170 The current normative landmark is the 2008 System of National Accounts, developed by the International 
Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations and World Bank.  
171 Ravallion (n 4). 
172 Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Global Poverty and the Politics of Good Intentions’ in Ruth Buchanan and Peer 
Zumbansen (eds), Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and Transitional Justice (Hart 2014). 
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that it is not practical or appropriate to provide an overview of such indicators here 
without losing track of the scope of the chapter, I will limit myself to indicate that through 
experts, advisors, researchers and policy designers,173 which provide most exemplary 
articulations of the knowledge-law-intervention compound, the World Bank has assumed 
the hegemony of global poverty monitoring and the management of funds for the 
international financing of poverty alleviation and/or development projects. It is also the 
World Bank's guidelines that guide public policy designs around the world. Despite the 
overwhelming primacy of the World Bank’s repository, there are several studies that point 
to methodological, ethical and political problems in World Bank poverty data work, as well 
as the effects of its work in sacralising a global understanding of the problem of poverty as 
something to be fixed via templates of what worked elsewhere – an attitude from which 
many collateral problems emerge, renewing the very nature of the original problem being 
tackled.174 
Within the frameworks of the World Bank itself, the notion of poverty, its causes, and the 
methods for its reduction have also undergone significant transformations in emphasis 
overtime. The broad periodisation typically presented is that up to the 1970s, the 
emphasis was placed on shifting national-developmentalist ventures by supporting 
infrastructure (telecommunications, energy and urban reform) and state-building 
advancements (judicial reform, labour and trade reforms, land market reforms and 
formalisation of property rights), strengthening the rule of law as a method to reduce 
poverty in its own right.175 In the late 1980s globalisation gained momentum and the well-
known 1989 Washington Consensus established the neoliberal model to be implemented 
in developing countries via Structural Adjustment loans (or Development Policy Loans). 
This was done through investments conditional on national incorporation of values of 
governance, free markets and transparency in state structures, with priority being placed 
on private sector takeover of public expenditures, against bureaucratic, corrupt and 
paternalist third world governments. Just as the nation-based welfare states faced 
neoliberal thrusts and, more recently, the financialization of social provisions, concurrently 
– or perhaps I should say experimentally, in the global laboratory – the ‘developing world’ 
 
173 Influential experts to mention include Jeffrey Sachs, Martin Ravallion, Joseph E Stiglitz, and, most famously, 
Anthony Atkinson and Amartya Sen. 
174 For example, see Paul Cammack, ‘What the World Bank Means by Poverty Reduction, and Why it Matters’ 
(2004) 9(2) New Political Economy 189. 
175 Alvaro Santos, ‘The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development’ in David M 
Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge 
University Press 2006) 275. 
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witnessed drastic transformations to the dynamics of international conditioned aid. The 
experience in the developing world soon rebounded on the poor in the developed 
economies, with an increasing trend towards forming public-private partnerships. The 
1990s unfolded as a transitional decade in which the damaging effects of globalisation 
began to be perceived and new themes emerged to ‘de-economise’ poverty, presenting it 
as an increasingly multidimensional phenomenon. This framework also enables the 
formulation of affirmative or compensatory policies of income distribution to help 
individuals escape the vicious cycles of poverty.  
At the turn of the millennium, the change of emphasis was reportedly consolidated. In 
1997, the United Nations document Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for 
Reform176 urged for human rights to be ‘mainstreamed’ into all its programmes, policies 
and activities. A human rights-based approach to development was formulated as a 
conceptual framework based on international standards and the language of rights and 
obligations within international law.177 While there is no ‘right to be free from poverty’ 
with corresponding duties on states,178 peoples of the world hold a human right to 
development.179 On the other hand, whilst scholars problematise the lack of accountability 
of the international legal order, rendering it ‘toothless’,180 this framework seems to sustain 
a view of a sort of ‘natural transition from capabilities to rights’.181 The culminating 
innovation at the turn of the century, as is widely known, was the Millennium Summit of 
the General Assembly in 2000 which established the Millennium Development Goals,182 
which have since been further renewed as the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.183 
 
176 Other landmarks on this topic are the United Nations Development Programme’s documents: ‘Poverty 
Reduction and Human Rights Practice Note’ (2003); ‘Human Development Report’ (1997), and ‘Overcoming 
Human Poverty’ (1998 and 2000). 
177 A language much criticised for not deploying the normative imperatives of its status as binding law.  Navi 
Pillay, ‘The Tunis Imperative: Human Rights in Development Cooperation in the Wake of the Arab Spring’, 
(United Nations Chief Executives Board, United Nations 2011). 
178 Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, ‘Poverty, Obligation, and the International Economic Legal System: What 
are our Duties to the Global Poor?’ in Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer (ed), Poverty and the International 
Economic Legal System: Duties to the World’s Poor (Cambridge University Press 2013) 3. 
179 Relevant landmarks are the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development and the Declaration of the 
1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights, which states that the right to development is an inalienable 
human right and an integral part of fundamental human freedoms.  
180 Pahuja (n 172).  
181 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Human Rights and Poverty 
Reduction: A Conceptual Framework’ (United Nations 2004) 6. 
182 The Millennium Declaration (Resolution 55/2) of the United Nations 2000 Millennium Summit which 
adopted the Millennium Development Goals, followed by the 2005 World Summit and the 2010 MDG review. 
Available at <https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/> accessed 17 August 2020. 
183 United Nations Resolution 70/1. See the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/> accessed 
17 August 2020. 
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Both agendas consolidated the multidimensional understanding of poverty and fixed goal 
number one as to reduce poverty, i.e. initially to halve the proportion of people living on 
less than $1 a day and of people who suffer from hunger by 2015, now to ‘eradicate 
extreme poverty for all people everywhere’, that is those now living on less than $1.25 a 
day’ by 2030.184 
The concept of multidimensional poverty is anchored in Amartya Sen’s ‘capability 
approach’, which defines poverty as the absence or inadequate fulfilment of the basic 
freedom or opportunity to pursue well-being (matters such as health, access to food and 
water, education, adequate housing, healthcare, sanitation, decent work and social 
security).185 The human rights-based approach prescribes that such basic capabilities are 
internationally recognised rights attainable by the same means by which people can ‘claim 
and access their civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights’.186 Despite the efforts 
to view poverty – or make poverty visible – as a multidimensional matter, the reduction of 
which is achievable by means of increased access to rights, studies also dispute that the 
World Bank’s practices of knowledge-law-intervention truly adhere to these 
frameworks.187 Others also emphasise that the market-oriented, economicist, income-
based view of poverty as a development challenge has never been unsettled but indeed 
refashioned  into ‘pro-poor’ terminology: pro-poor growth, pro-poor markets, inclusive 
growth, financial inclusion, pro-poor private-sector led development, conditional cash 
transfers, microfinance, to name a few.188 It is more accurately defined as a growth ‘plus’ 
approach, in which economic growth is still the core idea of development even though it 
might aggregate other traits or factors.189 The new fashionable terminology, critics often 
indicate, followed from the backlash of the structural adjustment years and scapegoated 
failed monetary policies recorded at the end of the 1990s.190  It is in these terms that the 
aforementioned trend of poverty financialization flourished, as will be discussed in chapter 
 
184 A rich account of the conflictive history between development and human rights agendas which ended in 
their mutual alignment in the millennial turn can be found in Philip Alston, ‘Ships Passing in the Night: The 
Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate seen through the lens of the Millennium 
Development Goals’ (2005) 27(2) Human Rights Quarterly 755. 
185 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Alfred A Knopf 1999). 
186 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Principles and Guidelines for a Human 
Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies’ (United Nations 2006) iii. 
187 An example of a case study that demonstrates the urban upgrading programmes in contrast to the 
freedom or capabilities approach to poverty is: Alexandre Apsan Frediani, ‘Amartya Sen, the World Bank, and 
the Redress of Urban Poverty: A Brazilian Case Study’ (2007) 8(1) Journal of Human Development 133. 
188 Roy (n 100); Philip Mader, The Political Economy of Microfinance: Financializing Poverty (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2015). 
189 Pahuja (n 172) 37. 
190 Roy (n 100). 
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4.191 If today the private equity funds, corporate foundations, insurance and other asset 
management companies of the financial market dominate global welfare provisions – with 
private healthcare systems, pension funds, educational credit, university endowments, 
investment funds for public-private partnerships, urban policy, and many other everyday 
lending operations – an interesting transformation to be noted here is how the ‘state-
failure’ theory increasingly morphed into an idea of ‘market failure’: it is the private sector 
which requires support and reform in order to excel in an inclusive manner.192 On the 
other hand, it is also by means of extending the reach of a pro-poor, inclusive market that 
poverty will be overcome. In other words, financial capital expansion, the breaking into 
new frontiers, new territories and new clientele, becomes a mission, a joint effort of a 
humanitarian international community. 
As a final point in this section, it is important to highlight the programmes of land reform 
sponsored by the world bank and other cooperation agencies. An influential publication in 
this regard is Hernando de Soto’s 2000 book The Mystery of Capital, in which he correlates 
poverty in low- and middle-income countries to underdeveloped regimes of property, 
without registered property titles, rendering assets owned by poor people ‘dead capital’, 
i.e. unused as collateral for loans.193 De Soto’s proposal was to promote land titling in 
order to provide the poor with the capabilities to access capital and, thus, escape poverty 
– as a side effect, almost by chance, the financial market could finally penetrate long-
aspired territories of poverty and informal land use within the slums of the ‘Global South’ 
(new clients and new assets). I mentioned in chapter 1 that land titling was indeed a 
promoted agenda for international prosperity and modernisation. Land reform to 
modernise registration has been present in the World Bank’s repertoire for a long time – 
including in McNamara’s above cited speech in regard to small farmers’ access to 
registered titles. But drawing informal tenancy arrangements into the frameworks of rights 
and ownership, despite the attractive term ‘land reform’ – after all, are not social 
movements historically campaigning for land reform and property redistribution? – can be 
misleading and indeed problematic.  
 
191 A final indication to mention in this direction is the World Bank’s 2015 ‘Maximizing Finance for 
Development’ strategy, a sort of crowd-sourced finance innovation with reduced risk to the private sector. In 
other words, a new role of mediator, or facilitator, is (self)ascribed to the World Bank, gathering private 
investors to aid developing countries. 
192 Roy (n 100). 
193 This analysis of the book’s influence and impact in global policy reforms is from Rolnik (n 138) 155-169. 
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Besides, by looking at this influential ‘agenda’ of privatisation within the larger history of 
poverty administration that I have retraced in this chapter, it can be realised that there is 
not much novelty to it: give the poor the resources to escape the trap of poverty they got 
themselves into. Again, it reveals an assumption that the market will flow harmoniously. 
That there is a lack of evidence supporting this belief, and indeed there are studies 
demonstrating that titles only offered a limited contribution to poor people’s access to 
credit, is beyond the point that I am making here. My point is rather that by means of legal 
reforms and land registration investments, a specific profile of the global poor is being 
selected (or sampled) for intervention. They are then being assimilated into the circuits of 
finance and formal market economy as the proper kind of poor populations that have a 
chance to escape poverty – provided they demonstrate sufficient capacity and diligence to 
do so. To these newly formalised poor people, human rights might be of service as 
framework and toolbox to succeed. 
Again, I must restate an initial reservation I presented in this thesis – that is that I do not 
wish to neglect the material basis of poverty by way of analysing its aesthetic composition 
and continual reformulation. It is evident that tenure security and adequate housing must 
be taken seriously and that indeed, in many cases in which reforms are presented, they 
are welcomed by local communities and are often responses to demands from social 
movements. The critique that I am developing here is not meant to disregard the 
perversity of tenure insecurity or to dismiss that land and housing formalisation, with its 
accompanying property rights, is an important claim and a necessary step towards social 
justice within the capitalistic frame which governs our mode of existence in the world as 
we know it today. On the other hand, it is relevant to reflect on the global ‘mechanism for 
increasing the exposure of the poorest to [continual] processes of dispossession’.194 By 
intensifying or democratising access to land titles, another effect is taking place (regardless 
of the plane of intentions): the hegemony of private property is re-confirmed as the only 
possible form of tenure, further effacing any other possible modes of habitation and land 
occupation. 
That being said, here is my most central point, that which I have reiterated after tracing 
the evolution of each of the clusters in this chapter: it is law – i.e. broadly construed legal 
practices – that creates categories in the first place which will then be used to inform 
empirical experiments of social research that will attempt to demonstrate the efficacy of 
 
194 Rolnik (n 138) 168. 
115 
 
such a model of intervention. By means of legal practices, the poor as development client 
or aid recipient are transformed into the poor as a microentrepreneur, an asset holder and 
a borrower. It is also in legal terms that informality of land occupation and formality of 
ownership is demarcated. By shaping the contours of what designates the poor and what 
is left out of the frame in different epochs of places, law establishes the conditions and 
terms around which knowledge practices and intervention practices might be structured. 
Moreover, it is also through diverse and perhaps seemingly disconnected legal practices 
that the territorialisations of poverty are established, for example, in the adoption of 
comparable indexes of economic growth that confirm the geopolitics of global poverty and 
that happen to coincide with the Third World/Developing World/Global South. The 
national and local territorialities of poverty are also shaped by such legal practices, as is 
the centuries old urban crisis with regard to slums, which endure clearances, demolitions, 
ghettoization, militarisation, upgradings, urban renewal, displacements to urban 
peripheries… will they endure financial assimilation? Or will slums linger and accumulate 
layers of violence, impermanence, insecurity, displacements, imminent risk of eviction, 
policing and military occupations, capital incorporation, gentrification and touristification? 
International law has long been exposed for its clear and often unapologetic colonial-
imperialist legacy by scholarly accounts. Despite its proclaimed mission to secure 
international stability, peace and humanitarian values guided by the frameworks of 
development and human rights – self-interestedly or benevolently, it does not matter and 
actually both motivations apply at once – critical scholars sustain that international law is 
much more of a part of the problem which exacerbates rather than reduces poverty.195 
However, instead of engaging with the debates on efficacy or need for reforms, I set out to 
inquire into the legal-aesthetic interventionism of these centres of poverty production, i.e. 
centres of global poverty knowledge and intervention. This is the analysis that I will 
undertake in the next chapters of this thesis. But first, let me establish a preliminary 
analysis of what these four clustered trends in poverty administration might tell us, when 
analysed together, about the role played by law and legal practices in general. 
 
2.5 Form and content: framing ‘the poor’ as legal profiles  
If drawing lines and raising fences inscribe the divisions which create the propertied and 
the propertyless, as discussed in chapter 1, codified law appears to enable the 
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consolidation of such positionalities as stable categories independent from the traces that 
created them in the first place.196 In this final section, I situate the various reorientations of 
antipoverty legal trends outlined above as traits of a wider mechanism of poverty 
production. I delve into the discussion of how knowledge practices, legal practices and 
policy practices work together in prescribing and instituting poverty as an ontological 
problem to be further detected, refined and fixed. As a result, poverty ceases to be a mere 
unifying concept and becomes an actually existing thing in the world, an entity that can be 
perceived on material grounds, assimilating entire populations and territories under the 
designation of “the poor”.  
As legal codifications of poverty accompany the shifting conceptualisations of poverty in 
time and space, poverty is here construed as a form, the content of which is the 
populations and territories that form incorporates and modulates, which is to say, bodies 
and soil are the material components that get modulated into the form of poverty. This 
point draws on a Georg Simmel’s ‘The Poor’, which explores the meaning of modern 
assistance to the poor in a kind of philosophy of rights and obligations.197 As the 
underlying commonality, Simmel stresses that in any given society, who is ‘poor’ and who 
isn’t depends less on any specific deprivation than on whether someone is (or should be) 
the subject of dedicated institutions. The history narrated in this chapter delineates how 
‘the poor’, as a character, or indeed as a legal profile, have been substantially transformed 
while the form ‘poverty’ has seemed to be a stable phenomenon throughout modern 
history. By focusing on the aesthetic features of the historical definitions of poverty and 
the poor, I am looking at a qualitative function of law which prescribes attributes to the 
poor. These are not empirical characteristics, but rather normative qualifications and 
projected imageries, as I shall explain. 
In the models above it becomes clear how poverty definition – in fact, poverty creation as 
an idea and poverty production as a social reality – articulates multiple directions of 
influences between practices of knowledge, law and intervention. As a result of these 
exchanges, poverty comes to be in the world as we know it and we find poverty data, 
antipoverty legislation and social policy as separate instances that inform and support one 
another while being black-boxed as autonomous systems. However, what the narrated 
history above suggests is that the procedures of poverty definition are inseparable from 
 
196 What Denise Ferreira da Silva calls an onto-epistemological transformation. Denise Ferreira da Silva, ‘No-
Bodies: Law, Raciality and Violence’ (2014) 9(1) Meritum 119. 
197 Georg Simmel, ‘The Poor’, Claire Jacobson (tr) (1965) 13(2) Social Problems 118. 
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the procedures of its remediation. It all starts with a single, rudimentary action of 
inscribing poverty – to trace its contours, to log its inner attributes and to test its 
cohesiveness and/or expansiveness. ‘Poverty data’ is ‘inscribed poverty’. As with any other 
data, poverty needs to be inscribed in order to be quantified and manipulated. In that 
regard, inscription, the notation of data, surpasses empiricist knowledge practices and 
indeed entails creative practices of making an object visible, tractable, manageable – 
conditioned by a previous legal ascription. Notice this is not to undermine poverty data as 
a subjective, value-judgement kind of impression which suggests that accuracy or 
objectivity of empirical observation has not been achieved. I claim that data normatively 
organises the world, as will be seen in chapter 3. The act of inscription, I argue, derives 
from the innermost gesture that gives rise to any such practices and outcomes, that is, the 
gesture of the technical-analytical gaze that establishes a basic divide. The gaze observes, 
surveys, and visualises poverty in order to act on it as an independent problem to be fixed. 
The gaze consolidates a perspectivist encounter between the subject who sees and the 
object that is seen. As such, the gaze fabricates those perspectives as existing entities, the 
nonpoor and the poor.  
As will become clearer in the following chapter, I situate law as mediating the gaze of the 
nonpoor towards the poor (articulated through a hostility towards the indolent poor, fear 
of the dangerous poor, fascination with the exotic poor, hatred towards the ungrateful 
poor). In other words, I foreground the ways in which law outlines the phenomena that 
science will apprehend and politics will intervene in. Although I am centralising law in this 
thesis, I do not wish to suggest that this is a linear process of chronological determinations 
– that first law inscribes, then science quantifies and politics transforms. Instead, these 
flows of exchange are more adequately construed as multidirectional and in the next 
chapter I will explicate that, in the circuitous exchanges, quantification also leads to 
qualification, meaning that scientific formulations and calculations of poverty also 
determine the conditions of poverty’s verification and indeed manifestation in the world. 
In chapters 4 and 5, I will delve into the issue of how quantified and qualified poverty 
materially affect populations and territories, by creating the conditions under which 
bodies and soil are configured or assimilated by intervention practices. 
Law provides the crucial means through which an ontologising move occurs, conferring to 
poverty an objective status of ‘social reality’ – that is, a hybrid blend of natural adversity 
and a calamitous condition intrinsic to society. This social reality has been historically 
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constructed as a problematic – a ‘social problem’ – one which requires permanent 
remedies and which propels the modern cognitive and pragmatic ambitions to know it and 
fix it. It has been seen in the previous sections how antipoverty legislation can do that, on 
the one hand, by taking measures to endorse the productivity of the poor – by acting upon 
the workers to be employed, the homeless to be housed, the destitute to be banked, i.e. 
the ‘informals’ to be formalised as poor. On the other hand, legislation can also foster this 
formation by acting upon threats to be removed – vagrants to be contained, criminals to 
be penalised, fraudsters or scroungers to be managed, debtors to be foreclosed. Under the 
frame of analysis that I just laid out, by attempting to fix the problem, law co-produces the 
problem of poverty, creating stratification, stigmatisation, classification, informalisation, 
and indeed unlawfulness. It may seem that such practices are detecting, computing and 
classifying existing inequalities, social hierarchies and gaps between strata, classes or even 
nations. But in fact, I am suggesting, the gesture of visualising and inscribing is also a 
gesture of material creation in that it evokes the form and also modulates the content of 
poverty.  
It is a commonplace conception that codified laws are formal responses to scientific 
discoveries about poverty, in a process of informed decision making, which then provide 
the guidelines for political interventions upon poor populations and territories. But in fact, 
as I have demonstrated in this chapter, law can be seen to turn poverty into a visible 
occurrence in the first place, for science and politics to then act on it as a problem to be 
fixed. Hence, law figures as the process through which poverty is presented to the eye as a 
problem that needs to be fixed. Science and politics will take care of scrutinising the 
problem and exploring solutions by means of other practices that further co-form or co-
produce legal techniques – to that effect, I have argued, these are also legal practices from 
a legal refinement standpoint.  
I will delve into this broad conceptualisation of ‘law’ in chapters 3 and 4. In this chapter, I 
have simply treated legal codifications (antipoverty legislation) as parts of what law is. In 
fact, codifications are to be construed as the result of legal operations, their contingent 
consolidation in time and space. In other words, legal codifications are read as instant 
snapshots of law’s advancements, i.e. crystallised moments within a broader unfolding of 
‘law’ as a technology. But law itself, as a technology, is the process of its own making, 
which explains why it is moved by continual practices of knowledge and intervention. Law 
is also a catalyst, an enabler of the unfolding of a series of other practices. Here is a sketch 
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of how this way of conceptualising law and of framing it as a means of poverty 
visualisation unfold in the four modes of ‘dealing with poverty’ examined above:  
1) The practices that enabled the formulation and the functioning of the poor laws, 
which included the technical-scientific studies to press for institutional and legal 
reforms as well as the daily operations which implemented the poor laws – whether 
complying with its determinations of workhouses, vagrant removals, or even 
introducing new practices of poor relief which gradually instigated further changes to 
policy (such as continuing to offer outdoor relief despite the legal determinations of 
‘less eligibility’) – these practices are what collectively produce poverty as a problem of 
lack, of genius, a pathology to be cured by rehabilitating individuals and putting them to 
work. In this light, law enacts the conditions of its own requirements to operate. 
2) The practices of law enforcement, guided by knowledge of the associations 
between crime-poverty-race, end up producing more and more data which confirm 
these associations amongst the poor, the criminalised and the racialised. The 
selectiveness of using statistics of crime to deduce conclusions about crime and 
criminals in society work, paradoxically, to re-target the very subjects that were 
criminalised in the first place, and to invisibilise criminality that was left off the record, 
as unreported crimes. This is how data and law interact to establish the foundations of 
(and feed the continued expansion of) a war on poverty which is gradually transfigured 
into a war against the poor. Poor populations and territories are increasingly policed, 
increasingly studied and increasingly being objects of policy as poverty becomes 
visualised as a problem of crime (violence, drugs, theft, begging, benefit fraud, ghettos).  
3) The practices of managing public-private social protections and citizenship rights, 
particularly in the disputed context of its entrenchment by consensus-building global 
integration, breed increasingly diversified modes of data collection and usage. 
Manifesting a shift in social measurements, driven by strategic policy practice to 
identify and compare efficient pathways to social change, the welfare cluster presents a 
nascent rights-based logic of legal techniques used to deal with poverty as a ‘right to 
support’. In the process of increasing privatisation and financialization of social 
provisions, this right turns back into proprietary, contractual relations. 
4) The practices of international, multilateral financial institutions establish novel 
forms of social stratification and hierarchy on a global scale. Whether individuals, 
peoples or nations, the poor of the world are geographically verified and visually 
recognisable. This is not an innovation in practice, but indeed a replacement of 
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methods, parameters and reach. A newly formed basis of global classifications gives rise 
to renewed (and to an extent, unproblematic) technical modes of hierarchy. By being 
remedied with increasingly financial resources, not only the perception of the solution 
but the very nature of poverty is transformed. Poverty becomes a problem of finance 
and finance becomes elevated to the sanctified status of a human right. Finance capital 
expansion, breaking into new frontiers, new territories and new clientele, becomes a 
mission, a joint effort of a humanitarian international community. 
Rather than purely responsive, in this frame of analysis, law is actant. Law determines the 
conditions of possibility of data. Law provides the sampling for data-generative practices; 
it selects the populations and territories, the samples of poverty to which scientific 
scrutiny and policy intervention will follow. Poverty is not a naturally occurring 
phenomenon, nor is it a social reality that science examines and policy works on; it is 
formed by the legally recognised poor, the formalised poor. Formalisation, i.e. assimilation 
into the “proper” form of poverty, is the underlying legal operation that is present in each 
of the preceding epochal thrusts of poverty administration. Moreover, law is continually 
perfecting its populational and territorial sampling. Legislation has historically generated 
volumes of evidence about the nature and the material conditions of the poor. This is how 
the reorientations in antipoverty legislation seen in this chapter are made sense of. Law 
has supported advancements in poverty research without raising many questions 
regarding the extent to which legislation created the conditions of the poor in the first 
place. 
The historical transformations of the attitudes towards poverty have been recounted by 
way of indicating a pattern articulating what I am calling the compound of knowledge-law-
intervention. This pattern reveals important elements of continuity between trends and 
shifts that could otherwise be viewed as completely different, succeeding and mutually 
exclusive ‘regimes’ of poverty management. However, the extent to which trends and 
commonalities can be found are also dependent on the broad view of what configures 
knowledge, law and intervention. The knowledge practices of classical political economists 
are antagonistic to those of social investigators, who in the twenty-first century collect big 
data on the world population, yet they are both assembled as modes of knowledge 
production. The measures of mass incarceration in no way resemble the social policies of 
social security and income benefit, but still they are both broadly construed as antipoverty 
policy. And, most importantly for a legal research, nineteenth century laws are utterly 
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distant from the rites of international law and human rights today, though they are also 
both assembled under the broad marker of law. The arrangements of such varied 
occurrences into the same legal terminology should not be taken for granted. In each 
collection of attitudes analysed in this chapter we find entirely different elements to be 
framed as legal codifications, scientific reasoning and interventionist approaches, to the 
extent that I could make a case that each collection reconstructs the nature, structure and 
functions of each component of the abovementioned compound. For example, as opposed 
to the early modern, disciplinary and punitive legislation, law under the welfare state can 
be seen to have been functionally transformed into a programmatic instrument of societal 
administration, as an interventionist device.198 However, I set out to focus on the 
similarities, continuities and connections which reveal patterns of legal practices – even 
though of different emphases – to be situated within a constant technological role. 
My argument here is that law, as a technology, can be located in a mediating position 
enabling two circuits, that of knowledge practices and that of intervention practices, or 
alternatively the science of poverty and the politics of poverty. These circuits are here 
presented as such, by assembling a series of practices that are seemingly disconnected, 
particularly from a contextual or an institutional point of view. For example, the war on 
poverty turned into a war against the poor in the United States is a context-specific policy 
framework. But, as mentioned, the USA foreign agenda of a war on drugs and a war on 
terror transposes the notion of the internal enemy to Latin America among other regions, 
which fuels a warfare that is at present in full power and which also works to criminalise 
the poor elsewhere.199 At first sight, the association of the war on poverty in the 1970s 
USA and the war on drugs in Latin America today is read as an international order type of 
problem, mainly possible of being analysed through the lenses of dependency theory – if 
not as a demagogic appeal of conspiracy theories. The fact that the model of the internal 
or domestic enemy has been adopted by experts, as a technical knowledge by think-tanks 
dedicated to solving the problem of poverty and violence in Latin-American slums, is only 
reflected upon from a political and not scientific point of view. But indeed, the scientific 
categories of marginalisation and of a culture of poverty, among others, have been 
 
198 For this analysis, see Teubner’s collection of critiques of welfare legal regulations as a formalist lament of 
the transition from classical formal law to the political instrumentalization of law by the welfare state. 
Gunther Teubner, ‘The Transformation of Law in the Welfare State’ in Gunther Teubne (ed), Dilemmas of Law 
in the Welfare State (Walter de Gruyter 1988). 
199 Wacquant describes how this process plays out in Brazil in Loïc Wacquant, ‘The Militarization of Urban 
Marginality: Lessons from the Brazilian Metropolis’ (2008) 2(1) International Political Sociology 56. 
As for the engendered images of the enemy and the dependent, see Martha L Cottam, Images and 
Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (University of Pittsburgh Press 1994). 
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deployed in such areas,200 have played their role in shaping housing policy201 and have 
generated a plethora of data that now work to objectively confirm the relevance of such 
standards, lenses and/or measures. 
Likewise, although confined to a long-past yet deep-rooted history in Europe, it is 
interesting to identify how workhouse-like institutions, premised on confinement and 
reformation of the workshy, were trialled in the colonial territories before prison 
reformers rationalised punishment in Europe.202 Similarly, the welfare state, never fully 
adopted in the underdeveloped ‘Global South’ – although it has been seen that it is also 
not cohesive and stable in the ‘Global North’ – has elsewhere introduced hybrid models of 
means-tested social benefits and homeownership where there are no social housing 
programmes, mixing slum-clearance and social housing discourse by means of the 
militarised violence of evictions, removals and displacement.203  
Moreover, the mentioned use of laboratory-like practices, particularly but not exclusively 
in the developed-underdeveloped worlds relationality, illustrates other important 
connections between data collection and intervention policy dissemination. This was true 
quite early on in the case of scientific approaches to poverty knowledge, such as in the 
colonial laboratory of ‘scientific colonisation’, i.e. a ‘scientifically informed pursuit of native 
development’ by which, contrary to what common wisdom would suggest, the eugenic 
research in colonial Kenya, for example, was led by a progressive intellectual elite 
concerned with ‘native welfare’.204 This is also true today when policy transfers occur 
within a technocratic appreciation of successful ready-made experiences elsewhere and 
supported by reputable experts worldwide.205 This can be found in practices demonising 
welfare recipients as part of the implementation of work discipline, as well as in a cross-
sector criminal-financial exchange, where, for example, the war on drugs outreach into 
Latin America is conducted by intensive funding of law enforcement and ‘generous foreign 
aid packages’.206 The ‘laboratory rats’, thus, have been shown to be the world’s poor at 
large, regardless of clear-cut geopolitical partitions. While indigenous peoples were being 
exterminated in the ‘New world’, and racialised African bodies were being enslaved and 
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traded worldwide, Europe’s poor were also being acted upon – punished, removed, 
forcibly migrated, confined, evicted, sanitised. 
As David Englander noted, since the first attempt to develop a social measure in the 
nineteenth century Poor Law reform, policy figures have been the ‘determinant rather 
than the outcome of empirical research’.207 On the other hand, we have seen how the 
implementation of twentieth century welfare modes of administrative practice prefigures 
a model of experimental policies and monitoring indicators of success at a global scale. An 
interesting consolidation of the role of data and indicators as evidence emerges: not 
destined to verify the efficacy of practices and policies in terms of their ends, but indeed 
aimed at the means. Or more on point, as Sally Merry Engles analysed in regard to the 
current ‘obsession with indicators’, it seems that we are not concerned with indicators of 
success on strategies of intervention but rather with successful use of funds, leading to 
what Sundhya Pahuja described as an accountability towards the donors, not the not the 
recipients of aid.208 As such, social sciences end up elaborating and authenticating with 
scientific objectivity the nonpoor’s perception of poverty.  
I will come back to the circuits of knowledge and intervention in chapter 4, when I will be 
addressing the workings of the industry of global poverty reduction. But I would like to 
stress here that while it is only at the end of the twentieth century that the industry 
emerged as a self-referring milieu – with recognisable institutional structures, flows of 
capital, career paths and expert formations – even before that the interactions of science 
and politics dedicated to poverty had already been at play and, indeed, stably mediated by 
law. This bridging or mediating role that I am assigning to law consists of understanding 
law as providing the procedural, formal and consolidated ways through which the industry 
of poverty reduction functions. It is by looking at the larger history of interaction between 
science and policy – where globally and locally distributed co-occurrences of poverty data 
and remedies are circulating, continually producing effects and providing the means for 
other occurrences as an intricate machinery that reproduces itself – that a stable role of 
law become visible. Surely, legal techniques can also be grouped by alternative approaches 
in order to identify other connections. For example, if one observes the clusters of poverty 
administration presented in this chapter as closed-end models, or epochal governing 
regimes, one would identify law’s constitutive role in alternative compartmentalised fronts 
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such as disciplinary institutions, racialised welfare policy regimes,209 neoliberal 
precarisation,210 workfare and prisonfare, the neo-colonial international order, financial 
warfare, corporate global governance, the feminisation of microcredit interventions,211 as 
many critical studies do. With such lenses, one could still identify that law plays an overall 
role of preservation, although there is no agreement as to what is being preserved: the 
interests of the ruling class? The institutions? The sovereign? The project of modernity? 
The empire? Capital? However, the overarching legal role that I am expounding here is left 
unnoticed or secondary in such accounts.  For example, criminal law’s role of repressing 
the poor become far too distant from – in fact, inconsistent with – international contracts 
designed to transfer donations to support infrastructural developments in remote areas of 
the world. 
So what is involved in this stable legal role that I identify? I am arguing that legal 
techniques enable poverty to be seen as a thing in the world. Legal techniques form, as 
such, a technology of visualisation. How can law be seen to work in the same overarching 
role throughout shifting trends of poverty administration? To return to a point made 
earlier, law mobilizes practices of seeing, of sampling, by creating the populational profiles 
and regulating the territorial distribution of poverty. Legal techniques are applied to select 
(to sample) in the material world that which fits the general concept and to eliminate that 
which has been left out of the frame. In other words, law creates the conditions of 
possibility for poverty to be seen in the world and to be acted upon. It establishes ways of 
seeing by distinguishing between the acceptable (seeable) poor and the objectionable 
(concealed) poor – the latter are, nonetheless, the results of law’s own creation of poverty 
as a visible problem to be suppressed. As such, law underpins the modern gaze that 
visualises poverty and modulates territories and populations to adhere to the distributions 
of the seeable and the unseeable poor. It is, as such, a dividing gaze. But it does not merely 
separate the subject and the object of sight, the subject and the object of poverty 
alleviation; nor does it only subdivide the poor into the good and the bad poor. The 
dividing gaze, as I shall demonstrate, engenders a generalised visual economy that affects 
the everyday life of entire populations and territories of poverty which are deemed 
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‘excluded’ from social dynamics, ‘redlined’ from economic activity, ‘marginalised’ from 
urban landscapes.  
Interestingly, a reversed effect can also be sketched out: by making poverty visible law also 
emerges with a recognisable form. Dealing with poverty shapes legislation, the temporarily 
codified laws. As such, these emergent effects are not a blueprint to follow, a set of 
guiding principles prescribed by a fundamental authority. They are simply the result of all 
the practices involved in making it, which can only be (partially) identified in retrospect, by 
extracting the determinant procedures, components and contingent factors, architectures, 
genealogy and source-code that generates the contingent modes of existence and the 
functioning of an algorithmic performance. If we were to observe in retrospect how 
codified laws have emerged and transformed historically in the forms that they have, it 
might be easy to identify that they are not the ends, but rather the means by which 
knowledge and intervention operate. In this chapter I have presented some hints/clues of 
what was involved in the recent history of antipoverty legislation, by looking at different 
models simultaneously. Only an in depth look at each model could attempt to recollect the 
determinant steps that led to their formation. Yet, my purpose was to display law as 
something beyond the codified instruments that I presented as legal landmarks, not to 
inspect each of them. My aim was to contemplate on the complex circulation of trends, 
orientations, influences, communications that set in motion an industry of poverty 
reduction. I am interested in the machinery that enables such transmissions rather than in 
their content, aiming to capture the practices that are left invisible in records, reports, 
guidelines and indicators of success that are produced by such industry. In the next 
chapter I will take a closer look at how the making of poverty and the making of law are 
intertwined. I do that by taking a closer look at what has been mentioned here as the 
aesthetic features of law: legal-aesthetics is the thread that I use to navigate in and out the 








Poverty as a legal-aesthetic composition: quantifying and qualifying social problems 
 
 
Reflecting on her ground-breaking feat on the measurement of poverty, Mollie Orshansky 
famously stated, ‘For deciding who is poor, prayers are more relevant than calculation 
because poverty, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder’.1 This is a peculiar statement 
coming from a statistician dedicated to social quantifications, yet it is extremely revealing 
of the aesthetics of poverty production. In this chapter I will delve into this point to 
maintain that scientific formulations and calculations of poverty form the conditions of 
poverty’s verification and indeed manifestation in the world. I argue that poverty data 
does not merely represent a so-called social reality, it rather creates such reality. Scientific 
formulation of poverty works both as a sensory apprehension of perceived elements and 
as a performative gesture of creation that also has the power to deny the existence of 
other non-appearing social configurations. 
While poverty specialists have early on adhered to a growing preponderance of 
quantitative over qualitative inquiry,2 in this chapter I frame the quantification of ‘social 
problems’ as a matter of qualification. As such, quantifications are turned into qualitative 
designations (images) which, in turn, create new things in the world as social problems. To 
raise this argument, I draw aesthetic connections between knowledge, law and 
intervention – i.e., between scientific conceptualisations of poverty, images of the poor 
produced through legal technologies, and compositional configurations of populations and 
territories classified as in poverty. A peculiar challenge posed by the modern project of 
circumscribing poverty is that poverty itself is an aesthetic creation that is continually 
renewed by/within methodological innovations of measurement and policy. To be sure, 
Thomas Malthus’ notion of poverty is not the same as Peter Townsend’s notion of poverty, 
although both refer to economic growth or prosperity as a common denominator. These 
are particular and singular concepts and the continual reinventions of poverty seem to 
correspond less to new discoveries than to changes of lenses, of perspective. The changing 
 
1 Mollie Orshansky, ‘How poverty is measured’ (1969) 92(2) Monthly Labor Review 37. 
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modern science as a whole: the reduction of qualitative determinants to quantitative ones’. In Georg Simmel, 
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concepts of poverty also bring to existence different images of poverty, different 
approaches to tackling poverty and different profiles of poverty, as has been discussed in 
chapter 2. Of course, the variable and renewable concepts of poverty refer to a common 
material condition of lack, as discussed in chapter 1. None of the critiques raised in this 
research are meant to suggest that poverty is a fantasy with no material grounds.  
I will develop this argument guided by a material perspective on visualisation and 
cognition that follows Bruno Latour’s foregrounding of the ‘writing and imaging 
craftsmanship’ of science.3 I seek to make sense of the history of poverty knowledge 
traced in the previous chapter through its innovations in techniques of inscription – i.e. the 
progressive changes in writing, documenting, drawing, inspecting, archiving, calculating, 
computing and so on – that produce onto-epistemological claims and which, in turn, 
accompany conceptual, theoretical and institutional transformations. As a wider aim, I 
interrogate poverty data in terms of the facts it produces, both as constructions and as 
autonomous realities at the same time. Hence, I investigate poverty data as inscriptions 
which present poverty as something to be known – it presents ‘absent things’ to the 
senses as objects for the procedures of knowledge.4 In that regard, I will return to the 
point I made in chapter 2 that, if law is to be construed as a visual technology, legal 
practices work as techniques of inscription and of sampling that condition the formation of 
data, which are then organised and classified by scientific scrutiny in order to produce an 
intelligible (readable and presentable) idea of poverty.  
In the first section, I discuss the aesthetic aspect of knowledge production, with Chiara 
Bottici’s theory of the imaginal.5 I refer to aesthetics in terms of its sense-making and 
world-making functions. I then turn to the established scholarship of ‘law and aesthetics’ 
to situate my argument within a perspective which highlights the practical and 
administrative basis of law (as a proper craftsmanship of visualisation, in Latour’s terms), 
with reference to Cornelia Vismann and Alain Pottage. Vismann’s approach to the media 
and the techniques by which a ‘legal’ problem is articulated is particularly useful to suggest 
that law itself also appears in the making6 – which is to say, both law and poverty are 
 
3 Bruno Latour, ‘Visualisation and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands’ in Henrika Kuklick and Elizabeth 
Long (ed), Knowledge and Society Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past and Present, vol 6 (Jai Press 1986). 
4 Inscription, according to Latour, assembles diverse traces into a visible form and presents them synoptically 
to the agonistic encounters of the scientific practice. Everything that composes the object of knowledge is 
transformed into immutable mobiles that become readable and presentable. Latour (n 3) 15. 
5 Chiara Bottici, Imaginal Politics: Images Beyond Imagination and the Imaginary (Columbia University Press 
2019). 
6 Cornelia Vismann, ‘Cultural Techniques and Sovereignty’ (2013) 30(6) Theory, Culture & Society 83. 
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emergent effects that appear out of the knowledge and policy practices under 
examination. With Pottage, I contend that law cannot be captured as something that pre-
exists its practical operations and codifications.7 I end with a reading of the history of 
science, chiefly from Theodore Porter, which points to the technological and creative 
features of social quantification in order to return to legal references, such as Mary Poovey 
and Annelise Riles, and to explore the effects of qualification which derive from the 
mathematization of the social. 
 
3.1 Poverty knowledge: cognition, visualisation and normative world-making 
The interdisciplinary field of poverty research is dedicated to assessing the extents and 
nature of global poverty – whether through econometrics, household surveys, 
ethnographies, cartographies or many other methods. As has been indicated, the 
emergence of social sciences at the turn of the twentieth century unfolds from the 
ambition to quantify social phenomena, poverty being a primary focus, involving a 
fundamental occupation with the task of measuring, counting and describing poverty 
through scientific methods. In the data-driven world of our times, the point of depicting 
poverty is often taken for granted and, when interrogating the social role of scientific 
knowledge, one should definitely raise questions: who are the receivers of such a picture, 
and for what purposes is the picture used?8 These certainly are politically relevant 
questions. However, they also take for granted another more fundamental question: can 
poverty be an object of depiction in the first place? What lies behind the project to 
quantify the social is an ontological assumption (or strategic postulation) that attributes a 
status of objective reality to poverty.  
Surely, to say that poverty is objectively real, an identifiable object, is a methodological 
premise and should not be confused with a faithful and naïve belief held by social 
scientists. After all, in order to examine a particular ‘social reality’, one must 
conventionally decide on basic characteristics that isolate it from other nonessential 
variables. Nonetheless, the conventions of modern sciences presuppose that there is a 
reality out there to be studied and, admittedly, poverty of all ‘social problems’ definitely 
does evoke clear (yet historically forged) symbols that are visible and in plain sight. 
However, reality is not a given. Chiara Bottici recounts that the history of the notion of 
 
7 Alain Pottage, ‘The Materiality of What?’ (2012) 39(1) Journal of Law and Society 167. 
8 Else Øyen, ‘Poverty Research Rethought’ in Else Øyen, SM Miller and Syed Abdus Samad (Eds), Poverty: A 
Global Review: Handbook on International Poverty Research (Scandinavian University Press 1996) 9. 
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reality, as the material conditions of experience independent from the mind, is a recent, 
modern notion developed from Kantian philosophy.9 Not only is it recent, it is also 
continually changing. Reality evokes, in different periods and places, issues of presence, 
existence, being, experience and essence of things in the world. On the other hand, it also 
establishes that which will be deemed unreal, absent, inexistent, nonessential, 
insignificant, immaterial, imaginary, irrelevant, lifeless or void.  
It is useful to hold on to the pictorial metaphor suggested in the term ‘depiction’ above: 
poverty knowledge works as a framing process. It paints a picture. Instead of revealing 
existing realities, poverty knowledge gives linear form to the chaos of social configurations 
which it attempts to apprehend and depict. Measurements and calculations give form, 
aesthetic form, to poverty, providing a conventional image to the hitherto absence of 
form. A social phenomenon is thus created. Specialist knowledge proposes claims of truth 
and useful notions in specific historic moments. Each new conceptual formulation 
engenders a corresponding praxis to deal with the conventional, yet transitory, notion of 
poverty – i.e. the prevailing interpretation at each given time. Furthermore, the normative 
features conventionally decided for the definition and classifications of poverty are 
internalised and lead to the differentiations between that which conforms to the 
classificatory structures and that which presents its negative counterpart – differentiations 
which lead, in turn, not only to the distinction between the poor and the nonpoor, but also 
to the frequently explored distinction between the good and the bad poor, the deserving 
and the undeserving poor (the latter being those who do not adhere to the conventional 
and normative aesthetical forms of poverty).  
This is an important insight that should be emphasised from the outset: knowledge is 
aesthetic.10 In other words, a philosophical concept is an aesthetic creation and, likewise, a 
scientific category is also an aesthetic creation. Unlike the notion of reality, the aesthetic 
attribute of knowledge production is not a recent idea. Philosophical inquiries into 
perception and comprehension come from a long chain of influences and critiques dating 
back to ancient philosophy, as can be found in Chiara Bottici’s genealogy of imagination 
and the imaginary.11 In crude terms – as this is certainly not a theoretical lineage I wish to 
agitate – Plato’s phantasia is described as being rooted in aesthesis (sensation, sense 
perception) and judgement in the sensible world of appearances, as a genuine form of 
 
9 Bottici (n 5). 
10 To that extent, as a concept and a scientific category, poverty is an aesthetic creation. 
11Bottici (n 5). 
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knowledge separate from the understanding of intellect. With contemplation as 
knowledge’s highest form, sensory perception differs in degree from ideas. Aristotelian’s 
phantasia also corresponds to aesthesis and sensory apprehension, although ideas come 
from the sensible world and images mediate sense perception and conception. That is to 
say, knowledge is rooted in the senses and, even though immaterial, images 
(phantasmata) are sensed. Unified, composite images create the conditions of possibility 
for perception and cognition and, thus, it is through an aesthetic and affective operation 
that things appear in the world (things are presented to the senses) to be, then, 
interpreted, calculated, deliberated and acted upon. 
Modern European philosophy, however, with the primacy of reason, stands on quite 
different foundations to the ancient connections between sensation and knowledge. In the 
modern worldview, the sensorial, aesthetic and affective aspects of knowledge production 
are replaced by purely rational, logical and empirical methods which, as mentioned before, 
presuppose an existing, external reality to be objectively known. Aesthetics and its 
subjective imagination are excluded from knowledge in modern philosophy.12 The 
Enlightenment’s emancipation of the subject from myths, in fact, postulates a new 
conception of reality that separates the subject and the object of knowledge.13 Kant’s 
knowledge is the synthesis of sense data by intellectual pure reason, which is to say, in a 
Kantian, idealist tradition the mind conditions the perception of the world and external 
objects in space and time. Aesthetics, then, become the proper field of art, sensibility and 
pure judgment about beauty, in a ‘division between reason and imagination, science and 
art, and thus critique and creativity’.14 Science and art produce competing or 
complementary representations of a given reality. To understand the external world is 
then a matter of experience combined with a priori concepts – the latter are universal and 
necessary knowledge not derived from experience. In other words, there is an element of 
a priori knowledge to the experience and perception of external objects. 
Other philosophical traditions have since revisited the sense-knowledge connection, 
especially phenomenology at the turn of the twentieth century.15 Edmund Husserl studied 
the perceptual field of the experience – with objects being constituted in the perception of 
the experiencing subject – aiming to understand the ability of appearances to convey 
 
12 Bottici (n 5) 24. 
13 Bottici (n 5). 
14 Bottici (n 5) 26. 
15 See in Horia Bratu and Ileana Marculescu, ‘Aesthetics and Phenomenology’ (1979) 37(3) Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 335. 
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senses of reality. Instead of attempting to reveal what lies beneath the appearances of 
things, or to raise doubt about the existence of the perceived objects, the point was to 
show how objects are constituted as the things they are within the field of subjective 
experience. Husserl displaced the scientific world of objectivity and challenged an 
assumption of naturalism in philosophy and philosophical method. A ‘life world’ as 
opposed to an objective world of science, is a world of meaning disclosed by the 
suspension of the natural attitude. Developed further by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, among 
others, as an existential phenomenology, this scholarship is at the root of the relation of 
self and other in existentialism. Phenomenology excavates the apprehension and 
comprehension of objects, entities and events in the course of everyday experiences of 
the world, where reality manifests itself for human intelligibility and raises questions 
about the existence of an independent real world beyond human observation. The ‘gaze’ 
has since been theorised as an element of processes of subjectivation in poststructuralist 
schools of thought, and of objectification of others particularly in feminist and critical race 
theory. In the case of the latter, W.E.B. Du Bois and Franz Fanon exemplarily developed 
perceptual thinking and highlighted the flipside of the existentialist analysis by 
interrogating the effects of being seen and constituted as other – as well as the troubles of 
seeing oneself through the eyes of others.16 It is worth noting that the phenomenological 
understanding is aligned with the critical legal theories, as will be discussed below, based 
on recognition, and upholds a series of associations related to an idea of subjectivity as the 
individual identity of the subject. Although it is certainly important to interrogate the 
position of the subject as poststructuralist thinkers do, I would like to stress the 
importance of also focusing on the object of sight and perception, as I aim to do in this 
thesis.  
Another school of thought that is important to mention is empiricism – from which social 
sciences later emerged. Empiricism, formalism and scientism derive from the shift in 
modern western thought that conceives of reality as an a priori product of human 
understanding.17 For David Hume and others at the forefront of liberalism, knowledge is 
based on experience, i.e. sensory experience, as opposed to rationalist, metaphysical 
ideas. The primacy of the experiment, of empirical evidence and of the scientific method 
later led to August Comte’s positivism which later inspired the formation of sociology. 
 
16 Namely Du Bois’ notion of ‘double consciousness’ and Fanon’s ‘black consciousness under a white gaze’ 
WEB Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (Penguin 1996); Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (first published 
1952, Pluto Press 1986). 
17Bottici (n 5). 
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Positivist social sciences are particularly determinant as a field that arose from the 
reification of social phenomena towards quantification. From the early social statisticians 
and pioneers of the social survey to the contemporary aggregate data, quantification is 
rooted in an objective form of observing the world where immaterial and apparently 
unrelated elements can be drawn together to make visible what was previously unnoticed. 
Social sciences have followed an empirical approach to knowledge and poverty has 
typically been studied as a concrete problem, one that not only is part of an external 
reality but that also requires strategic intervention. This new applied science produced 
knowledge about poverty, as a problem to be solved. Although dedicated to social change, 
this new knowledge was seemingly produced without consideration of its own effects in 
the world – that is, of how it affected the very phenomenon it was trying to apprehend.  
This is the point of my critique in this section. By seemingly not reflecting on its internal 
function (that knowledge is sensory only after a stage of creation) and its external 
functions (that knowledge affects its own object of creation and cognition, by fabricating 
new entities), it seems to have not occurred to poverty experts to interrogate the 
aesthetic effects of their own enterprise. However, the comprehensive examination of the 
historical connections between conceptualisations of poverty, images of the poor and 
interventions upon populations and territories classified as in poverty begs a more 
dedicated scrutiny about the fabrication of poverty and its effects in the world. Poverty as 
a concept is a pseudo-entity with no corporeal or incorporeal a priori or pre-social 
existence. Poverty is not the content of an impression of the world, but rather a construct, 
an image-entity that is projected onto the world. As a philosophical concept, poverty is 
grounded on undeniable material conditions, however it gathers such conditions into an 
image, a unifying category with no prior existence which is then retrospectively captured 
as a thing in the world. As useful constructions, nonetheless, associated with perceptions 
of an external world, the modern concepts of poverty accompany new ways of seeing and 
knowing the material world which link thought and experience and that, in turn, produce 
concrete effects. Such effects occur when images are projected into the world, informing 
worldviews. Subsequently, perception generates conception that in turn informs 
perception again. To put it more accurately: conceptualisations of poverty which are 
formed from the visualisation of samples and inscriptions will inform perceptions of 
poverty in the concrete world by framing populations and territories of poverty. This 
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means that perspective (regarding inscriptions) prevails over perception (of actually 
existing objects).18 
The idea of poverty and the ‘reality’ of poverty in the concrete world are here recognised 
as part and parcel of the same productive circuitous machinery. To reiterate: there are 
material manifestations of poverty, but they take effect through the production of 
knowledge, i.e. they appear through different materialities depending on the techniques 
of inscription and articulation that frame them. This argument can be seen as a relativist 
attempt to disassociate notions of poverty from the materiality of a life rendered (seen as) 
‘in poverty’. However, this is not a discussion about the distinctions between poverty 
knowledge and the concreteness of poverty (even less so about the inability of scientific 
methods to accurately apprehend the reality of poverty). In fact, I have already indicated 
that there can be no presupposed distinction between knowledge and reality. Although I 
signal that there are effects of poverty data within everyday life dynamics, my goal is much 
more modest. I am making the case that the process of writing and imaging poverty is 
what makes it a visible and existing thing in the world, which is very different from denying 
the material conditions of lives in poverty. 
In his piece titled Visualisation and Cognition, Bruno Latour19 analyses visual inscriptions in 
scientific procedures, according to which three-dimensional objects are translated into 
two-dimensional inscriptions (into devices such as maps, photographs, records, surveys, 
censuses, files) that are mobile, immutable and flat at the same time that they are 
reproducible, comparable, superimposable. Cascaded inscriptions work to mobilise and 
muster new resources to enter the agonistic encounters of knowledge production, 
accumulating allies and defeating dissenters. Writing and imaging, then, precede the 
worldly perception of a phenomenon. Through inscriptions, objects are presented to the 
senses. They compose a phenomenon to be perceived. Like ‘economy’ and ‘market’, I am 
suggesting that ‘poverty’ is also framed as a thing in the world after processes of 
inscription that collect and sum up ‘a few indicators out of many traces’ about foreign 
places and times.20 First, as we have seen in chapter 1, the inscription of poverty occurs in 
the drawings of property that produce the propertied and the propertyless, through ‘cuts’ 
that organise and constitute the world into seemingly ‘stabilised and sedimented’ pre-
 
18 Latour (n 3). 
19 Latour (n 3). 
20 Latour (n 3) 27. 
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social categories.21 Then, the inscription of the propertyless as ontological entities 
visualises the poor as problems to be fixed – as threats to be removed, or as indolents to 
be disciplined, and so on – as has been discussed in chapter 2. Law provides the crucial 
means through which such ontologisation occurs, by turning quantity into quality. This 
occurs because law is a technology of visualisation and, as such, it activates the intrinsically 
inscriptive functions of sampling. To put it in crude terms, legal practices are practices of 
inscription that condition scientific scrutiny. 
Moreover, such inscriptions make it possible to modulate the objects whose traces they 
are meant to register and make visible. These are the terms with which I analysed poverty 
data production in chapter 2 as resulting from the interplay of knowledge, law and 
intervention. As resources engendered and mobilised by methods of quantification, 
ranging from early social surveys up to state-of-the-art innovations of satellite images and 
remote sensing, data make poverty visible as a unified and global phenomenon. Then, this 
constructed image of poverty is presented to the senses as an object for the aesthetic 
process of knowledge production and for intervention. In blunt terms: poverty is first 
invented and later perceived and I have established that law, broadly constructed, is a 
driving force mediating these processes. An immediate problem to be recognised in this 
order of things is that perception is limited to what has been offered to the senses, i.e. 
what was selected to form part of that object. The continually updated image will shape 
the changing paradigms of poverty knowledge. Another aspect to stress is that without 
this capacity to generate stable, mobile and comparable inscriptions, the material 
conditions of poverty would remain local and temporary manifestations of extensively 
diverse modes of existence. Latour’s work is useful because it rejects the question about 
the relationship between cognitive abilities and social structures by discarding the 
social/cognitive divide which assumes that society is separate from its science, images and 
information.22 
As demonstrated in chapter 2, legal practices play a determinant role in the mechanism of 
accumulating and registering traces about ‘the poor’. Yet, rather than simply construed as 
collecting empirical data from a supposedly objective reality of poverty, law seems to 
appear (to be made) in the innovations of inscriptions. It has been established, in fact, that 
legal techniques systematically affect the formation of general configurations and 
 
21 Nicholas Blomley, ‘Cuts, Flows, and the Geographies of Property’ (2010) 7(2) Law, Culture and the 
Humanities 207. 
22 Latour (n 3) 30, fn 17. 
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perceptions of poverty. At this point it seems more accurate to situate law – i.e., legal 
practices – at the core of a perspectivist arena that makes poverty perceivable in the first 
place. Whether by forming systems of poor relief, of confinement, of social assistance or 
of international aid, law is typically present in eugenic, punitivist, welfarist and 
humanitarian projects regarding ‘the poor’. In reflecting on the media-technological 
grounds of law, Cornelia Vismann23 offers an important contribution to this point. By 
placing the historical transformations of law in the material basis of record keeping, lists, 
inventories and censuses, Vismann’s work allows for an analysis of their descriptive, 
prescriptive and performative operations, with particular attention to their functions: 
evidentiary, normative, reality-producing. As a result, ‘reality is what is found in files’.24  
I will move on to an analysis of the role of law in knowledge production and intervention. 
However, instead of stressing disparities, incidents where the world does not coincide with 
the official registers of poverty, I work along the historical construction of the ‘file-world’ 
of poverty in order to critique its interpretations as a matter of ‘fact’. The task to keep in 
mind, in parallel with the specific discussions presented in the next sections, is to explore 
how the ways in which law regulates poverty concomitantly engender particular unified 
images and actual ways of seeing ‘the poor’, i.e., how practices turn concepts into material 
facts. I will pick up on this point in the next chapter. 
To clarify, by ‘image’ I do not mean to propose an exploration limited to the realm of the 
visual, although in the case of visual presentations of information and data the visual 
aspect of images is more evidently present. Image is broadly conceptualised as an 
aesthetic composition that merges sensorial, cognitive, affective and even imaginative 
elements. Yet, more than a construct resulting from creative methods, image is itself a 
technology that produces material effects in the world. In other words, as will be proposed 
in the next section, image is both representational and technological, both meaning-
making and world-making. To lay out this argument, it is relevant to consider, following 
Vismann, that files (and their informational substrate, i.e., data) are mediums of presence 
with ontological qualities themselves. Files and data equip law with a ‘presentist effect’, 
i.e., oriented towards presence.25 The aesthetic functions of scientific inscriptions of 
poverty walk hand in hand with legal-aesthetic modulations26 of poverty. It is this 
 
23 Cornelia Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology (Stanford University Press 2008) 9. 
24Vismann (n 23) 56. 
25 Vismann (n 23) 10 and 54. 
26 At this point in the argument, it seems adequate to lay out that I use the term modulation to allude to 
variable and interpenetrable mechanisms that give shape to populations and territories without a reference 
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technological aspect rather than the content of ‘images of poverty’ that interests me in 
this research.  
Finally, in considering the links between visuality and conceptualisations of poverty, I am 
putting forward the relativeness of the concept of poverty in different visual economies 
and I am speculating about the so-called reality of poverty as we know it: the capitalistic 
poverty.27 In doing so, I am bringing into view bridges between epistemology and 
ontology. From Bottici we learn that, as the product of both mental faculties and material 
conditions, images are not simply a visual resource.28 Images are also functional, operative 
constructs which condition the world and its subjects. It is in the realm of the imaginal that 
I consider the interactions of knowledge, law and intervention practices. Not only 
knowledge is implicated in the aesthetic processes mentioned above; law is also mobilised 
by images and modulates the world through an aesthetic function. Hence, Aesthetics 
refers both to sense-making and to world-making. This feature is more noticeable at the 
turning point where perception (apprehension) of poverty as a social phenomenon 
becomes a productive tool (projection) for intervention in the material world. I will frame 
this turning point in the passage from quantification to qualification. But first, it is relevant 
to explore in more depth the existing literature that connects law and aesthetics. 
 
3.2 Law and aesthetics: on legal technologies of perception and visuality  
The connection between law and aesthetics is not a new proposition in critical thought. In 
fact, Birkbeck School of Law has nurtured various participants in the so-called scholarly 
movement of Law and Aesthetics, which investigates the sensorial interplay between legal 
 
to a sovereign, disciplinary power or ideology actively and forcefully moulding the world. This is a term I take 
from Gilles Deleuze’s analysis of societies of control, according to which modulation is contrasted to the 
moulding of ‘spaces of enclosure’ which Michel Foucault, in turn, critiqued in disciplinary institutions (family, 
schools, hospital, factory, prison and so forth). See Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ 
(1992) 59 October 3.  
27 It is important to stress here that according to Latour’s framework of analysis, instead of maintaining a 
Marxist-materialist account of the history of science (according to which the new modes of production 
created a new way of thinking), ‘capitalism’ is usefully understood as a process of mobilisation of immutable 
mobiles. Capitalism is a process of mobilisation which refers to the capitalisation of material instruments, like 
money or any other inscription device, which are calculated and arrayed in cascades of larger and larger scale. 
The history of science and the history of capitalism meet in the power of their inscriptions, rather than in a 
supposed determinist relationality. Latour (n 3) 28-30.   
Earlier in this thesis I defined ‘capitalistic’ notions, in terms of a thinking through capitalism, as a cohesive 
concept itself (See fn 1, Ch 1).  This point will be picked up in chapter 4 where I raise the common history of 
different centres of calculation, such as economy, poverty research and law, which formulate the 
contemporary concepts of poverty (what is here referred to as the capitalistic poverty, in contrast with other 
epochal notions of poverty). 
28 Bottici (n 5). 
137 
 
subjects, objects and images. In this section I revisit some of the main references in this 
debate in order to situate my research as a contribution to this scholarship. As I adopt a 
particular understanding of what constitutes an ‘image’ – its properties, its mediums and 
its functions – I shall specify the direction my research prioritises amid the literature 
reviewed in this section. However, a more comprehensive genealogy of such scholarship is 
still needed and I do not attempt to do that in this thesis. To be sure, the investigation 
concerns the aesthetic functions of knowledge production, specifically the aesthetics of 
calculations and measurements of poverty, which in turn produce aesthetic effects on the 
material world beyond the direct impacts of interventions informed by such knowledge. 
The focus is on how occasional changes in methods of poverty definition and 
measurement can work to affect the geopolitics of poverty by presenting new imageries 
and producing new ways of seeing and framing populations and territories. In order to 
develop this argument, I suggest that law (legal techniques at large) is a moving force 
through which images become functional and productive. But how do legal theorists 
conceptualise images? 
Tracing a history of critical legal scholarship, Costas Douzinas identifies in the 1980s and 
early 1990s an ‘aesthetic turn’ in the work of the so-called ‘BritCrits’.29 Influenced by 
continental and post-structuralist philosophy, such critics construed law as a linguistic 
category. Law is primarily examined as a ‘textual web rather than a system of norms’.30 
While in the North American tradition of legal realism and pragmatism this has developed 
into interpretative practices highlighting contradictions in legal doctrines and decisions, 
the British critics focused on interrogating the authority and legitimacy of law as 
language31 and literature.32 Since the early stages of this growing scholarship, the 
analytical tools were as diverse as rhetoric, hermeneutics, semiotics, theology and 
psychoanalysis.33 A fundamental understanding then was that law was as much a system 
 
29 Costas Douzinas, ‘A Short History of the British Critical Legal Conference or, the Responsibility of the Critic’ 
(2014) 25 (2) Law and Critique 187. A genealogy of Critical Legal Studies can also be found in Adam Gearey, 
‘Change is Gonna Come: Critical Legal Studies and the Legacies of the New Left’ (2013) 24 (3) Law and Critique 
211.   
30 Douzinas (n 29) 191.  
31 E.g. Peter Goodrich, ‘The Role of Linguistics in Legal Analysis’ (1984) 47(5) Modern Law Review 523; Costas 
Douzinas, Roannie Warrington and Shaun McVeigh, Postmodern Jurisprudence: The Law of Text in the Texts of 
Law (Routledge 1993). 
32 E.g. Adam Gearey, ‘Finnegans Wake and the Law of Love' (1997) 8(2) Law and Critique 245; Maria 
Aristodemou, ‘Studies in Law and Literature: Directions and Concerns’ (1993) 22 Anglo-American Law Review 
157. 
33 E.g.  Peter Goodrich, Oedipus Lex: Psychoanalysis, History, Law (University of California Press 1995); Piyel 
Haldar, 'The Spectacular and Legal Forms of Legal Justice' (1996) 19(3) Art History 448; Costas Douzinas and 
Ronnie Warrington, Justice Miscarried: Ethics, Aesthetics and the Law (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1994). 
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of sign as it was a formative part of the symbolic order. As such, critics sought to 
deconstruct traditional notions of law and to view it instead as a fiction, albeit very 
effective in changing the world.  
However, legal aesthetics also raises insights beyond the written forms, and more recent 
investments have attempted to draw structures and landmarks from multiple scholarships 
into the encounter between legal critique and aesthetics – Law and Image being one of 
these.34 In an influential edited volume on Law and the Image: The Authority of Art and the 
Aesthetics of Law, Costas Douzinas and Lynda Nead35 promoted intersections between law 
and art history. Contrary to ancient understandings that would situate them as 
antithetical, law and art are seen to be mutually implicated. The historical ambivalence of 
law towards reliance on and hostility towards symbols, between iconophilia and 
iconoclasm suggest, instead, that ‘law has always had an aesthetic policy’, whereas 
modern law is ‘an aesthetic practice that denies its art’.36 The collection was pioneering in 
proposing to develop a legal iconology of law’s symbols, emblems, allegorical figures, 
courtroom architecture, staged performances and visual politics, from the concrete 
standpoint of legal cases, artworks, built spaces and historical artefacts. The contributions 
in this book foreground theoretical discussions about the gaze and the subject, 
recognition, representation of self and other, identity, and subjectivity within the then 
growing scholarship of Law and Image.37 A few years later, Adam Gearey published Law 
and Aesthetics38 to propose creative approaches to understanding law as an aesthetic 
phenomenon itself, capable of interrupting established categories and generating new 
legal relationships. 
Another influential collection – Law and Art: Justice, Ethics and Aesthetics edited by Oren 
Ben-Dor – presents many legal scholars who are reflecting on the interdisciplinary and 
political encounters of law and art from diverse philosophical perspectives. The book 
delves into the ‘aesthetic sensibilities’ implicated in legal critiques and brings aesthesis to 
the forefront. Here, law is defined as an essentially aesthetic activity,39 linking judgement 
of art and judgement of law, and proposing important reflections about the legal subject 
 
34 For an account of the field of law and image theory, see Marcus VAB de Matos, ‘How to Picture 
Sovereignty: A Visual Theory of Subjectivity and Subjection’ (PhD Thesis, University of London 2018). 
35 Costas Douzinas and Lynda Nead, Law and the Image: The Authority of Art and the Aesthetics of Law 
(University of Chicago Press 1999). 
36 Douzinas and Nead (n 35) 5. 
37 See also Costas Douzinas 'Law's Fear of the Image: Whistler v. Ruskin' (1996) 19(3) Art History 353. 
38 Adam Gearey, Law and Aesthetics (Hart Publishing 2001). 
39 Oren Ben-Dor, ‘Introduction: Standing Before the Gates of the Law’ in Oren Ben-Dor (ed), Law and Art: 
Justice, Ethics and Aesthetics (Routledge 2011) 3. 
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within the oppressive and emancipatory dimensions of legal aesthetics. A clearer sense of 
how to legally conceptualise images begins to find resonances. In this collection, Costas 
Douzinas develops a Legal Phenomenology of Images, where the image is defined as ‘the 
object of vision’ which constitutes the subject of law as the ‘modern seeing subject’.40 The 
subject operates an ‘imagistic perception’ of the external world and internalises its images 
into ‘mental representations’. Perception, under this framework, is taken to be a ‘specular 
operation’ of consciousness. The ‘image phenomenon’ is said to hold this function of 
making visible, of presenting the absent. The image is distinct from the thing being 
depicted but its operation is that of presenting that thing as an entity, not simply a 
mimetic representation. Thus, in this phenomenological approach to images there is a 
sense of differentiation between perception and reality – ‘The image poses the thing for a 
subject. In this ‘presencing’, the thing is assembled into being for the viewer. […] in doing 
so, both the thing and the subject are called into life, the image turns anything into 
something for someone’.41 This move confers unity and identity to the subject of vision 
and the object of gaze.42 It also situates law as part of the ‘normative control of the visual’ 
– which lays the policing of images and the economy of permitted images – forming 
regimes of vision corresponding to different historical epochs. Such ‘legally conditioned 
regimes of visibility’ administer historically changing ways of seeing ‘as natural, normal and 
truthful’43 and determine the symbolic constructions by which things appear or are 
concealed in the field of vision. 
This phenomenological approach is much indebted to earlier conceptualisations of image 
as emblematical representation, which is connected to the foundations of modern legal 
culture and the constitution of the legal subject.44 Both approaches place images as 
bearers of signification, the conditions of possibility for bodies to exist and to make sense 
of the world. However, the former also draws on earlier philosophical influences, such as 
Husserl himself, but also Heidegger and Jean-Luc Nancy, to develop more grounded 
formulations of and indeed interventions in the ‘lifeworld’. It is in this sense that 
Douzinas’s image can be conceptualised as an independent object, rather than a mere 
 
40 Costas Douzinas, ‘Legal Phenomenology of Images’ in Oren Ben-Dor (ed), Law and Art: Justice, Ethics and 
Aesthetics (Routledge 2011) 253. 
41 Douzinas (n 40) 248. 
42 Douzinas (n 40) 253. 
43 Douzinas (n 40) 254. 
44 See Pierre Legendre, ‘Introduction to the Theory of the Image: Narcissus and the Other in the Mirror,’ Peter 
Goodrich and Alain Pottage (trs) (1997) 8 Law and Critique 3. 
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simulation or repetition of an existing object – representation, thus, stands for an act of 
creation and presentation.  
I will draw on this concept of the image in order to elucidate other important references 
that allow me to study poverty data as image. Before I do that, I would like to make a brief 
reference to the numerous contemporary intellectual debates, coalesced from such 
diverse chains of influences, and which in different ways helped me to determine my 
research questions and calibrate the arguments I present in this thesis. For example, from 
the phenomenological perspective, Leif Dahlberg’s collection Visualizing Law and Authority 
also argues that legal aesthetics present ways of seeing, i.e. form part of the mechanisms 
and structures that allow us to decode the world into everyday perceptions and social 
interactions. With reference to Merleau-Ponty, Dahlberg hints that not only is the world 
constituted by the ways in which it ‘appears to us’, it is also the case that we are 
constantly ‘learning to see’ and to transform that very world. Within this framework, ‘law 
constitutes a visual and aesthetic field of cognitive and normative world making’,45 which 
ontologises legal categories and concepts. Another collection worth mentioning is Anne 
Wagner and Richard Sherwin’s Law, Culture and Visual Studies, a landmark in the 
intersection of legal and visual studies, examining law’s intermediation with diverse forms 
of contemporary visual media technology, communication and culture.46 Also, Karin Van 
Marle and Stewart Motha’s Genres of Critique: Law, Aesthetics and Liminality seeks to 
explore ‘critique through aesthetic forms’ by inspiring a kind of anti-colonial ethics to 
guide critical legal thought and practice expanding into other geographies, with a primary 
focus on South Africa.47  
Besides these ground-breaking collaborative publications, there are also numerous 
individual works published in journals around the world that could be sampled to form 
part of this scholarship, which is no longer enclosed within the disciplinary boundaries of 
British critical legal studies. In fact, Linda Mulcahy also refers to a ‘visual turn’ in socio-legal 
studies, where images have been found to offer useful tools to construct ‘revisionist 
histories of socio-legal subjects’ at the margins of the legal system.48 Likewise, in the North 
 
45 Leif Dahlberg, ‘Introduction: Visualizing Law and Authority’ in Leif Dahlberg (ed), Visualizing Law and 
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American critical legal tradition, there has also emerged what has been termed ‘visual 
jurisprudence’.49 The diversity of writings could be arranged in reference to the multiple 
forms of visual media: photography,50 film,51 design,52 street art,53 digital images,54 
architecture,55 urban landscapes,56 acts of protest and imagined futures57 and, indeed, 
images that go beyond the visual58 or include other sensorial and affective dimensions.59 
The diversity of intellectual work in the field could also be ordered according to how 
images and legal practices are framed – evidential objects,60 forensic architecture,61 visual 
criminology,62 legal feminist aesthetics63 and so forth – and could even include an 
understanding of aesthetic forms as gestures of violence.64 More recently, Desmond 
Manderson organised another important book on Law and the Visual65 – to which I will 
now turn – where he identifies at present three ‘constellations of research interest’ in the 
field: ‘visual representations about the law, visual technologies in the law, and aesthetic 
critique of the law’.66 These distinct emphases reiterate the multiplicity of approaches that 
have proliferated within what a few decades ago could be seen as a momentary encounter 
between disciplines.  
 
49 Richard K Sherwin, ‘Visual Jurisprudence’ (2013) 57(1) New York Law School Review 11. 
50 E.g. Katherine Biber, Captive Images: Race, Crime, Photography (Routledge 2007). 
51 E.g. Leslie J Moran et al (eds), Law’s Moving Image (Cavendish Publishing Limited 2004); Nathan Moore and 
Anne Bottomley, ‘Law, Diagram, Film: Critique Exhausted’ (2012) 23(2) Law and Critique 163. 
52 Linda Mulcahy, ‘Architects of Justice: The Politics of Courtroom Design’ (2007) 16(3) Social & Legal Studies 
383.  
53 E.g. Alison Young, ‘Criminal Images: The Affective Judgment of Street Art and Graffiti’ (2012) 8(3) Crime, 
Media, Culture 296. 
54 Louise Amoore, ‘Lines of Sight: On the Visualization of Unknown Futures’ (2009) 13(1) Citizenship Studies 
17. 
55 E.g. Anne Bottomley and Nathan Moore, ‘What is a Building? Documents for the Contractual Diagramming 
of Design’ (2012) 16(3) Architectural Research Quarterly 261. 
56 E.g. Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (ed), Law and the City (Routledge 2007).  
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California Press 2000). 
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University Press 2016). 
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61 E.g. Eyal Weizman, Forensic Architecture: Violence at the Threshold of Detectability (Zone Books 2017). 
62 E.g. Eamonn Carrabine, ‘Just Images: Aesthetics, Ethics and Visual Criminology’ (2012) 52(3) British Journal 
of Criminology 463. 
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Representation of Sexual Violence in International Law’ (2012) 36(1) Australian Feminist Law Journal 107. 
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65 Desmond Manderson, ‘Imaginal Law’ in Desmond Manderson (ed), Law and the Visual: Representations, 
Technologies, and Critique (University of Toronto Press 2018). 
66 Manderson (n 65) 9. 
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Manderson’s collection is a relevant source for my research as it, in a way, bridges the 
earlier phenomenological approaches and the ‘legal materialities’ that I embrace in broad 
terms. Although there are fundamental philosophical incompatibilities between the two, 
connections can be established in that both perspectives encompass the notion of an 
autonomous status of images regardless of their correspondence to reality. In fact, both 
perspectives understand that what we call ‘reality’ is precisely an outcome of imaginal 
resources rather than a pre-existing configuration. A material approach will assume that 
there can be no reference to an ‘out there’ as there is no dualist sense of reality and there 
have always been just images,67 whilst a phenomenological position remarks that reality is 
simply not accessible beyond the extent of our symbolic order. This is a discussion that can 
be developed further in the abovementioned debate around appearances and reality.68 
For both, denying reality or suggesting that it is all fabricated and, thus, unreal, is definitely 
not the pertinent critique. The effective critical gesture is to indicate that such fabrications 
are functional. Hence, the point that is relevant to this chapter is that, in different ways, 
both see how ‘fictions’ of any kind (knowledge, law, imaginal creations) are operational, 
productive or functional, which is to say that such ‘fictions’ concretely affect the world. 
This is the core of my inquiry, which I have clarified by laying out the primary caveat of not 
taking poverty to be immaterial just because I examine it as a fabrication. 
The philosophical disparities between the two approaches, however, cannot simply be 
overlooked. The cited references in the field of ‘Law and Aesthetics’ place images as a 
mediation between the subject and the world – whether the world is formed from the 
subject’s perspective, or the world determines the subject. Emphasis is placed on the 
visual interplay between subject, object and images, where images are a medium of 
representation of objects to the subject and, as such, partake in the process of 
subjectification. However, with Bottici’s approach, as presented in the previous section, 
images can be usefully placed as the analytical starting point.69 Whereas, since its early 
stages, law and aesthetics involved experimentations with postmodern influences, the 
emphasis on legal materialities is a more recent connection, where image attains material 
and visual presences and indeed agency. Whilst making reference to a framework of 
material culture, Kate West has pointed to a ‘material turn’ within the interplay of visual 
studies and critical legal theory, which signals a move to conceptualise both law and image 
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in material terms, that is, not simply in terms of their aesthetic content, but perhaps in 
their objecthood.70  
Indeed, scholars of legal materialities clash with postmodern analyses because of the 
latter’s presupposed relationality between subject, object and image which attributes 
exclusive acting agency to the subject. The divide between subject and object has been 
characterised by Marilyn Strathern71 as a modern analytical division which upholds other 
modernist divides that are, in turn, commonly critiqued by the so-called postmodern 
literature (e.g. culture-nature, law-society, us-them, self-other). From a legal standpoint, 
Vismann wrote about a relational middle ground to be established within the subject-
object divide so as to productively destabilise these analytical structures and to contradict 
the ‘legally sanctioned notion’ that only the acting subject is an agent at ‘the source of a 
conflict or a legal matter’.72 In Vismann’s proposition, media and things, in fact, determine 
the subject’s field of action, which is to say, the ‘operation itself produces the subject, who 
will then claim mastery over both the tool and the action’.73 Law-making is an operation, 
conditioned by previously configured legal forms, and in which ‘the object of disputation, 
and the rules of decision also play a part in the production of the actual law’.74 This shift in 
angle sets off a medium-based perspective, according to which media function as carriers 
of operations and ‘the sovereign subject becomes disempowered, and it is things that are 
invested with agency instead’.75 Therefore, media are construed as performers, rather 
than objects of passive existence. The methodological implication in adopting this 
perspective is to attempt to extract, from operations, their rules of execution, their codes 
of procedure, their practical expertise, their ‘algorithmic dimension’, which in itself 
‘contradicts the spontaneity of the gesture’.76 In that sense, ‘law’ is nothing more than a 
practical operation – one that, according to Alain Pottage, differentiates the legal and the 
non-legal77 – and will be shaped by its own processes. The operation itself produces law, 
rather than being activated by an acting subject of law. The observation of media and the 
techniques by which legal problems are articulated and responded to entails admitting 
that law is not a pre-existing formation that defines operations and codifications.  
 
70 Kate West, ‘Feeling Things: From Visual to Material Jurisprudence’ (2020) 31(1) Law and Critique 113. 
71 Marilyn Strathern, ‘Cutting the Network’ (1996) 2(3) The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 517. 
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75 Vismann (n 6) 4. 
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Hence, not only poverty, but also law itself is a social-technical formation and, in their 
interconnection evoked in this thesis, law is also made through its making of poverty. This 
is the approach towards which the analyses in chapter 2 has driven me, by identifying that 
the commonly acknowledged causal link between the findings of social sciences and the 
refinements of legal codes is only partially what occurs in this disciplinary encounter. 
Following this frame of analysis, I consider that both law and poverty appear as emergent 
effects of inscriptions and prescriptions. Although I am not, in this thesis, looking into the 
materiality of images as objects per se, in terms of methodology, I draw on materialist 
references to address the technological aspect of images that facilitate material 
transformations. I claim that images produce material effects, in fact, produce and 
transform realities. Furthermore, I claim that law is part of that mechanism because, on 
the one hand, images work as legal technology and, on the other, the operations which we 
call ‘law’ are mobilised by images and modulate the world through aesthetic functions. 
Imaginal law, as Desmond Manderson borrows the term from Chiara Bottici, is to say that, 
like politics, law operates through images to frame, communicate, constitute, legitimate 
and realise both the subject and the world. Law’s imaginal feature refers to its operations 
as a visual discourse, i.e. an ‘emphasis on visual media’s vital components of the discursive 
operations that organize and interpret normative, aesthetic, and legal structure around 
us’.78 Yet, image is not simply a medium, an evidence or portrayal of social dynamics, it is 
also an independent thing, a form that modulates and validates law’s enactment – the 
imaginal law is ‘a law of and in the image’.79 It is in that sense that chapter 2 in this thesis 
presented different visual models of poverty and their respective images of ‘the poor’ 
which have been at the same time formed by law and have shaped law’s functioning – 
thus, simultaneously symptomatic and operational. In Manderson’s collection, Shane 
Chalmers’ schematic conceptualisation of image as a transitional phenomenon is 
particularly relevant to this point. To paraphrase Chalmer’s scheme, image transitions 
between representational and technological dimensions – i.e. as a meaning-making 
medium that makes visible, in the first case, and as a world-making object of visualisation 
which is physically present in a world that alters around it, in the second. This transitional 
image presents four aspects that occur simultaneously: 
 
 
78 Manderson (n 65) 4. 
79 Manderson (n 65) 5. 
145 
 
(1) as representation, images provide a fluid medium for seeing and revealing, 
and overlooking, their object; but (2) as representation, images also create 
their object through visualization – making visible what would remain 
otherwise unseen; and (3) as technology, images are a product of history, 
bound to their own objectivity; but (4) as technology, images also course 
through history, whilst being defied or ignored by a world that shifts around 
them.80  
This scheme assembles a working definition of image that I adopt in this thesis. However, 
as I have already indicated, I am referring to images of poverty contained in poverty data. 
The visual assemblages, collages and associations that data enables make poverty visible, 
material and operational with normative functions. From what has been discussed thus 
far, knowledge practices are undoubtedly active in this production, but they also 
presuppose a legal operation of selecting and sampling the objects of scientific inspection. 
I will now establish another bridge between knowledge and legal practices in the 
production of poverty, i.e., that which turns scientific findings and quantifications into 
further legal and political qualifications that make poverty a verifiable occurrence in the 
world that, in turn, confirms its imageries. Richard Sherwin’s term ‘visual economy of 
presence’ is useful to indicate that, rather than establishing a kind of visual regime that 
determines ways of seeing, law both reflects and implements aesthetic registers by which 
‘reality’ appears in the world.81   
While I am interested in the rules of procedure that generate poverty knowledge, I am 
most interested in the operations through which poverty is transformed into an existing 
phenomenon, i.e. how the conceptualised poverty is materialised in the world and how 
that materialisation puts in motion a series of implications that remain typically concealed 
or rendered secondary to the phenomenon of poverty that we are able to see under the 
frameworks of a modernist perspective dividing a ‘subject who acts and an object that 
serves’.82 This is the ultimate purpose of this research, to comprehend what is left behind 
in poverty definitions as integral elements of poverty rather than the excluded, not 
pertaining, ‘outside’. A guiding assumption of this theorisation is to consider, first, the 
calculative treatment of poverty as an aesthetic composition, i.e., a framework that also 
invisibilises other elements that are out of frame. A second stage is to regard legal 
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practices as partaking in the transformation of quantities of poverty into qualities of 
poverty, by ways of legal-aesthetic modulations. I turn to this second stage now. 
 
3.3 From social quantification to the qualification of populations and territories  
By introducing a material approach to the discussions formulated by scholars in the field of 
‘Law and Aesthetics’, I have argued that poverty data is creative of poverty as an existing 
reality. My point, then, is that law is a crucial technology operating at the turning point 
where data becomes fact, or where a statistical entity becomes a factual entity.83 In other 
words, what social sciences produce as quantification, legal frameworks turn into 
qualification. If we see quantification and measurement in terms of what they are 
intended to generate through science – that is, as objective, standardised and 
mathematical descriptions of the complex ‘external world’ under observation – then their 
aim is to know the reality, the real nature of things in an independently existing world. 
However, considering that we have seen that reality is after all an artifice, quantitative 
data are turned into qualitative designations (composed, collated images) that, in turn, 
create new things in the world (social phenomena, social problems). Differently from a 
deconstructive approach that would question the universality of scientific knowledge, my 
critique is not suggesting that quantitative data should not be viewed as valid, reliable or 
useful. While I certainly agree that it is not possible to claim that knowledge production 
can ever accurately apprehend the so-called external world, I claim that this is the case 
because there simply cannot be a distinction between knowledge and reality as both 
Latour and Bottici remark. Furthermore, while there certainly are ideological and political 
interests behind practices of quantification, as Marxist critics have overwhelmingly 
exposed, this is also not the emphasis of my critique. The emphasis, again, is on the 
technological aspect of scientific knowledge, that is, what it intentionally or 
unintentionally creates in the world.  
The argument I now present is that quantification of poverty promptly becomes 
qualification of poverty and that concrete interventions – largely processed by way of law 
and legal operations – generate a whole set of consequences for populations and 
territories classified as ‘in poverty’ or ‘poor’. In a more immediate dimension, this is the 
doing of administration, management and bureaucracy. But in a broader legal dimension, I 
am questioning how data normatively organises the world in a shift from epistemology to 
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ontology. What happens to the world that poverty data claims to depict? My argument is 
that poverty data creates the visual economy of a particular form of poverty that needs to 
be acted upon and, in doing so, it is also generating a different mode of intervention in 
social dynamics that do not meet the poverty standards and thresholds. Notice that this is 
different from claiming that data is only capable of detecting and depicting some but not 
other aspects of a real-world phenomenon. Instead, to paraphrase Theodore Porter, 
poverty data are able to describe social reality because they help to define it and, indeed, 
to create it.84 As a result, antipoverty law, as both a source and a consequence of poverty 
data, engender corresponding modes of visualisation, knowledge and intervention. This 
operative interplay between data and law is what I will refer to as legal-aesthetic 
modulations upon populations and territories. 
From a history of science perspective, as put forward by Theodore Porter,85 quantification 
is a social technology, a method directed towards practice instead of pure theoretical 
abstraction. In both the natural and the social sciences, calculation renders the world 
objective, a proper object of scientific inquiry. The modern appeal of social quantification, 
says Porter, is not merely about an aspiration of social sciences to be viewed as a proper 
science, by mirroring methods from natural sciences. The experimental study of empirical 
reality is, rather, aimed at finding and measuring problems to inform policy solutions – 
hence the intrinsic link between social research and social policy (or of science, 
management and technologies of decision-making). An appraisal of this historical 
intertwining of science and technology requires tracing the modern history of social 
quantification in relation to professions and bureaucracies, before it came to constitute 
the foundational principles of academic disciplines. Porter refers, for example, to 
economic mathematics in the aftermath of calculations to support policy advice. Censuses 
also have a much longer history than social research, but in the order of demographics and 
statistics as technologies of government rather than of theory production. Porter points to 
this curious arrangement where quantitative measurements go back to ancient times but 
under an instrumental, practical imperative rather than an abstract, scientific one. 
Numbers were originally the domain of practical activities (e.g. commerce and 
administration) instead of the domain of mathematics, whose ancient root is geometry, 
whereas ‘arithmetic and algebra were born as practical arts’.86 Thus, quantification has 
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only recently been used for the testing of theories, having up to mid-nineteenth century 
been centrally applied for management of people and nature, particularly in the aims of 
improving industrial technologies (in engineering and banking, for example). In Porter’s 
words, ‘The economic writings of physicists and engineers, at least up to the 1930s, 
suggests that the ambitions of scientists have been more closely allied with ideals of 
quantification and control than with abstract mathematical formulation. Measurement 
was not simply a link to theory, but a technology for managing events and an ethic that 
structured and gave meaning to scientific practice’.87  
In chapter 2, I demonstrated this shift which inaugurates poverty research in the twentieth 
century. Here is how Bales presented Charles Booth’s understanding of his own work: 
Early in his research on poverty he [Booth] wrote that policy could 'be built out 
of a big theory, and facts and statistics run in to fit it', but this was not the way 
he wished to work. Instead he sought to construct through research 'a large 
statistical framework built to receive an accumulation of facts'. When this 
framework was filled with all the available data and evidence, then from it 
might be 'evolved the theory and the law and the basis of more intelligent 
action'. Carried into practice the construction of this framework and the 
collection of information to fill it would consume the efforts of Booth and his 
research staff for seventeen years. To achieve this ‘accumulation of facts' 
aggregate statistical analysis was combined with observation and participation 
to present a balanced and human portrait of the life of, what was then, the 
largest city in the world. 
Booth's work was a search for factual information, his orientation essentially 
inductive and positivist. Viewed from a temporal distance that allows his work 
to be placed in its historical context, it becomes recognisable as a response to 
the deductive and grand theoretical approach of many of his contemporaries.88 
 
The incorporation of mathematical formulations into economic policy has accelerated 
since the second half of the nineteenth century. What started as an introduction of physics 
to social and economic decision-making, Porter explains, gradually developed to 
incorporate more abstract mathematics and statistics into social policy. Social dynamics 
have thus been transformed into problems, i.e., mathematical problems to be solved 
through equations. Still, applied mathematics was interested in practical problems. For 
example, the statistical movements in nineteenth-century Europe – the epicentre of which 
was England with the Statistical Society of London – were proponents of a mathematical, 
inductive alternative to abstract, deductive political economic theories by promoting 
empirical investigations able to generate accurate data of the concrete world or to ‘use of 
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mathematics to show the inconclusiveness of existing theory’.89 Notwithstanding the fact 
that it was a move to make political economy more empirical and scientific, Porter 
remarks that the mathematization of economics was largely aimed at social reform, to 
adequately and reliably inform public intervention – as has been discussed in chapter 2. 
The advancement of quantitative techniques walked hand in hand with philanthropy. 
As mathematical constructs, to borrow from Marcus Faro de Castro’s analysis regarding 
what he termed the ‘devices of interest aggregation’,90 social data and indicators are 
simultaneously artefacts (that is, products of ‘expert networks’) and apparatuses (they 
hold a strategic function). Social data present cognitive, political and economic 
implications and facilitate structural changes to social organisation. They are social 
conventions organised as social reality via institutional processes with secured intellectual 
control over their creation and manipulation. Furthermore, such data constitute the 
elemental frameworks of policies, technologies and markets leading to infrastructures of 
global governance generally neglected by critical legal theory. As Sally Engle Merry 
explains, ‘Indicators are a technology of not only knowledge production but also 
governance. […] Standardized measures mean that the state can better administer its 
population’.91 Nevertheless, law works as a part of this process, both in the production of 
data and in the legitimation of policy designs which those data have inspired. This is a 
point where the main references of this chapter meet, that is in pointing out the different 
ways in which numbers generate norms while also being co-produced in legal moments 
whereby the things that are counted are themselves categories derived from legal 
operations. Through data, individuals are made governable, as Porter writes, and 
government takes shape as an entity in recording itself into a file-based system of power, 
as remarked by Vismann.92 Indicators become, indeed, a technology of global governance. 
Latour’s centres of calculation become centres of legal production that dictate, prescribe 
and govern. Bottici reminds us that, while sovereignty is typically representational, the 
term governance was recently coined to denote the politics of the World Bank, as opposed 
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to the functions of national government. Governance is based on images from different 
perspectives, that is as a technique, a politics within the crisis of representation.93 
In previous chapters I referred to this in terms of how the creation of racial categorisations 
directly affects populations, and how crime rates affect territories. Statistics transform the 
world that science purports to describe. To return to Cornelia Vismann’s point and to add 
to Porter’s frame of analysis, scientific advancement is a social process that requires 
administrative work, bureaucratic structure, professional expertise and it produces 
constellations of data, documents, files and archives. Reality is composed from inscriptions 
in files, through which invisible dynamics are made visible as functioning structures. 
Similarly, Latour describes how the economy of a nation is turned visible in graphics, 
charts, lists, tables. But something else is at stake in what Porter indicates is the ‘creative 
power of statistics’. Society and its structures, analysed both in idealist and materialist 
traditions, are statistical categories which gain the status of entities, and ‘Having become 
official, then, they become increasingly real’.94  
Calculations establish standards, codes and norms. But a distinction must be maintained 
between the description and the prescription. In an analysis of the global financial crisis 
which began to unfold in 2007, Mary Poovey shows how neoliberal financial models, 
originally designed as a metaphor to algorithmically simulate the economy and manage 
uncertainty, were deployed by professionals, actualised in the world and treated as an 
actual description of the system it supposedly depicted, thus affecting the way the 
financial market works and generating further uncertainty.95 At the heart of the subprime 
crisis caused by the proliferation of unregulated derivatives was a model of the housing 
market which was operationalised by investors as if it was an actual representation of 
reality, instead of a modelled simulation of behaviour, risks and fluctuations in the real 
estate market. An economic theory – e.g., the theory of value that informs neoclassical 
economics, based on the liberal metaphor of the invisible hand of the market – seems to 
express facts about an autonomous market but it actually reflects, primarily, the model of 
value that investors use. In fact, the more the model is deployed, the more the financial 
world comes to look like the model. Poovey points to the reflexive nature of the 
relationship between the model and the market, in the sense that the model has an 
impact on that which it proports to describe. She exposes the effects of what she calls a 
 
93 Bottici (n 5) 108. 
94 Porter (n 84) 42. 
95 Mary Poovey, ‘On “the Limits to Financialization”’ (2015) 5(2) Dialogues in Human Geography 220. 
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metaphor, as a figure of speech to create methodological and theoretical consensus, and 
the treatment of a mathematical model derived from that metaphor as if it were 
descriptive, an accurate depiction. A model is informed by the metaphor with an analytic 
function to simulate real world phenomena, by simplifying complexity and eliminating 
variables in order to perform experiments. However, treating a model as an actual 
reflection of what it claims to describe, can actually make the model operative, functional, 
performative. The discrepancy between the model and the phenomenon widens when it 
does not correspond to the actual conditions it proports to describe: then, the reality 
created by the model will eventually collapse, as was the case in the recent financial crisis. 
Annelise Riles’ ethnography of legal experts in the financial markets, on the other hand, 
begins with the view that to claim that financial knowledge is performative and not merely 
descriptive of markets is far too obvious a remark and she questions who actually believes 
that economic knowledge is merely descriptive and not constitutive in this way. Riles 
observes the financial market of derivatives trading from the perspective of the collaterals 
(as documents rather than norms) and their interactions with legal experts (rather than 
mathematicians). Rather than a conflict between knowledge and reality, Riles focuses on 
the incongruence between disparate forms of expertise, namely that produced by the 
mathematicians and computer experts in contrast with the legal experts. This 
anthropological approach is particularly useful for undoing the long-standing critique of 
legal fictions as reflecting/engendering neutral beliefs and for foregrounding their 
technological effects in an explicit politics of finance, as opposed to a hidden politics 
masked by epistemological practice.96  
Although I am precisely problematising the passage from scientific fictions to facts, I am 
not concluding that the danger of such constructed factuality is that it might muster 
support, feed beliefs and, thus, naturalise distorted realties. Again, assumptions about a 
‘real reality’ are beyond my remit. I am rather pointing to a legal operation through which 
fictions become facts, which evokes the move through which a legal problem is articulated 
and thus through which law appears as an emergent effect. From this perspective, social 
quantifications have a creative function. They create entities and transform the world that 
it intends to describe. Quantifications not only capture and portray realities, but effectively 
create reality.97 Quantified poverty is an artifice and – without going into the merits of its 
 
96 Annelise Riles, ‘Collateral Expertise: Legal Knowledge in the Global Financial Markets’ (2010) 51(6) Current 
Anthropology 795. 
97 Porter (n 84). 
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authenticity, veracity or reliability – it materialises poverty as a thing in the world. In that 
regard, I refer to qualification meaning that quantified data become the measure against 
which perception of poverty occurs, activating a binary code to ascribe that which is seen 
and that which is not, that which will be acknowledged by law and that which will be 
deemed an error of calculation. Errors are discarded. 
The statistical entity of poverty has also been reformulated throughout history, and it is in 
its variability that the mechanism of its transfiguration into a qualification of poverty 
becomes evident. I sought to illustrate this point in chapter 2. Early social surveys and the 
reforms of the poor relief systems continually reshaped the figure of the vagrant, the 
vagabond, the beggar. Scientific criminology created the ideal types of the criminal; 
International development law has created multiple suffering, passive and pity-worthy 
characters in its short history: the refugee, the destitute, the illiterate, the starving, the 
unbanked... all unified in the marker of global poverty. In each of these exemplary imaginal 
models, legal operations and frameworks are actively participating in the materialisation 
of ‘figures’ by framing, selecting, filtering people with a sieve provided by quantifying 
practices, whilst simultaneously reshaping the filter itself.98 The point is that the 
mathematization of social life does not merely structure interactions of society with the 
material world, but it also contributes to the production of different kinds of social order.99 
The claim here again is that scientific knowledge has historically conditioned the ways of 
seeing poverty as a social phenomenon/problem which is materialised in the world in the 
image of its statistical composition. 
The point here, to restate, evokes the passage from epistemology to ontology – that is, 
that quantification leads to the qualification of populations and territories, by raising 
quantified elements to the level of a priori characteristics to be later detected and inferred 
in the material world. In circumscribing poverty in the world, quantifying and establishing 
a parameter for its identification and for the subsequent classification of populations and 
territories within these conceptual frameworks is an a priori conceptual formulation. Traits 
that are quantified (because they are deemed quantifiable) become the qualitative traces 
of poverty, the inherent attributes that characterise poverty, regardless of other 
unquantified (or unquantifiable) traits. Afterwards, the extracted mathematical formula of 
poverty (e.g. the calculations of household income) become the filter through which 
 
98 Other ‘driving forces’ were also mentioned as active in such formations, such as literary arts, medical 
disciplines, financial institutions, corporate foundations and mass media. 
99 Faro de Castro (n 90) 3. 
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poverty is recognised in the world and intervened in (with the poverty line). To put it 
bluntly, that which social sciences objectify and quantify, codified law applies and enforces 
in order to qualify (to categorize and frame) populations and territories. Description is 
turned into prescription. This is how poverty becomes real, an existing thing in the world: 
an existing entity appears from a statistical category. 
Law and legal operations are an important moving force of this reality and fact producing 
transfiguration, of which Vismann writes, ‘law designs its own truth of reality’. By creating 
a legally acceptable reality, law can also erase unwanted realities. Bottici’s imaginal, the 
creation of images, makes something new in the world by presenting what is absent and 
with the power to lie and deny existence to other facts.100 Legal scholarship has invested in 
understanding the mechanisms through which fiction is transformed into reality. At a 
broader level, as has been covered in chapter 1, Emily Grabham shows how the 
quantification of time into a linear temporality lead to qualification, i.e. the regulation of 
legal time.101 Also, Sarah Keenan examines how the Torrens system established the self-
actualising legal fiction of land title registration as representations of future values, which 
are treated as present facts that enable trade. Moreover, the functional effect of title 
registration has also worked to categorise and manage populations and territories, 
producing social categories materialised as raciality.102 In view of this, I claim that a legal-
aesthetic machinery modulates populations and territories, turning the fictional images of 
poverty into real and material entities. It has been established that law acts on images. 
This means that rather than evidence of external facts, images and legal instantiations 
‘partake the same reality’ and ‘construct the world we live in’.103 As Riles puts it, ‘A fiction 
is rather a technique, more like a machine than a story, a tool for practical intervention’.104 
Through a material approach inspired by Vismann, we see a clear need to unravel the 
historical construction of the functional ‘file-world’ of poverty and the ontological 
assumptions of the data-driven world of our times in order to critique poverty’s 
conceptualisations and imageries as a matter of fact. 
These points are relevant when we are referring to posited law (poor Laws, criminal law, 
social security law, international development law, property law…) as well as in terms of 
 
100 Bottici (n 5). 
101 Emily Grabham, Brewing Legal Times: Things, Form, and the Enactment of Law (University of Toronto Press 
2016). 
102 Sarah Keenan, ‘Smoke, Curtains and Mirrors: The Production of Race Through Time and Title Registration’ 
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broader, open-ended, normative enunciations or structures of governance (which evoke 
the practices of public agencies, international foundations and scientific institutions). The 
next chapter is dedicated to a more grounded analysis of these formations based on the 
contemporary workings of the ‘industry of global poverty reduction’. The aim is to verify, 







The visual economy of global poverty: data as a legal technology 
 
Where does the dream of a world free of poverty come from?1 The previous chapters 
showed how poverty reduction became a global project in the recent history of 
‘capitalistic’ poverty, a project to be led by multilateral financial institutions, by means of 
the infrastructures of international law and following a development motive (a rights-
based and pro-poor development agenda) towards global prosperity based on technical 
expertise. A true industry of global poverty alleviation is formed in the collaborative 
practices of knowledge, law and intervention. It is an industry in the sense of being a 
sector that capitalises around the idea of non-profit aid, fundraising and donations; which 
relies on chains of specialist organisations, experts, intellectuals, professionals, 
fieldworkers and indeed workers of all kinds; and which produces outcomes that circulate 
in a global marketplace of corporate philanthropy. It is a self-generated industry, which 
creates its own objects of intervention and the conditions for its own global expansion. 
Arundhati Roy writes about a global corporate governance that emerges from private 
foundations and financial institutions, as unaccountable entities which design policies, 
promote the rule of law and demand accountability from poor countries.2 They also 
govern by funding nongovernmental organisations, think tanks, universities, independent 
researchers, artists, activists and students, who are the mediators and practitioners that 
keep the industry together and operating in its mundaneness. Like capital, philanthropy 
has recently shifted from a mercantilist and industrial basis and has increasingly become a 
corporation-based financial activity, penetrating into unnoticed dimensions of everyday 
life and aggregated into indeterminate connections to the ‘seed funding’ of multi-donor 
trust funds – to use the field’s parlance.  
Critical scholars of international development law focus on the interference of institutions 
such as the World Bank – but also the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade 
Organization, the United Nations and its many agencies, as well as a multitude of 
international organisations and groups which form the ‘international community’ – in the 
 
1 ‘Our Dream is a World Free of Poverty’ is the slogan that marks the World Bank’s mission statements and 
which is carved on the walls of the World Bank Group’s Washington headquarters. 
2 Arundhati Roy, Capitalism: A Ghost Story (Verso 2014). 
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geopolitics of global poverty, the international division of labour and the distribution of 
global wealth.3 The typical post-developmental approach is to focus on how international 
law creates problematic infrastructures which mirror or reiterate colonial and imperialist 
legacies and how institutions work to influence, politically and economically, the global 
order primarily ensuring the stability of the international banking system. International law 
is, thus, characterised as part of the problem, not the solution. This critique is extremely 
important when considering, from a global perspective, the maintenance of neo-colonial 
arrangements that sustain the predicament of the so-called ‘Global South’. However, as I 
have indicated from the outset, my aim in this thesis has been oriented towards the 
mundane practices that manufacture grand ideas, organise the world and work at 
producing actually existing entities. From this perspective, the critique that I raise in this 
chapter concerns the visual economy of global poverty. In regard to the international 
development frameworks, I foreground a sort of aesthetic interventionism resulting from 
the conceptual determination of poverty. Ultimately, as outlined in chapter 2, this 
approach frames the changing modes of seeing and acting upon poverty by observing the 
transformations in social research and the corresponding methodologies for regulating, 
monitoring and fighting poverty which, in turn, transfigure the very images and profiles of 
poverty in the concrete world. 
I have mentioned that since its post-war creation, the World Bank has assumed a 
hegemony of global poverty monitoring and of funding poverty alleviation initiatives. The 
overwhelming dominance is such that the production of knowledge about poverty, the 
methodologies of quantification of poverty, the data sources for poverty research 
worldwide, the formulation of responses to the problem of poverty in the world, the 
institutional arrangements for fighting poverty and the social policies implemented in the 
world's most remote locations… all this comes from a monopoly of poverty held by a 
financial institution, ‘the Bank’. Has the World Bank historically influenced the institutional 
structures of entire countries with its loans? Absolutely, and authors such as Ananya Roy 
often describe the destructive impacts of the infamous Structural Adjustments upon 
 
3 Notably in this thesis, central references are Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Global Poverty and the Politics of Good 
Intentions’ in Ruth Buchanan and Peer Zumbansen (eds), Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and 
Transitional Justice (Hart 2014); Ananya Roy, Poverty Capital: Microfinance and the Making of Development 
(Taylor & Francis 2010); and Alvaro Santos, ‘The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic 
Development’ in David M Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical 
Appraisal (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
See also: Michael Goldman, Imperial Nature: The World Bank and Struggles for Social Justice in an Age of 
Globalization (Yale University Press 2005). 
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nations.4 Likewise, documents from WikiLeaks reveal how multilateral financial institutions 
effectively served as ‘unconventional weapons’ within a global financial warfare.5 
However, the extent to which the World Bank’s prerogative of definition has re-structured 
the world’s ways of seeing poverty remains blurred. As a ‘knowledge bank’,6 its investment 
in the production of knowledge and data is intense, including investing in the direct 
training of intellectuals, experts, NGOs, research institutions and universities. Today, the 
World Bank maintains a vast network of high-productivity researchers who publish reports 
and case studies from around the world – many of which operate under the caveat of not 
representing the Bank’s official position. Despite this dominance of information about 
poverty that it generates, there are several studies that point to the lack of clarity or to 
methodological problems in the World Bank’s studies, as well as to the role these 
shortcomings play in legitimising the Bank itself as a world authority in poverty knowledge, 
by obliterating alternative approaches, and as a promoter of a naturalised, standardised 
and calculable notion of poverty – that is of poverty as a matter of fact.7 
At the same time, the millennial turn has seemingly produced new conditions to this 
conceptual and practical primacy, in what Ananya Roy calls the democratisation of 
development.8 Ever more organisations, foundations and financial institutions take the 
stage leading diverse strategies to ‘empower the poor’, to equip them with the tools to 
escape their own fate. In a confluence of ‘ages’ – of globalisation, of finance and of the 
mainstreaming of human rights – microfinance emerges as one such widespread and 
widely accepted poverty alleviation tools. The industry of global poverty reduction has 
been integrated into the global financial market, or, more candidly, it has opened new 
frontiers for finance capital, i.e., the subprime frontier. As a result, constellations of local 
and global market practices are integrated – from the world’s largest investment funds to 
the most trivial acts of ‘ethical consumption’ in local coffeeshops – to save the poor.9 
Furthermore, the ‘audit culture’ of corporate social responsibility standards, as identified 
by Sally Engle Merry, is increasingly expanding the production of indicators across sectors 
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and indeed reaching into global governance.10 This ‘turn to indicators’ forms part of new 
modes of knowledge production in which standardised metrics and ‘translocal’ aggregated 
information are made monitorable and accountable in what has been termed as ‘venture 
philanthropy’.11 As Roy puts it, poverty knowledge goes hand in hand with poverty capital: 
‘It is here that a metrics of risk assessment and management is forged; it is here that the 
poor are classified and categorized; and it is here that more generally the business of 
poverty comes to be “financialized,” or transformed into a set of financial benchmarks and 
indicators’.12 Needless to say, although new actors have entered the business of saving the 
poor, the World Bank and IMF have been leading the way for a long time, preparing the 
environment for financial services to the poor in all corners of the world.13 More recently, 
as presented in chapter 2, such experienced institutions have taken up the mission of 
facilitating crowd-sourced finance and multi-donor trust funds with reduced risk to the 
private sector seeking to exercise (and capitalise on) social responsibility. 
The discussion in the previous chapters suggests how conceptualisations and 
corresponding imageries of poverty have ambiguous connections – both cause and effect – 
to strategies of intervention. If we take social policies as responses to dominant legally-
formed imageries and conceptualisations, we can look at a particular society at any given 
time and extract from its relevant policy the corresponding standards of acceptability and, 
therefore, its predominant images of what poverty is and what it would involve to 
measure and eliminate it, provided that a general interest in such a project was in place. 
However, the point that this chapter aims to pick up and develop is that poverty definition 
is itself part of poverty production. That is to say, that new conceptual formulations are 
continually raised to the level of a priori characteristics to be later detected and inferred in 
the world, and then acted upon. To prefigure the argument, this a priori instantiation is to 
be viewed as generated by what I earlier called the sampling function performed by law. 
That being the case, the question of ‘fixing the problem’ and mustering interest or support 
for such a project, loses its significance. It is precisely that attempt to forge a project that 
creates poverty as we know it in the first place. 
 
10 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance’ (2011) 52(3) 
Current Anthropology 83. 
11 See Peter Frumkin, ‘Inside venture philanthropy’ (2003) 40(4) Society 7. 
12 Roy (n 3). 
13 Philip Mader, The Political Economy of Microfinance: Financializing Poverty (Palgrave Macmillan 2015). 
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It is not particularly innovative to sustain that concepts are not discoveries but indeed 
creations.14 Yet, there is something about the metrics of poverty that is specifically – 
though disguisedly – creative. The formulation of what, who and where is ‘the poor’ is a 
construction that precedes its material fulfilment, although it is methodologically 
expressed as a diagnosis. In other words, the method which at a first glance appears to be 
an empirical induction, turns out to be a deduction. In circumscribing poverty in the world, 
the quantification and the establishment of parameters for its identification and for the 
subsequent classification of populations and territories according to these conceptual 
frameworks turns out to be (to rely on) an a priori conceptual formulation; impelled by 
preceding intervention methods, as indicated in chapter 2, the procedures of poverty 
definition are inseparable from the procedures of its remediation. As a result, the 
responses to 'fight poverty' are formulated externally and irrespectively to what specific 
diagnoses may point to. Subsequently, poverty data produces effects – as a technologically 
functioning device – feeding the crisis-reaction discourse that calls for urgent action. The 
argument being put forward here is that the descriptiveness of quantitative poverty data is 
also aesthetic in its own methodological approaches, which work to validate the very 
mechanisms of intervention that created them, as in a self-referential mechanism. Just as 
photography has been widely used to validate eugenicist and bio-anthropological 
criminology as well as pathologizing and criminalising policies, so statistics have created 
narratives and imageries that attest to the selected features and traits prioritised in 
different historical times and places towards practical intervention. These definitions, in 
turn, produce further material changes – the vagrant, the criminal, the insalubrious slum, 
the dangerous black ghetto, to name a few such imaginal materialisations revisited in 
chapter 2 – by feeding new understandings and new strategies of action. As a machinery 
that keeps rolling and reproducing itself – the same old ‘satanic mill’ spinning its wheel15 – 
the circuits of knowledge and of intervention feed each other in a circular manner. Here 
lies the legal-aesthetics of poverty. 
In chapter 5 I shall address this connection between the conceptual determinations of 
poverty and their concrete effects on lives in poverty, from the point of view of the legal-
aesthetic modulations that organise territories and populations, soil and bodies. I make 
 
14 Creations with very concrete effects, I must add, just like other concepts in the natural and social sciences 
which are at the same time a discovery and an invention, as unravelled in Michel Foucault, The Order of 
Things (Vintage Books 1994). Again, in saying this, my purpose is not to discredit science as empty 
constructions but to signal its deductive formulations and material consequences. 
15 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (first published 1944, 
Beacon Press 2001). 
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reference to more concrete and contextual aspects that can work to conceal this interplay 
between conceptualisation and actual manifestation. For now, I would like to dedicate this 
chapter to a reflection about the legal connections between data and image in order to set 
out how poverty is first defined, circumscribed and created as a visual fact, then 
materialised in the concrete world via modulations. In other words, the aim is to examine 
how poverty data and its strategies of presentation can be construed as fostering a visual 
economy of poverty that later takes shape in the concrete world.16 
 
4.1 The ‘facts’ of poverty data: the intervenable form of poverty 
To claim that law is imaginal, as Desmond Manderson borrows the term from Chiara 
Bottici, is to say that it operates through images ‘to communicate ideas and norms, to 
frame experiences, to constitute relations, to generate the emotions that construct the 
world we live in’.17 But as has been discussed in chapter 3, image is not merely 
representational, as in evidence or depiction of social realities. It is a form that indeed 
accompanies law’s codifications – that is both cause and effect. As image, data about the 
social world plays a central role in prescribing the imagistic compositions that are then 
handled as ‘facts’. As an example, which has been raised earlier, crime data is collected, 
organised and composed by law enforcement and victimisation surveys and feed back into 
the institutional responses of criminal courts. Of course, this is a formalist, positivist 
presupposition of how institutions operate and in diverse settings and historical contexts 
this presupposition does not apply at all. However, holding on to such a formalist, 
institutional reading of the interactions of law and data for argument’s sake – or better 
said, considering that the positivist treatment of law as a legitimate system is particularly 
imaginal, for its use of an image of the exemplary law from which legitimate authority 
emanates18 – it is in the imaginal realm that data feeds law. Which is to say, data 
composition paints a picture and law acts on it. In other words, it is with certain images in 
mind (of the poor) that rights and obligations are instituted and legal institutions operate. 
 
16 According to Richard Sherwin, law establishes a visual economy, an embodied way of seeing that 
‘constitutes the reality in which we live’ where the things that appear are properly administered. Richard K 
Sherwin, ‘What Authorizes the Image? The Visual Economy of Post-Secular Jurisprudence’ in Desmond 
Manderson (ed) Law and the Visual: Representations, Technologies, and Critique (University of Toronto Press 
2018) 333. 
17 Desmond Manderson, ‘Imaginal Law’ in Desmond Manderson (ed), Law and the Visual: Representations, 
Technologies, and Critique (University of Toronto Press 2018) 4. 
18 Chiara Bottici, Imaginal Politics: Images Beyond Imagination and the Imaginary (Columbia University Press 
2019) 102 and 165. 
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The ambivalent power of Bottici’s imaginal – both a means of critique and of oppression – 
determines an overarching incapacity to question what is given through the production of 
images. It is here that a visual economy can be grasped as underlying the ways of seeing 
poverty in the world today, including in terms of its territorial distribution and 
populational arrangements. The World Bank’s global governance, its technical-
administrative politics, produces conclusive figures and profiles. It is indeed an imaginal 
governance, the power of which emerges from paperwork – its accumulation of endless, 
large-scale records forming the material basis of its ways to determine poverty.19 When 
the most valued or uncontested source of data about global poverty today prescribes 
what, where, how and who are the poor, this is undisputedly the basic composition to 
frame and process local populations and territories. This will particularly be the case if that 
expert authority in poverty knowledge happens to also be the financial institution which 
will fund developmental initiatives to tackle the now demarcated reality of poverty, as 
post-development scholars typically criticise. Data is thus instantly received as a matter of 
fact, as a representation of real things in the world. In chapter 3, I sought to unravel the 
complex knot which connects reality and representation. I argued that poverty data is 
rather creative of realities – more precisely, that quantifications are turned into qualitative 
designations (images) which, in turn, create new things in the world as social problems. 
After having seen in chapter 2 how poverty knowledge has become, through legally-forged 
images, such a productive field of research in the twentieth century, it becomes clearer 
that the gesture of definition is, first, inconsistent, experimental and tentative; second, it is 
selective, leaving behind unprioritized variables. 
Certainly, data stands on its own and should be taken seriously. The critique developed in 
this thesis is not to be received as any sort of parallel to science denialism. The critique is 
definitely not an attempt to expose poverty research as misleading or deceitful. It is simply 
an assessment of the legal interactions between data and image, pointing towards legal-
aesthetic effects which are often overlooked by methodology designs concerned with 
scientific abstraction. Are selectiveness, variations and revisions of methods preventable? 
Certainly not within the framework of modern social sciences. In that framework, data is 
 
19 Latour writes about the power that emerges from paperwork – from the accumulation of endless records 
arrayed in cascades – and how from inscriptions and their immutable mobilisation are raised the material 
basis that forms macro-actors, or large-scale entities that dominate the scene. It is in this sense, as I have 
mentioned before, in this research I am not considering institutional interest and ideology in the creation of 
data, but actually that the power to create data makes the institutional power. Bruno Latour, ‘Visualisation 
and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands’ in Henrika Kuklick and Elizabeth Long (ed), Knowledge and 
Society Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past and Present, vol 6 (Jai Press 1986). 
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simply the result of social-scientific rites and conventions which create instrumental 
approximations and estimations so as to turn the social world into an object of scientific 
inquiry and intervention. Data create very important readings of the world and translate 
into resources for policy-making – with typical guidelines for research-policy relations 
requiring evidence-based, effective change and pathways to impact.20 However, from the 
perspective of law – and this thesis reports on a legal research project – data has a very 
particular role as a legal technique. In other fields, data may assume other roles and 
potential. Within law, data is a technique, a tool that produces things in the world. 
Therefore, the constructivist approach I may seem to imply here is limited to reflections 
about the legal field, rather than an absolute phenomenological approach to data, 
knowledge and truth.  
To reiterate it schematically, science produces a frame of quantification; law turns the 
frame into a qualitative template, a model to give unity and shape to amorphous 
populations and territories so that they more accurately resemble the image of poverty 
that science and policy supposedly can fix. The material conditions of life need to fit into 
the model to be intervened upon and to be fixed. In this argument, I am building from the 
specific legal moment discussed in chapter 3, in which law is presented to the eyes as 
something that exists because it functions as an operative technology and produces 
effects in the world. This legal moment occurs when quantitative indicators are turned 
into qualifications of poverty and, as such, activate the circuit of interventions against 
poverty. Here is how the legal-aesthetic frame of analysis that I follow might suggest a 
particular reading of these operations: 
First, as has been established already, data provides the aesthetic content of poverty and 
law materialises poverty as a social problem in the concrete world. Law, here, provides a 
bridge to this materialisation, enabling interventions against poverty to be designed and 
implemented. The claim here is that law does this by reading data as fact. From this 
delimited perspective, data occupies the position of a constructed and productive device 
that is not ontologically independent from the conceptual and perceptual scheme that 
generated it – just like images are not visual evidence, representations of external facts or 
legal events, ‘they are objects that partake of the same reality’.21 But when, for example, 
institutions respond to data by taking action – what is termed as informing policy with 
 
20 See, for example, in Christina Boswell and Katherine Smith, ‘Rethinking Policy “Impact”: Four Models of 
Research-Policy Relations’ (2017) 3(44) Palgrave Communications 1. 
21 Manderson (n 17) 4.  
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research findings – they do so because of a way of seeing poverty data that becomes a 
way of seeing poverty in its own right. Again, when the World Bank determines poverty 
measurement methodologies and the policy designs to tackle it, it is also creating the 
problem it is setting out to fix, by creating the lenses through which poverty will be seen in 
the world. If poverty is eventually no longer to be circumscribed by income, and it is rather 
to be identified via purchase power, for example, the materiality that reveals purchase 
power will again be sensed through aesthetic criteria of data processing (e.g. asset 
holdings, ownership of electronic devices in a household).22 Indeed, numbers do not speak 
for themselves,23 and here lies my argument that poverty definition is part of poverty 
production: the methods designed to investigate social phenomena co-produce the world. 
In other words, methods used in social sciences assume a model of linear reality that 
imposes temporal ontologies24 as well as spatial configurations.25 I claim that it is law that 
turns data into fact, in the passage from knowledge to intervention, by assuming the legal-
technological point of view which I discussed in chapter 3.  
Second, ‘law’ is itself made in the process of turning data into factuality, and poverty into a 
fact to be seen within a visual economy. Whilst this is done (legally done) by the gesture of 
formalisation – that is, by the assimilation of populations and territories into the ‘proper’, 
intervenable form of poverty – an effect of this gesture is the shaping of law into 
recognisable codes, legislations, institutions, procedures, architectures, iconology, 
traditions, rites, doctrines, jurisdictions, precedents, jurisprudence… the list goes on. Each 
of the epochal thrusts of poverty administration reviewed in chapter 2 demonstrate this 
double formation. The assistance provided to the poor formalises those who are poor and 
those who are not with the status of fact. To put it another way, in order to access aid, one 
needs to conform to the reigning profile of ‘the poor’ in vogue. The same occurs within the 
punitivist spectrum: to be found poor is to be found bearing the markers of poverty, such 
as raciality and its correlate propensity to criminality. To be ascribed the marker ‘poor’ is 
to be formalised as ‘poor’ – quite literally to be assimilated into a form.  
 
22 To exemplify what such an analysis entails, see: Yating Li et al, ‘Household Appliance Ownership and Income 
Inequality: Evidence from Micro Data in China’ (2019) 56 China Economic Review. 
23 Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers (Princeton University Press 1995). 
24 I have mentioned before how modern law sets a linear temporality, with Emily Grabham, Brewing Legal 
Times: Things, Form, and the Enactment of Law (University of Toronto Press 2016). 
25 Similarly, law establishes ordered and readable spatialities, as can be found in Andrea Mubi Brighenti, 




Within modern liberal law, described in chapter 1 as premised on proprietary regimes of 
individual and exclusive ownership, a very peculiar legal technique is articulated in the 
formalisation of poverty and in the resulting emergence of law as a given: rights. In one 
gesture of the technical-analytical gaze, populations are turned into property-less citizens 
in a rights-based nation-state, territories are turned into zoned spaces of governance 
within the rule of law. To have access to rights, one needs, first, to become poor, to be 
formalised as poor – the proper poor, the known and intervenable poor. The transition 
into the form of poverty is led and measured by the marker (and language) of access to 
rights, for which further formalisation is increasingly required. Under that token, law is not 
construed as merely punishing the poor, or disciplining the poor for the sake of an 
arbitrary exercise of power. Law is the resulting articulation of mundane objects and 
practices that pertain to the circuits of knowledge and of intervention. My claim is that the 
integrated practices of knowledge and intervention are also, from this particular 
viewpoint, legal practices. This is why I indicated that the governance to which the world’s 
poor are subjected is more usefully construed as technologies rather than manifestations 
of power. 
As such, law is not something that pre-exists the ways it is made, something external to 
the knowledge practice, only to validate the resulting data, images and/or facts of poverty 
as the abovementioned positivist narrative frames it. Both law and poverty are instead 
emergent effects that appear out of these practices.  As such, the issue should not be 
reduced either to norms or to institutions falling into the assumption that we already 
know what we mean by ‘law’. The task is rather to unravel the media-technological 
aspects that tie together seemingly different histories of formation. What does this mode 
of conceptualising poverty data and image say about law? If law is not a pre-existing 
structure, then it is itself a ‘centre of calculation’ that builds itself in the making. The 
modes of poverty administration that I presented in chapter 2 do not precede those 
institutions that receive and respond to the poverty data originating from science – be it 
from social surveys, from scientific racism or from global poverty indicators. Law, as a 
centre of calculation, is itself formed alongside the production of other visualisation 
practices. This position entails a rejection, with Latour once again, of the ‘the idea that the 
stuff society is made of is somehow different from that of our sciences, our images, and 
our information’.26 As Latour puts it: 
 




There is not a history of engineers, then a history of capitalists, then one of 
scientists, then one of mathematicians, then one of economists. Rather, there 
is a single history of these centers of calculation. It is not only because they 
look exclusively at maps, account books, drawings, legal texts and files, that 
cartographers, merchants, engineers, jurists and civil servants get the edge on 
all the others. It is because all these inscriptions can be superimposed, 
reshuffled, recombined, and summarized, and that totally new phenomena 
emerge, hidden from the other people from whom all these inscriptions have 
been exacted.  
More precisely we should be able to explain, with the concept and empirical 
knowledge of these centers of calculation, how insignificant people working 
only with papers and signs become the most powerful of all. Papers and signs 
are incredibly weak and fragile. This is why explaining anything with them 
seemed so ludicrous at first. […] This is precisely the paradox. By working on 
papers alone, on fragile inscriptions which are immensely less than the things 
from which they are extracted, it is still possible to dominate all things, and all 
people. What is insignificant for all other cultures becomes the most 
significant, the only significant aspect of reality.27 
 
As a centre of calculation, law emerges to the eyes as a repository of legal instruments, 
i.e., the media and the techniques by which a specifically ‘legal’ problem of poverty is 
articulated and responded to. Law appears a posteriori, when an act or event is a qualified 
as legal and ascribed legal effect.28 Furthermore, it is through this legal formation that 
poverty becomes an ontological ‘fact’, as I have termed it, and the quantification of 
poverty through statistics becomes the qualification of populations and territories. The 
factuality of poverty is thus legally constructed and materialised. Other collateral 
manifestations deemed external to such a poverty model will be deemed non-legal, with 
the effect of being disregarded, denied existence or potentially eliminated. It is at this 
point that law appears in the posited shape of international development law, and the 
other models examined in chapter 2.  
For analytical purposes – that is, to be able to analyse the connections within such a 
multitude of practices, events and circumstances whose interactions can be overlooked as 
being seemingly unrelated to one another – I visualise all these occurrences as integrating 
(co-producing) broader ‘circuits’, removed from the constraints of time and space. In other 
words, I conceive of them as part of a comprehensive whole: the interconnected circuits of 
knowledge and intervention which form together the industry of global poverty reduction. 
By ‘circuits’ I refer to the mode of functioning of open-ended itineraries in which parts 
 
27 Latour (n 19) 30. 
28 Alain Pottage, ‘The Materiality of What?’ (2012) 39(1) Journal of Law and Society 177. 
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combine and work together as pieces of a machinery, or indeed conductors in a circuit, as 
direct routes of determination or indirect routes of influence, with logs of data-generating 
practices and practice-oriented techniques. As mentioned before, I draw on Ananya Roy’s 
use of the metaphor of circuits for her own methods of tracing ‘poverty capital’, which she 
adapted from global commodity chain analysis.29 Roy maps the centralities and 
multiplicities of the millennial development goals, guided by multi-sited yet context-based 
configurations to situate the circuits that generate capital and truths about poverty 
eradication, namely: the Washington Consensus, the Bangladeshi model of microfinance, 
and the post-9/11 imperial frontier in the Middle East.  
In contrast, the approach that I follow is not situated in the particular or focused on 
contextual perspectives of a global vision of the problem of poverty. Instead, I have sought 
to be attentive to both global and local distributions – indeed, to global-local circuits of 
knowledge and intervention – simultaneously assembling context-specific, international 
and cross-cultural practices that might be traditional, instant or conjunctural as well as 
long-standing and epoch-making.30 Rather than determined by a dominant rationality, or 
superstructures, or imperial politics, the functioning of such circuits are here construed as 
the contingent results of situated exchanges, constrained negotiations, policed struggles 
and problem-solving techniques.31 For the scope of the analysis that I develop in this 
thesis, it would be insufficient to frame these circuits as concentric, originating in a 
multilateral development agency – say, in the World Bank – and descending all the way 
outwards to the local practices of a funded ethnographer doing fieldwork in a remote 
village in the so-called ‘Global South’. Yet, the metaphor of circuits is useful precisely 
because it allows an analysis of diverse practices as simultaneously being part of different, 
polycentric chains, which include being construed as incidentally, or momentarily, 
connected to conductors belonging to other kinds of circuits (e.g. circuits of capital and of 
debt).  
The circuit of knowledge – or that which I have referred to as science, poverty knowledge, 
research or expertise – produces data to understand the problem that poverty represents. 
 
29 Roy (n 3). 
30 Inspired by the methods applied and discussed by Irus Braverman although, again, I depart from 
ethnographic approaches and prioritise my own experiences as a participant of the circuits, i.e. as a socio-
legal practice researcher who interacts in/with territories of poverty and violence.  
Irus Braverman, ‘Who's Afraid of Methodology? Advocating a Methodological Turn in Legal Geography’ in Irus 
Braverman, Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney, Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar (eds), The Expanding Spaces of Law: A 
Timely Legal Geography (Stanford University Press 2014). 
31 A perspective aligned with that which is also laid out in David Garland, ‘Punishment and Welfare Revisited’ 
(2019) 21(3) Punishment & Society 267. 
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It is formed by the technical-scientific practices that design and apply methods of 
apprehending and measuring ‘the social’ into readable phenomena, or rather into 
problems to be solved. It also forms networks and institutions, métiers, scholarships, 
agendas, projects, frameworks, guidance, principles... an actual ‘epistemic community’.32 
Quantification, we have seen, is the proper moment of a pragmatic emphasis on 
knowledge production, one oriented towards taking action. The expansion of indicators, 
technologies of audit and performance evaluation, as analysed by Sally Engle Merry, are a 
significant part of this circuit, gathering public, private, international and local practices of 
self-monitoring, the outcomes of which are presented as ‘forms of knowledge rather than 
as particular representations of a methodology and particular political decisions about 
what to measure and what to call it’.33 On the other hand, the circuit of intervention – the 
politics of poverty in terms of policy, aid, philanthropy, charity, social projects, as well as 
community-based self-organised initiatives – produces strategic action to remedy the 
problem of poverty. This circuit includes, but is not restricted to, institutional responses to 
the social problem of poverty and development projects, which form networks of funders, 
consultants, experts, policy-makers, governments, multilateral agencies, civil society 
organisations, social services, plans, contracts, cooperations, loans, reforms… The circuit is 
also formed by activists and social movements as well as individual initiatives which, for 
example, join a loose network of those who contribute to charity or, why not, privately 
donate pocket money to beggars. 
As a result of this adopted perspective, and as I have mentioned, my main concern is not 
the accuracy of the streams and flows that I found within the circuits that I have observed, 
or their causal links, or indeed the precision of their cascaded influences. I am, rather, 
interested in what unnoticed associations could reveal about how poverty knowledge, 
antipoverty law and interventions against poverty operate together. By looking at law – at 
legal techniques and practices at work rather than exclusively codified antipoverty 
legislation – in a mediating position within a broader picture of poverty production, I 
emphasise the ways in which a mediator enables transmissions to function within circuits. 
Thus, what is the role played by law as an active mediator in between the circuits of 
knowledge practices and intervention practices? In a nutshell, it is that of sacralising 
procedures, stabilising interactions, ontologising abstractions in a visual economy. It is also 
a role of securing the flows between the circuits for their own reproduction. We have seen 
 
32 Richard Rottenburg, Far-Fetched Facts: A Parable of Development Aid (MIT Press 2009). 
33 Merry (n 10) 88. 
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in the narrated history in chapter 2 that, even before the global governance of financial 
institutions had coalesced into a recognisable métier, the interactions of science and 
politics dedicated to poverty has already been at play and, indeed, stably mediated by law. 
I shall now turn to the current developmental trends of poverty in terms of its 
financialization in order to examine the rights-based approach as agitating sampling 
techniques for its continual refinement, by means of legal-aesthetic modulations. 
 
4.2 The financial imageries of poverty 
Up until now, I referred to the imagistic feature of poverty data without specifying what it 
is about data that makes it image-like, or why it is that I am correlating data and image.  
For sure, data bears form and content, and one needs only to glance at the growing field 
of data visualisation to understand how it offers more than techniques of illustration or 
presentation, and is rather increasingly dominated by philosophical scholarships that 
explore the visuality of data. Data, under this philosophical exploration, is image, i.e. 
information in visual graphic form. But there is more to it, particularly to the role of 
poverty data in the contemporary global networks, in which the industry of poverty 
reduction articulates intricate and overwhelming amounts of specialist information. Firstly, 
I have presented images in chapter 2 that illustrate the ways in which data generate 
images: in the drawings of an investigative journalist who is trendily immersed in the 
fascinating hype of documenting the living conditions of the poor as seen by the nonpoor; 
maps of the city that transmit scientific scrutiny to locate and classify the poor; mugshots 
of criminal subjects to be filed in records as evidence of criminality; infographics that 
contrapose common beliefs about the living conditions of the racialised poor; measures of 
human bodies to sustain a bio-anthropological foundation to social research and to 
support correlations of physical, racial and behavioural traits; and numerical tables 
displaying a growing mathematical approach to poverty, collecting indicators of its 
dimensions and distributions and complex graphs of aggregate data which enable further 
scrutiny. Moreover, poverty data is often accompanied by photographic images that 
convey an impression – typically mobilising pity, guilt and benevolence. One needs only a 
bus or tube ride in London today to be taken aback by the amount of charity adverts 
calling for donations. These adverts present the face of the poor, usually innocent-looking 
and tragically helpless children. Also, global poverty reports present colourful and hopeful 





Figure 11: Charity posters in London's public spaces (2017).34 
 
Second, and more in tune with the argument in chapter 3, poverty data also evokes 
imaginal components of poverty, i.e., it conveys descriptive elements to be put together in 
a collage that shapes ‘the poor’. This collage, nonetheless, is not always forcefully 
disseminated but instead leads to convenient images, at the individual or social level, 
conscious or unconscious, in Bottici’s flexible employment of these terms.35 I have 
mentioned the connection between sensory perception and knowledge dating back to 
ancient philosophy. By the twenty-first century, it could be said, the industry of poverty 
reduction has skilfully intensified this connection to an extent that data – which was 
supposed to reflect scientifically and empirically obtained information – is fittingly located 
in the domain of behavioural marketing strategies. Hence the aforementioned conceptual 
and aesthetic interventionism. This element of marketing has been duly exacerbated in 
 
34 Figure 11 attribution: collage, created by author, of charity posters in London public spaces taken 
throughout 2017. 
35 Bottici (n 18) 63-66. 
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recent years, effectively pervading consumer relations in terms of new notions of ethical, 
green, fair-trade consumerism as well as corporate social responsibility.36 The industry’s 
images thus enter the realm of affects and mobilise what will be discussed in the next 
chapter in terms of Luc Boltanski’s ‘politics of pity’ and Sundhya Pahuja’s ‘politics of good 
intentions’ in which – to allude to a central inspiration to this thesis, the manifesto The 
Aesthetics of Hunger by the Brazilian filmmaker Glauber Rocha – the observer ‘cultivates a 
taste for that misery, not as a tragic symptom, but merely as a formal data within his field 
of interest’.37 
Yet, even in its purest scientific motive, poverty research provides descriptive data which 
paints a picture, or composes a collage. What would the presently predominant collage 
look like? The post-development and financialization literature with which I engage in this 
thesis describes the targeted poor as, first and foremost, the ‘unbanked‘, the bottom 
segments, the poorest of the poor who have not yet been incorporated into formal 
economic, welfare and labour relations. The objective is to turn them into the ‘banked’ – 
here is the renewed assimilation into a form of the proper, intervenable poor that I have 
been referring to as formalisation. Thus, the first step has been to advocate financial 
inclusion with the primordial articulation of credit as a basic human right.38 Ananya Roy 
analyses this so-called microfinance revolution and its role in shaping a global capital of 
poverty, i.e. a model of capital expansion in which the hitherto unbanked are increasingly 
included in financial markets.39 The new image of the ‘banked’ is painted as a growing 
group of self-made, self-employed, entrepreneurial subjects who only need an opportunity 
to flourish and escape poverty on their own. It is a financial consumer rather than a 
development client, who is empowered to be economically active, despite being engaged 
in strict regimes of debt and discipline. As a result, the images of the poor under this 
 
36 Merry (n 10). 
37 Glauber Rocha, ‘The Aesthetics of Hunger and The Aesthetics of Dreaming’ Manifestos from 1965 and 1971, 
translated and posted by Documenta14 (Documenta14 2007). 
See also Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics (Cambridge University Press 2009); 
Pahuja (n 3) 
38 As famously advocated by Muhammad Yunus, the Nobel prize-winning founder and CEO of the Grameen 
bank, who implemented the first successful model of microfinance in Bangladesh, which was then exported 
widely to the rest of the world. See: Randeep Ramesh, 'Credit is a Basic Human Right' The Guardian (London, 
5 January 2007). 
The exercise of which requires investments not only in access to credit, but in preparing the poor to manage 
their savings through the aid of ‘Financial Education and Financial Literacy’ as part of ‘Human Rights 
Education’. See for example: Ghirmai Kefela, ‘Implications of Financial Literacy in Developing Countries’ 
(2011) 5(9) African Journal of Business Management 3699.  
39 Roy (n 3). 
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model are strongly linked what Silvia Federici called the 'debt economy'.40 Debt is, thus, 
ironically turned into a solution to poverty and the hardworking poor will prove 
themselves through the payback because they are not helpless benefit receivers.  
Contrary to typical imaging processes thus far seen in history, the profile of the ideal target 
of financialization is for the most part an openly and positively gendered and non-white 
profile. Women far away are projected into the exemplary image41 of those who, instead 
of passive victims, can flourish from local resources, use local creativity and even embrace 
their exotic identity as an opportunity for their businesses to reach global audiences.42 The  
contemporary image of the poor, as such, ‘is the Third World woman, Millennial Woman, 
who animates this millennial ethics, anchors a global conscience, and transforms the 
distance of gender and race into a liberal intimacy with the world’s poor’.43  
The problems inherent to this image and mode of operationalisation is well-known when 
framed in terms of critiques of the neoliberal rationality.44 But I would like to, instead, 
reflect on the effects of such an image on the residual unbanked. Roy observes that, even 
though microfinance was precisely expanded as a global strategy to reach the segments 
that remained out of reach to conventional finance, certain groups have still been deemed 
‘unbankable’. Although ‘redlining is the very thing that microfinance set out to mitigate’,45 
it seems that the fencing off of the objectionable poor was renewed once again in history. 
The residual unbanked are now the unbankable – not the unreached, but the feeble-
minded stubborn individuals who fail to succeed when provided the financial 
opportunities to do so, or who actively prefer informality, probably for contemptible 
inclinations towards an underground world – again, as has been historically the pattern. 
Mirroring – or perhaps enduring – historical purges on informality, the steps towards 
financial inclusion replicate the divisions of the good and the bad poor, the deserving and 
the undeserving, the duly banked or the obstinate unbanked. The latest version of this 
dichotomy being the auspicious debtor or the fraudulent credit seeker to be discarded.  
 
40 Silvia Federici, ‘From Commoning to Debt: Financialization, Microcredit, and the Changing Architecture of 
Capital Accumulation’ (2014) 113(2) South Atlantic Quarterly 231. 
41 As in Bottici’s exemplary figure, ‘the poor’ becomes an imaginal being that unifies heterogeneous 
characters, profiles and terrains, i.e., an exemplary figure formed by data and calculations regarding the final 
receivers of aid. Bottici (n 18). 
42 See also Ananya Roy, ‘Millennial Woman: The Gender Order of Development’ in Sylvia Chant (ed) The 
International Handbook of Gender and Poverty (Edward Elgar 2010). 
43 Roy, Poverty Capital (n 3) 33. 
44 See for example, Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Zone Books 2015). 
45 Roy (n 3) 54. 
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The new image of the poor, in the end, confirms Simmel’s characterisation of poverty, 
mentioned in chapter 2, as disconnected from material deprivation and indeed formed in 
the delivery of assistance. The poor are those who the nonpoor manage to deal with. 
Those who are beyond reach, relentlessly ‘unformalizable’ are deemed something else. 
But as I have anticipated in chapter 1, they are also not ‘excluded’, left outside from the 
social. The informal poor are indeed formative of the very need to continually expand, to 
renew the approach, to reach further, and in an increasingly specialised way. In analysing 
the circuits of finance, Philip Mader also returns to Simmel to identify a ‘true essence of 
poverty’ in social relations, mediated by production and exchanges which confer its 
‘material symptoms’ as the marker of its essence, and which work to obliterate the actual 
causes of everything that is drawn together in the register of poverty.46 Mader argues that 
microfinance financializes both the concept of and the solution to poverty, that is, poverty 
is both a problem of finance and the basis for new credit relations and surplus extraction 
that, in turn, produce further accumulation (and dispossession). By observing the 
narratives that are mobilised by financial markets to produce the above image 
composition of the financialized poor, microfinance reveals itself as a way of seeing of the 
nonpoor who see themselves while helping the poor. Microfinance, as a technical-
scientific solution and indeed as a right, makes poverty in the ‘Global South’ perceptible to 
the global finance circuits by proposing solutions to poverty in their terms, translating the 
poor’s perceived lack as demands for credit. It is not simply about loans, Mader says, it is 
about establishing a more direct connection between the very poor and the very rich, to 
rent out capital, outsource the enterprise of surplus extraction, and circumvent, obliterate 
and even criminalise informal models of endurance like mutual aid and community-based 
initiatives. 
To restate my point, legal techniques are applied to continually select (to sample and 
refine) in the material world those who fit the general concept – the proper form of 
poverty – and to eliminate that which has been left out of the frame. It becomes 
increasingly unacceptable to see dissenters of this supposedly win-win situation. Law may 
emerge in the criminalisation of the informal economies of the unbanked (such as informal 
street trade, irregular labour migration, made-illicit markets and so forth) and in the 
regulation of the legal category of the entrepreneur or self-employed (differentiated tax 
regimes, differentiated contracts, differentiated credit and labour relations etc). 
Regulating how the hitherto informal street vendor can be turned into a microbusiness 
 
46 Mader (n 13). 
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street vendor, to address what was framed as a problem of individual access to finance, 
involves national legal reforms across the world. As such, this formalisation conveniently 
contributes to the flexibilisation of labour law across the globe – a collateral benefit, as 
Pahuja would call it.47 Saving the poor is an increasingly private enterprise that constitutes 
the nonpoor – the benefactors who will receive their investments back, and indeed profit 
from their goodwill. 
The newly banked thus become the globally quantifiable and intervenable poor, further 
supporting mechanisms of data collection and aid provision. Yet, the dividing gaze does 
not merely affect the subject and the object of sight, the subject and the object of poverty 
alleviation. It, in fact, institutes a generalised visual economy that affects the everyday life 
dynamics of entire populations and territories of poverty, regardless of being recipients of 
microcredit or not. The dividing gaze segregates, or ghettoises. Hence, the visual economy 
of the financialized international development aid creates poverty as a financial problem 
and, as a consequence, the normative reality of poverty is shaped as such. As in other 
epochs, the industry’s practices resemble laboratory tests. Intervention models are trialled 
– based on general deductive reasoning of what the poor need – and research to support 
them follows, attesting that they are the model of ‘what works’. That was the case of 
microfinance: an initiative was seen as successful in Bangladesh, its pioneer got a Nobel 
Prize, the initiative was expanded (because ‘it worked’) into a worldwide experiment to 
which any scholar in the literature of financialization and post-development refers. As 
laboratory rats, the poor of the world were banked, houses became assets, local trade 
became invested businesses, people became entrepreneurs. The tragic failure of 
microfinance in many countries, which created deep crises, is beyond the point here.48 
What I wish to emphasise is how the collage above is less of a depiction of the poor than a 
template to follow, an a priori imagery to be later detected in and inferred from the world. 
Again, other historically and contextually constitutive elements of a life in poverty that 
eventually do not participate in the poverty-defining repertoire, become invisible. I will 
now problematise the ways in which we conceptualise that invisibility, as something 
rendered outside of law, subject to a regime of exception or disciplinary institutions. In 
fact, rather than exclusion as delineated in chapter 1, informality is much more usefully 
 
47 Sundhya Pahuja, ‘The Poverty of Development and the Development of Poverty in International Law’ in 
James Crawford and Sarah Nouwen (eds), Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, 
vol 3 (Hart Publishing 2012). 




analysed as a constitutive element that enables formalisation in the first place. Hence, I 
end the chapter by looking into what that which is left out of the picture might tell us 
about the picture’s framing process. 
 
4.3 The missing data and the rights-based approach to poverty 
What is not within the frames of the collage described above? Or in Cornelia Vismann’s 
terms, what is left off the records as an unwanted reality? To return to the discussion in 
chapter 1, where poverty is described through its racialised, spatialised, violent features, it 
is noteworthy that raciality, displacement and violence are typically absent from the 
composite image of the poor. By looking into the World Bank’s repository of documents, a 
simple search of key words reveals an immense number of documents from the most 
varied topics that intersect the theme of poverty.49 Out of the most diverse topics, race, 
violence and spatial conflicts are disconcertingly scarce or absent. On the other hand, 
gender is a particularly prolific topic – women’s empowerment, girl’s education, female 
labour market, women in business, gender issues, gender equality, as well as gender-
based violence to name a few recurring terms in reports. While ‘gender issues’ seem to be 
a prominent theme, although from a very specific angle of a private, essentialised identity, 
the invisibility of race in the eyes of the World Bank as a factor of poverty makes it 
impossible for the industry to understand the racial relations underpinning the distribution 
of wealth. To be clear, I am here referring to raciality in terms of the inherent constitution 
of the idea of race as an effect of the production of poverty by the technical-analytical 
gaze that classifies,50 and not as the inherent association of race and poverty which I 
revisited in chapter 2 and is present in themes of racial inclusion or equality.  
Poverty ends up appearing as a natural condition, which occurs by chance or other forms 
of apolitical determinism. On a global scale, this same racial issue underlies the division of 
the centre and periphery of capitalism – the ‘North’ and the ‘Global South’ – and, by 
establishing a method of addressing poverty within a financing logic for low- and middle-
income countries, the dividing line is preserved. It is this model of defining poverty by a 
financial warfare that perpetuates poverty, as we know it, in the world. This is the case 
 
49 On 18 April 2019, a search with the key word ‘poverty’ displayed 34,459 ‘research and publications’ 
documents since 1947. I could also retrieve a set of 23,131 documents under the topic of ‘Poverty Reduction’. 
The ‘Documents & Reports’ repository is available at: <http://documents.worldbank.org/> accessed 28 
August 2020.  
50 As typically stressed by Denise Ferreira da Silva.  
See Denise Ferreira da Silva, ‘No-Bodies: Law, Raciality and Violence’ (2014) 9(1) Meritum 132. 
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even though the international framework refers to a multidimensional notion of poverty, 
beyond the monetary indicators of household income, savings or other assets. I have 
mentioned in chapter 2 that a comprehensive understanding of poverty as a living 
condition – and its corresponding complex indicators – has come to include lack of access 
to essential goods or services (adequate housing, education, healthcare, food, water and 
sanitation, decent work and social security). In line with this, and as mentioned above, 
poverty can also be seen as connected to seemingly stable conditions of disadvantage – 
such as gender inequality and chronic mental or physical illness or disability – which seem 
to be seen under the international framework as unfortunate circumstances rather than 
historically and structurally determined dispossession.  
Although attention to these non-monetary dimensions of poverty has raised them to the 
level of ‘millennial goals’, it is also granted that economic growth is still the core idea of 
development – with this multidimensional image of poverty being defined as ‘growth 
plus’.51 To take the example of gender inequality as an accepted marker of poverty, that is 
to say, the understanding that poverty disproportionately affects women, this approach 
means that international initiatives focus on ‘empowering’ women towards financial 
independence and entrepreneurship, rather than a focus on historical and structural 
conditions which produce the ‘feminisation of poverty’ that antipoverty interventions 
construct as a phenomenon of current times.52 As a result, the so-called 
multidimensionality is not, in any way, the intersectionality of which feminist and racial 
theories speak. It reveals a clear perception of poverty as a conflict-less, stable condition – 
a naturally occurring attribute. In other words, even if recognised in its gendered and non-
white profile, as in Roy’s identification of financialized poverty in the image of the ‘Third 
World woman’, these are attributes close to physical characteristics (aesthetic features) of 
the condition of poverty.  
Despite the clear moves in international development to de-monetise poverty and 
recognise its multidimensionality, the poor continue to be presented to the eyes as a 
context-independent and ahistorical figure. As Sundhya Pahuja remarks, the development 
framework locates the causes of poverty in ‘local and present causes’, with no reference to 
historical and global factors such as, respectively, the colonial and imperialist legacies or 
 
51 Pahuja, ‘Global Poverty and the Politics of Good Intentions’ (n 3) 37. 
52 Sylvia Chant, ‘The “Feminisation of Poverty” and the “Feminisation” of Anti-Poverty Programmes: Room for 
Revision?’ (2008) 44(2) Journal of Development Studies 165. 
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the contemporary unfair international trade rules.53 As an effect of this understanding of 
the causes of poverty, the formats of global poverty interventions are historically based on 
material supplies to compensate for propertylessness – e.g. food provision, alms, charity, 
social benefits, development, finance. The typically missing data enables an image of the 
poor as any other universal subject who, if given the appropriate tools and the adequate 
mindset, would succeed in escaping poverty. This ascribed imagery – indeed a translation 
into normative, institutional repertoires – persistently evokes the traditional debate 
between universalism and relativism in theories of justice which are, nonetheless, 
oblivious to the diversity of experiences of poverty as an active injustice. In that regard, 
Bethânia Assy challenges the dichotomous idea of justice that follows from, in the first 
stance, formal equality and, on the other, identity politics.54 Contending the binary of 
contrafactual inclusion or essentialised identities – and considering how concrete 
experiences of socioeconomic injustice can unfold into processes of political 
subjectivation, particularly in cases intersected by issues of gender – Assy demonstrates 
that while social injustices are inapprehensible by normative structures, class, gender and 
racial traits are rather inscribed in productive (and insurgent) dynamics of political action, 
irreducible to identity structures or abstract universality.55 
The alluded ‘appropriate tools’ to fix global poverty today are, thus, interestingly but 
unsurprisingly presented on legal terms, in what has been presented in chapter 2 as a 
rights-based approach to poverty. It is in fact a human rights approach in which, more than 
a cause or a consequence of human rights violations, poverty is itself a human rights 
violation – a violation of the contentious ‘right to development’ as well as of 
socioeconomic rights to which the corresponding duties on states are unclear to say the 
least.56 The human rights approach to poverty entails a recognition of the poor as 
individual rights-holders and confers obligations to nation-states which, in turn, place a 
responsibility on the international community that includes the power to intervene in 
 
53 Pahuja (n 3) 37. 
54 Bethânia A Assy, ‘Subjectivation and Ontology of Political Action in Facing Injustice’ [In Portuguese: 
‘Subjetivação e Ontologia da Ação Política diante da Injustiça’] (2016) 7(15) Direito e Práxis 777 
55 Also on this point, considering how political mobilisation in proprietary disputes engender subjects, rights 
and indeed law, see Carolina Amadeo, ‘Disputare la Proprietà: il Conflitto come Generatore del Diritto’ in AA 
VV (ed) Dieci Idee per Ripensare il Capitalismo (Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli 2019). 
56 Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, ‘Poverty, Obligation, and the International Economic Legal System: What are 
our Duties to the Global Poor?’ in Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer (ed), Poverty and the International Economic 
Legal System: Duties to the World’s Poor (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
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humanitarian crises. Yet, rather than global equality, it is sufficiency and minimum 
provision that are aspired to.57  
It is unsurprising that rights are offered as the means of solving poverty because, as I have 
pointed out from the outset of this thesis, poverty is indeed a legal-aesthetic formation 
before it is formulated as a socioeconomic problem. And indeed, poverty has historically 
been a legal concern, as I established in chapter 2. However, contrary to the frames of 
analysis I followed there, the terms by which the concept of poverty encompasses its legal 
backgrounds in addition to its socioeconomic forms are essentialised – dispossession and 
its elements of race, gender and spatial distribution become naturalised characteristics. 
This is an already well-established critique of human rights, in terms of the depoliticization 
of global struggles.58 In the international sphere, this critique also includes the lack of 
enforceability, accountability and jurisdiction – which Pahuja terms the toothlessness of 
international law.59 However, it is important to be precise in this point to avoid a clumsy 
contradiction in relation to what has been argued earlier in this chapter. I argued that law 
emerges in the very moment in which it is put into practice in the passage from data to 
fact, or from quantification to qualification. But now I am indicating that legal elements 
are foregrounded, embraced in the very gesture of definition, through the quantification 
of access to rights (e.g., the human poverty index, the human development index). These 
are two different registers at play in seemingly the same reference to ‘law’: the practices 
that enable law to coalesce as a socio-technical form which produces further effects and 
law as an institutional framework, a repository of pre-existing and self-referential 
normative techniques. They are different but certainly connected. While I was, in the first 
moment, concerned with the originating and productive techniques of law, I am now 
alluding to elements of a critique of capitalistic poverty, one in which such formations are 
already at play and recognisable as entities. Poverty is already an entity – shaped into an 
attribute, a state and a condition – and the legal techniques operate as incessant 
refinements of its sampling functions.  
Thus, what is really unsurprising is that rights are evoked in favour of the poor. The logic of 
ascribing rights to the poor accompanied the history of poverty production and poverty 
knowledge. Rights are at the core of the mechanisms of the modulation to which I referred 
 
57 Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Harvard University Press 2018). 
58 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2000). 
See also: Ozan Kamiloglu, ‘Human Rights from Below: Neutrality, the Subject, and the Revolutionaries’ (PhD 
Thesis, University of London 2019). 
59 Pahuja (n 3).  
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earlier, not essentially in the sense of disciplinary powers, nor as ideological domination.  
Rights, here, are construed in terms of the typical practices of the industry of global 
poverty alleviation – the knowledge-law-intervention compound – which, as an effect, 
transforms the nature of things, the profiles of people and the possibilities of action. I am 
foregrounding technologies, not power relations. As Bottici writes, the imaginal operates 
in human rights through the images of rights, of the human and of the rational.60 As such, 
rights act as techniques, as catalysts of change – or as practical devices, ‘tools of technical 
differentiation’.61 The right to development, entitlements to social benefits and even the 
novel sense of a so-called right to credit promote change before the actual receipt of aid, 
benefits or credit. They promote changes, for example, in establishing criteria of eligibility, 
by imposing conditionalities, by penalising fraud. By responding to the conceptualisation 
of poverty as a thing in the world – and as such by coalescing from its own practices – law 
sets the adequate image of the poor, the model to be aspired to. One needs to comply 
with the imaginal poverty standards, conform to the prevailing images of poverty, in order 
to even begin to claim their rights.  
It is in the legal realm that poverty can potentially be unmade to dissipate into thin air. 
However, it is also in the legal realm that poverty is continually reshaped and refined. 
Historical uprisings against dispossession, racialisation and violence have been 
incorporated into the very machinery of poverty production in the name of poverty 
eradication. As such, claims to justice will be made to fit into the very structures erected 
around law, in terms of access to rights, services and goods. It is through the institutional 
administration of justice that poverty will be tackled, that is, through a sanitised, and thus 
essentialised idea of justice, in face of what has been presented in chapter 1, where 
poverty figured as an active injustice that is reclaimed based on aesthetic terms (its 
formative configurations, it’s appearances and disappearances in space and time) beyond 
material, socioeconomic terms. One needs to be a regular and formal subject of rights to 
position oneself as a plaintiff. One needs to become poor and to formalise one’s poverty. 
The move is towards formalisation. The fixing of poverty, its solution according to the 
current framework of intervention, evokes formalisation, as established in chapter 2.  
Formalisation is, indeed, the ultimate legal operation. However, as remarked in chapters 1 
and 2, formal/informal are not a dichotomy per se, not a binary opposition in the sense of 
 
60 Bottici (n 18) 162. 
61Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, ‘Human Rights and Latin American Southern Voices’ in Upendra Baxi, Christopher 
McCrudden and Abdul Paliwala (eds), Law’s Ethical, Global and Theoretical Contexts: Essays in Honour of 
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being inside/outside law. They are both ‘within’, they are both effects of legal practices. 
Not to idealise informality as a dimension free of violence – quite the contrary it is a 
dimension to which are relegated the obstinate poor who resist assimilation and are as 
such subjected to deeper forms of ‘precarity’ – this operational effect of rights in 
producing informality, is to be given proper consideration. Informalisation is the necessary 
countereffect of the requirements of formalisation. The ‘formal’ poor are contrasting with 
the ‘informal’ poor, i.e. those who live by that which has been rendered informal: informal 
economies, informal housing, informal labour, informal occupation of spaces, and so forth. 
Although critical legal literature typically focuses on exception, punishment, sovereign 
power and disciplinary techniques to say that all that stays outside of law is penalised, my 
point has been that these are constitutive aspects that are inscribed as external. Tactics to 
expand formalisation by way of rights to reach the ‘informal sectors’ include, again, 
changing the frames of poverty to accommodate new bodies and soil – e.g., re-regulating 
microbusiness tax regimes and flexibilising labour law, as mentioned above. Hence, 
informality is not challenged by formalisation; it is indeed forced upon populations and 
territories. From this perspective, the territorial and populational containment of slums 
that I have been referring to throughout this thesis is not to be construed as 
circumscribing the incalculable, objectionable poor ‘outside’ of the city but indeed a 
‘containment within’. I will take a closer look at this in the next chapter, by reflecting on 







Territorial and populational modulations of poverty in the city 
 
In this final chapter, I would like to take a different approach. I would like to present some 
of the concrete effects that can be (though seldom are) connected to what came to be 
formed as an industry of poverty monitoring and poverty alleviation. In other words, I 
establish associations between poverty data and poverty modulation – between that 
which is inscribed and then prescribed by law. I do this by critically analysing how legal 
techniques modulate the concrete world and feed back into data, thus establishing a flow 
of mutual and endless socio-technical creation falling upon populations and territories. In 
other words, while I have so far focused on reframing law as a part of data (and image) 
production, I will now turn to the ways in which such data (and images) end up being 
productive of material configurations. This concrete effect is what I previously termed 
‘legal-aesthetic modulations’ of populations and territories, which are propelled by images 
of poverty within the circuits of intervention.  
The reflections below are what essentially prompted me to develop this entire research 
and now it should all come full circle. I present more concrete and grounded elements in 
rather loose connections and they will remain so in this thesis because, for the kind of 
research that I have undertaken, the detection of the empirical accuracy and the precise 
chain of causation implied in said connections are not the main aspiration. I mentioned 
before that as a critical legal research project – instead of a socio-legal one – I prioritise, in 
this thesis, the workings of legal techniques of poverty visualisation and their effects of 
poverty production simultaneously in global and in local settings. In order to now turn to a 
more contextual analysis, I rely on multiple scholarly and media references which provide 
the necessary empirical basis to illustrate or validate my point and I also rely on my 
personal experience as a practitioner in the context that I will describe. That being said, I 
will start by briefly presenting a concrete (in fact, as tangible as it can be) landscape moved 
by an incident that occurred in the city I come from. I then move on to a broader 
examination of this landscape within the context in which it took place in order to return 
to the perspectivist encounter established by the metaphorical gaze that motivated the 
research – i.e. that performed by the nonpoor towards to the poor. Here is the incident: 
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In September 2018, a man was shot at a bus stop in the favela Chapéu Mangueira in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil. This man was shot three times by the police unit that monitored the area, a 
special force with an alleged role of peacekeeping, or more accurately of pacification. This 
man was a black man holding an umbrella and wearing a baby sling. He was waiting for his 
wife and children to arrive in the next van, which is one of the informal transport systems 
in favelas and the city at large. The police allegedly confused the victim’s umbrella with a 
rifle which means that the man was taken to be a criminal to be ‘neutralised’. Trying to 
move beyond the immediate contestation that offenders should not be extra-judicially 
executed, I would like to reflect on the multiple connections contained in the fact that it is 
perceived as a criminal behaviour to be a black favela resident and to hold an umbrella at 
one’s local bus stop.1 
This incident – unfortunately neither unusual nor infrequent in Brazil – could be seen as 
yet another case of police brutality and state violence under the frames of structural 
racism along with many others that occur all over the world. And, indeed, it is. I do not 
wish to claim a sort of uniqueness or priority in this event but these are not the aspects 
that I will draw attention to. Instead, I wish to underline precisely the legal-aesthetic 
elements contained in this incident, as it encapsulates most of the points that I have raised 
throughout this thesis. The victim embodied many of the analysed ‘markers’ of the 
factuality of poverty, i.e., of the legally-sanctioned and legally-repelled poverty. He was 
seen as racialised, as a criminal, as a slum dweller, as unbanked, as an informal occupier 
and as a vagrant in the sense of being badly positioned in the city, loitering at a corner in a 
favela for no obvious reason. His looks, his colour, his position, his environment, his 
accessories conveyed all that. It does not matter that the ‘material reality’ of the objects 
he carried was different from what the police saw, what counts is what was seen 
(perceived, apprehended, cognised). His location also betrayed him, because in a favela 
everyone is already halfway there into the perceptual frame and to fitting the profile – all 
it takes is a slight indicator that raises a flag. Sometimes it is indeed the objects one carries 
around (mobile phone2, screwdriver3, hydraulic jack4, popcorn packet5, school bag6… the 
 
1 The man was Rodrigo Alexandre da Silva Serrano, he was 26 years old, married, a father of two small 
children and worked in a bar in Ipanema. See about his case in an interview with his mother in: Carla Souza, 
‘Sentenced to Death by Rio Police for Carrying an Umbrella and a Baby Sling’ RioOnWatch (Rio de Janeiro, 18 
September 2019). 
2 Bruno Inácio and Fernanda Viegas, ‘Police Officer Confuses Mobile Phone with Gun and Shoots Young Man 
in Lagoa’ [In Portuguese: ‘Policial Confunde Celular com Arma e Mata Rapaz no Bairro Lagoa’] O Tempo (Belo 
Horizonte, 17 May 2017). 
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list goes on). At other times it is the way one acts, walks, dresses, reacts, exists. Quite 
accurately, poverty lies in the eyes of the beholder. One is poor for how they are seen, in 
their location, traits, style, movements, adornments. 
With this scene in mind, in this final chapter, I will disentangle some relevant elements out 
of the incident above in order to situate my overall argument and show how, despite 
seemingly abstract or disengaged, my analysis is grounded and situated. In trying to 
articulate the legal aesthetic argument through a material perspective, my endeavour is to 
unravel the intricate connections of appearance and disappearance that form the 
machinery of dispossession, which I have interrogated in chapter 1 of this thesis, and the 
extent to which poverty’s interpretation as a legal-aesthetic modulation can contribute to 
opening up new frontiers of theoretical inquiry about social injustice.  
 
5.1 The governance of appearances and disappearances in the urban landscape  
Within the wider context of the War on Drugs in Latin America, Brazil presents local 
particularities in addition to the principles implanted in the country’s criminal system via 
international intervention.7 As a country structurally marked by its colonial history and 
system of slavery, poverty in Brazil is entangled with clear racial and territorial 
demarcations. In Rio de Janeiro, the urban distribution of poverty is ordered by unofficial, 
yet factual segregation – which is to say that Rio is a city marked by geographic divisions 
between the rich and the poor which generally overlap with a racial divide. The 
topography of the city is itself part of the segregational setup, a landscape marked by hills 
where favelas seem to mushroom in the midst of rich and central areas. As largely 
uncharted territories, favelas are often seen as transient occupations of land, like enclaves 
interrupting the grids of the ‘official city’ of Rio. Indeed, a favela is often found entirely 
 
3 Bernardo Tabak, ‘Officer of the Military Police’s Tactical Unit Mistakes Drill for Gun and Kills Andaraí 
Resident’ [In Portuguese: ‘Policial do Bope Confunde Furadeira com Arma e Mata Morador do Andaraí’] G1, 
Globo (Rio de Janeiro, 19 May 2010). 
4 Rafael Soares, ‘Military Police Officer Who Mistook Hydraulic Jack for Machine Gun and Killed Young Men 
Retrieves Right to Bear Arms’ [In Portuguese: ‘PM que Confundiu Macaco Hidráulico com Metralhadora e 
Matou Jovens Volta a Ter Porte de Arma’] Extra, Globo (Rio de Janeiro, 12 June 2018). 
5 Lucas Gayoso, ‘16-Year-Old Dies after Being Shot at Borel’ [In Portuguese: ‘Jovem de 16 Anos Morre após Ser 
Baleado no Borel] Extra, Globo (Rio de Janeiro, 30 June 2016). 
6 Rafael Soares, ‘Military Police Officer Admits He was Confused and Killed Young Man after He Dropped his 
Backpack in Baixada’ [In Portuguese: ‘PM Admite que se Confundiu e Matou Jovem após ele Deixar Mochila 
Cair, na Baixada’] Extra, Globo (Rio de Janeiro, 4 January 2018). 
7 Such institutional interventions have been mentioned in chapter 2 and can be seen in detail in Ted Galen 




separated, both geographically and aesthetically, from ‘the city’, crawling up hillsides or 
peri-urban fringes, while the urban grid spreads within the city’s official perimeter. The 
geographic segregation that seemingly rules the distribution of poverty in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro thus appears to reveal two superimposed worlds: the world of the official city of 
Rio and the concealed world of the poor. Notwithstanding its deceptive designation of 
‘split city’ which cast out that which is ‘excluded’ from the official city, according to the 
frame of analysis which I have presented in this thesis, this is in fact an urban landscape 
assertively arranged by a violent spatial condition of injustice, which encompasses the 
vanishment and invisibilisation of the urban poor, both in time and in space – both in the 
city’s historiography and its geography.  
This arrangement is an aesthetic function in the same way as I have established since 
chapter 1, in that the framings of poverty determine the conditions of its appearance in 
the urban space. In this determination, not only the presence, but the very existence of the 
poor can be instantiated, relocated and also revoked. It is a disposition that manages the 
visibility or invisibility of poverty as well as the selective apparition and disappearance of 
populations and territories of poverty. I have mentioned that rather than a container of 
‘natural modes of ordering’, the space in this urban landscape must be seen as ‘relational, 
produced through diverse, networked processes’.8 That is to say, the violent divisions, 
segregations and visual economies are effects of the material inscription of immaterial 
relations, carved into bodies and soil.9 Populations and territories of poverty, in this 
particular context, are continually intervened upon by legal-aesthetic modulations that 
govern through ‘property’s logic of severability’,10 which codifies good vs bad poor, favela 
vs city, criminals vs citizens, among other apparent dualities. But they are also formative of 
entirely new and creative modes of urban life which, far from evading law, build on various 
forms of association, regulation and negotiation. In that regard, the legal is also a 
particular form of urban association in the city space.11 Having adopted, in this thesis, a 
broad view of law as formed by chains of legal practices and techniques that interweave 
social and urban configurations, and indeed bind new associations – whether as ordering 
or as consociations – within the ‘city of law’,12 it is interesting to consider how both the 
 
8 Nicholas Blomley, ‘Cuts, Flows, and the Geographies of Property’ (2010) 7(2) Law, Culture and the 
Humanities 204-205. 
9 Andrea Mubi Brighenti, ‘Lines, Barred Lines. Movement, Territory and the Law’ (2010) 6(3) International 
Journal of Law in Context 217. 
10 Blomley (n 8) 212. 
11 Kirsten Campbell, ‘The City of Law’ (2013) 9(2) International Journal of Law in Context 197. 
12 Campbell (n 11) 192. 
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legal and the urban are mutually constituted in this concrete landscape of ‘favelas’ and 
‘the city’. I would like to highlight the role of poverty data in these associations to argue 
that, far from excluded, the territorial containment of the urban poor is a fundamental 
characteristic of the landscape of Rio, a city that is inherently and actively constituted by 
spatial injustice as part of its very own legal-aesthetic compositionality. 
There are multiple layers of aesthetic implications to be explored in face of the concrete 
setup of favelas in the landscape of Rio de Janeiro. Firstly, there is the very backdrop of an 
urban design based on territorial segregation within the city. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, 
the separation of ‘the official city’ from ‘favelas’ is aesthetically evident from the outset in 
terms of architectural styles, hostile urban planning13 and different regulations for 
mobility14 and social organisation at large. This is an issue vastly explored in literature on 
urban sociology and critical geography which problematises the assumption that favelas 
are ‘the place of poverty in the city […] where violence, associated with drug dealing, is 
present in everyday life’.15 Not to be misread as spaces without law and state sovereignty, 
favelas are indeed subjected to differentiated regimes of state power, while also being 
frequently dominated by concurring powers – circumstances initially described as ‘legal 
pluralism’.16 The clear territorial divisions endorse recurring incidents of state violence, 
mass evictions and removals of entire communities, police raids and crossfire, as widely 
reported in the media.  
Another aesthetic layer that can be explored relates to profiles and characters historically 
formed around the figure of the favela resident (favelado). The elements that constitute 
this identity profiling involve what ‘they’ do, express, create and consume being 
stereotyped, reactively rejected and/or criminalised. Popular culture created in favelas can 
be appreciated ‘outside’, but it is usually criminalised ‘inside’ – from samba in early 
 
13 As illustrated by the use of ‘acoustic barriers’ along the motorway out of the international airport that 
conceals Maré, a complex of favelas, from sight. See Donna Bowater, ‘Rio's “Wall of Shame” between its 
Ghettos and Shiny Olympic Image’ The Telegraph (London, 23 July 23 2016). 
14 An example: limitations and cuts in bus lines that previously linked poorer areas to touristic areas amount 
to a restriction of access to ‘the official city’. See Aaron Gordon, ‘Rio's Olympic Legacy Bus System is Leaving 
Poor and Working Class Residents Behind’ Vice Sports (New York, 10 August 2016). 
15 Licia Valladares, ‘Social Sciences Representations of Favelas in Rio de Janeiro: A Historical Perspective’ 
LLILAS Visiting Resource Professor Papers (Latin American Network Information Center, University of Texas 
2008) 2. 
Important names to refer to in this scholarship include: Zuenir Ventura, Alba Zaluar, Luiz Antonio Machado da 
Silva, Janice Perelman, Luiz Eduardo Soares, Marcos Alvito and Edésio Fernandes, among many others. 
16 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality in 
Pasargada’ (1977) 12(1) Law & Society Review 5. 
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twentieth century to funk today.17 The flow of cultural exchange can frequently take place 
in this direction: it is possible to look with fascination ‘from outside’, to explore the 
vibrancy of favela culture, and even develop tourist activities and ‘safaris’ in favelas18 – as 
long as safety measures are provided. The inside-out flow of cultural exchange tends to be 
more problematic, as in when the poor dare to occupy or simply attend the spaces of the 
rich; we can see violent reactions to the clash of worlds, for example, in the space of a 
shopping mall.19 Although important and prolific it is not with the points of these analyses 
that I am concerned because, in accordance with the framework that I have established in 
this thesis, favelas are not the distinctive locus of poverty resulting from environmentally 
or culturally established determinations, nor are they the unclaimed leftover territories to 
which the poor are forcibly resettled in their exclusion from the city and thus having 
constructed identities of marginalisation.20 
The layer of aesthetic implications that is indeed interesting here is that of the role of 
statistics and data in framing a heterogeneous, chaotic phenomenon and determining the 
conditions of its appearance. Not only the presence, but the very existence of the 
statistically and cartographically framed entities is at stake. Considering the previously 
reported dense history of poverty knowledge and interventions upon slums, it might come 
as a surprise that many maps of the city of Rio (official and unofficial) do not record all of 
its favelas, or the internal organisation of such areas. Raquel Rolnik argues that exclusions 
from maps have long proved to be a key element for Rio in securing moral and legal 
authority for evicting favela residents. Rolnik describes such informal or squatter 
settlements as marked by a condition of ‘permanent transience’ for the urban poor, which 
is especially exacerbated under financial and rentier capitalism.21 In the global pattern of 
urban and housing policies fuelled by financialization, Rolnik argues, favelas are spaces 
marked by complex layers of indeterminacy, zones between legality and illegality, 
formality and informality, presence and absence – I would add: vitality and lethality. A 
permanently transient condition means that a piece of land, as a financial asset, is always 
 
17 Raphael Tsavkko Garcia, ‘Why is there Talk of Banning Funk Music in Brazil? The Persecution of Black Music 
in Brazil Continues’ Aljazeera (Doha, 16 October 2017). 
18 On the controversial and very profitable industry of slum tourism in the global south, see Bianca Freire-
Medeiros, ‘Poverty Tourism: From 18th-Century London to 21st-Century Rio de Janeiro’ LLILAS Benson 
(Austin, 24 August 2017). 
19 On what did come to be known as ‘Rolezinho’, see Désirée Poets, ‘Brazil’s Rolezinhos: Shopping Malls as 
Instruments of Geographic Inclusion’ RioOnWatch (Rio de Janeiro, 16 October 2014). 
20 These are ‘dogmas’ reproduced by social researchers in favelas and usefully mapped in Valladares (n 15) 17. 
I have also critiqued the environmental and cultural approaches to poverty in chapter 2 and, as will become 
clear, this often-unquestioned understanding reproduces a series of implications for the urban poor in Brazil. 
21Raquel Rolnik, Urban Warfare: Housing Under the Empire of Finance (Verso 2019). 
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under imminent threat of capture and removal. As a result, at the micro-level of everyday 
life, there are thousands of people with no home address who do not receive letters, 
cannot open a bank account, cannot access basic public services or even apply for formal 
jobs – i.e., the manifestations of informality which antipoverty intervention relentlessly 
focuses on, as discussed in chapter 4. At a macro-level, these populations and territories 
literally do not make it onto a map. Indeed, there are inconsistent registers of their 
presence and of their actual existence in the city’s official accounts of itself. These are also 
the conditions targeted by the industry of global poverty reduction in its agenda of slum 
upgrading and urban redevelopment mentioned in chapter 2.  
At first sight, the absence of favelas from the maps of Rio de Janeiro – whether in terms of 
their very designation or in terms of the internal mapping of favelas’ streets and alleyways 
– may seem to be in dissonance with the history of capitalist governance, control and 
discipline that targets the urban poor across the globe. However, considering the fact that 
favelas are generally subject to ostensive militarised control and securitisation, the 
absence is not here read as pure and simple omission but indeed as containment, or as 
Wacquant describes, the ‘punitive containment’ of the urban poor.22 Thus, the absence is 
construed as the proper inscription of clear and historical social relations: relations of 
invisibilisation, or selective visibilisation. The absence is itself (missing) data – information 
of a historically existent yet censored social dynamic, i.e., the presence of favelas and all 
the complexities that favelas represent in ‘the city’. Registering a community on the map is 
an all too permanent move for sites of imminent annihilation.23 As impermanent yet 
enduring settlements, some favelas have been shaping the landscapes of the city for 100 
years. Innumerous others have vanished from the areas they used to occupy with no 
remaining evidence of their past existence. Within a global ‘urban warfare’ that transforms 
urban land and lived territories into financial assets, the forces of finance and security are 
combined in favelas, forming a deadly machinery of dispossession and disappearance. Yet, 
just as dispossession is overwritten by developmental urban renovation projects, so are 
 
22 Loïc Wacquant, ‘The Militarization of Urban Marginality: Lessons from the Brazilian Metropolis’ (2008) 2(1) 
International Political Sociology 56. 
While Wacquant focuses on the state action, it is important to indicate that the territorial control of favelas 
can be held by different spheres of authority, such as drug-related organised crime, the milícias, the state 
police or the Brazilian Armed Forces. More on this to follow. 
23 This permanent sense of imminent removal is clear in the statement: ‘when they announced that the 
Olympic Games would be in Rio, we knew we were in greater trouble. [..] I always knew my home would be 
removed one day, but this moment was the worst in our struggle’ (Maria da Penha, resident of Vila 
Autódromo). Excerpt transcribed and translated by the author from the broadcast video: Johnny Harris, ‘2016 




the brutal effects of the militarised containment of the poor made unnoticeable to ‘the 
rest of the city’. While within the concrete landscape of favelas what is absent is 
officialdom or formality, from the official narrative of a map, favelas can be the ones 
rendered absent. It is a matter of perspective. 
Another particular predicament conditioning – and aesthetically configuring – this 
landscape must be noted. That is the link between urban poverty, raciality and criminality 
addressed in chapter 2 as historically constructed and confirmed by scientific correlations. 
In the case of Rio’s favelas, this link is awfully concrete, i.e. openly actualised and enacted 
by law enforcement and openly reproduced in the media, for whom elements of class and 
race are central to the distinction between drug users and drug dealers. Furthermore, in 
many cases, favelas are territorially controlled by so-called organised criminal groups – 
drug gangs or milícia (which can be loosely defined as gangs formed by state agents) – and 
erratically occupied by security forces, mainly the state Military Police24 or occasionally the 
national Armed Forces themselves. The result is a widespread warlike setup notoriously 
characterised by systematic violence. Amidst the crossfires, favela residents are affected 
as collateral damage. Needless to say, at this point, that this is a highly violent and lethal 
context: in 2018 there were 1,532 deaths registered as resulting from police interventions 
in the city of Rio alone; In 2019, this figure increased to 1,810 deaths.25 In Brazil at large, it 
was 5,804 deaths by the police in 2019 and calculations from 2018 show that an average 
of 14 people are killed by police officers every day.26 These are the official figures, 
calculated from the retroactively acknowledged poor who have been ‘neutralised’ by law 
enforcement agents. Other deaths remain unaccounted for, unacknowledged and 
unmemorable, as human rights group frequently report.27 Regarding the abovementioned 
aesthetic role of statistics, one should question what it might mean for public institutions 
to release such numbers. Despite the disastrous dimensions, these figures of violence add 
to feelings of fear and are often used to boost the sense of need for more military control 
of the situation. It is no surprise that the past elections in Brazil have been marked by 
 
24 The Military Police is part of the federated states’ public safety systems, not the national military structure, 
although they are reserved as ancillary forces of the Brazilian Army and operate by a military internal order 
and under military laws. 
25 As per the database ‘Violence Monitor’ kept by the Center for the Study of Violence of the University of São 
Paulo, the Brazilian Public Security Forum and the G1 news portal. Available at: 
<https://nev.prp.usp.br/en/projects/special-projects/violence-monitor/> accessed 29 June 2020. 
See also: Júlia Dias Carneiro, interview with Ignacio Cano, ‘Violence in Rio: Security Expert Warns of Return to 
Old Policies of Confrontation’ RioOnWatch (Rio de Janeiro, 29 March 2019). 
26 Don Phillips, ‘“A Devastating Scenario”: Brazil Sets New Record for Homicides at 63,880 Deaths’ The 
Guardian (London, 9 August 2018).  
27 Amnesty International, Brazil: You Killed My Son: Homicides by Military Police in the City of Rio de Janeiro 
(Report AMR 19/2068/2015, Amnesty International 2015). 
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widespread calls for military intervention28 – for a regime that is already in place and, 
despite the bloodbath, remains invisible for a significant segment of the public.  
But let’s not be taken in by this narrative. There is no war. These circumstances are about 
the incessant chasing of an ‘internal enemy’ with a highly militarised police structure and 
eventually resorting to the Armed Forces. This is what has been termed the millitarisation 
of favelas, which results, at any rate, in strict regimes of sociability with curfews, frequent 
prohibitions on gathering and of cultural manifestation and which also affects schools and 
local businesses. There is indeed a discursive dispute over the very meaning of the deaths 
and vanishments in this atmosphere, in order to oppose the dismissive indemnification of 
the violence perpetrated by law enforcement agents which the discourse of war facilitates. 
This war is rather, as Allen Feldman suggests,29 a regime of truth – processed through as 
unfortunate accidents, falsified by markers such as ‘resisting arrest’ or ‘threatening a 
police officer’ which means that the neutralised targets will have been considered a part of 
the organised crime, which then retroactively legitimises their execution. It is not 
uncommon for families (mothers) to have to come forward and contend that a targeted 
corpse was not that of a criminal – by showing to cameras the victim’s working papers.30 
‘Worker’ and ‘criminal’ are here the main normative categories that distinguish the good 
and the bad poor – again, the formal and the informal poor. 
The war on drugs is a relatively recent development, as discussed in chapter 2, and before 
that there were other legal frameworks for the criminalisation of impoverished and 
racialised groups in Brazil as well as the territorial containment of favelas – notably 
gambling but also other Afro-Brazilian cultural expressions such as samba, capoeira and 
funk have been historically outlawed. This so-called war against the ‘internal enemy’, 
which was derived from foreign influence and meshed well with principles of national 
security in the last military dictatorship of 1964-1988, today facilitates this urban 
landscape ruled by segregation and the extermination of the urban poor. As a wider order 
of things, it is relevant to stress that this is not only about the police – and definitely not 
 
28 Marina Lopes, ‘In Brazil, Nostalgia Grows for the Dictatorship - Not the Brutality, But the Law and Order’ 
Washington Post (Washington DC, 15 March 2018). 
29 Allen Feldman, ‘War Under Erasure: Contretemps, Disappearance, Anthropophagy, Survivance’ (2019) 22(1) 
Theory & Event 175. 
30 In the incident described in the beginning of this chapter, Rodrigo Serrano’s mother displays his worker ID 
covered in blood and states: ‘I don’t want my son’s image to be stained. He was not a thief or a drug dealer. 
He was a worker and had his working papers with him when he was killed.’ Statement translated by the 
author: Marcos Nunes, ‘“They Executed my Son”, says Mother During the Funeral of a Killed Waiter in Chapéu 
Mangueira’ [In Portuguese: ‘‘Executaram meu Filho’, diz Mãe, Durante Enterro de Garçom Morto no Chapéu 
Mangueira’] O Globo (Rio de Janeiro, 19 September 2018). 
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about bad police officers. Other institutions, and particularly the justice system in Brazil, 
play a part in this fabricated ‘internal war’ which is connected to the international quest of 
the War on Drugs. In other words, it is not only the police that easily ‘mistake’ black men 
holding their umbrellas at bus stops (or their screwdrivers, mobile phones, school bags…) 
for likely criminals. The judicial system also acknowledges certain aesthetic symbols as 
confirmation of culpability, especially when it comes to drug related offences. If we look at 
the incarceration rates in Brazil – which has the third largest prison population in the 
world31 – we can see that 67.7% are non-white, i.e. black (16.8%), brown [mixed race] 
(49.8%), indigenous (0.2%) and Asian (0.8%). Over 20% of the total prison population have 
been detained for drug related offences and within the so-called heinous crimes, drug 
trafficking amounts to 41.65% of the cases, against 28.74% for homicides. Among women, 
drug related offences are the overall most common offence, accounting for 50.9% of the 
cases.32  
Hence in Brazil, this link of poverty, race and crime is widely accepted and enacted by law 
enforcement agencies and judicial institutions. On one side, the literature on 
criminalisation of poverty is right to claim that a growing penalisation of the poor is found 
in the neoliberal thrust of past decades.33 However, there is another aspect (an aesthetic 
aspect) that remains overlooked in this discussion. Within an unquestioned understanding 
of a ‘culture of poverty’ allied with a sort of environmental determinism, raciality and 
geolocation can be construed as aesthetic attributes that add up to profiles of the poor. 
This landscape creates a particular condition for favela residents: not only is poverty 
criminalised but this very criminalisation ends up forging one-dimensional images of the 
‘dangerous poor’ that will further confirm that favelas are the locus of poverty and crime 
and, thus, reinforce the need for more police control. And indeed beyond the police, 
recent findings by Rio’s Public Defender's Office confirm this pattern within the judicial 
system: in criminal cases where the defendant is arrested in a favela or is identified as 
connected to a favela controlled by drug gangs, that geolocation tends to constitute (in 
courts practices, not in legislation) an aggravating circumstance of culpability and will likely 
be the determinant factor for framing the defendant for a supplementary offence termed 
 
31Roy Walmsley, ‘World Prison Population List - 12th edition’, World Prison Brief (ICPR/Birkbeck 2018). 
32 According to the ‘Infopen’ database held by the Brazilian Ministry of Justice, National Penitentiary 
Department. See in Departamento Penitenciário Nacional (DEPEN), Levantamento Nacional de Informações 
Penitenciárias – Infopen. Painel Interativo Dezembro/2019 (Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública 2020). 
33 This has been addressed in chapter 2 with Wacquant’s analysis of the ‘neoliberal penality’ that transmutes 
‘welfare’ into ‘prisonfare’ and with Garland’s hybrid concept of ‘penal-welfarism’. Loïc Wacquant, Punishing 
the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Duke University Press 2009); David Garland, 
‘Punishment and Welfare Revisited’ (2019) 21(3) Punishment & Society 267. 
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‘association with drug trafficking organisations’.34 It turns out, then, that while the 
problem of police responses and the institutional culture of violence that they reveal at 
first seemed to be the extent of the problem, this can instead be seen as part of a wider 
pattern of differential treatment across the institutions of justice. 
Moreover, and in tune with the aesthetic analysis that I propose in this thesis, one’s racial 
profile or place of residence become incriminating features. A ‘suspect’ is not only selected 
by racial profiling but also framed a second time based on geographic location, which 
reveals that which I have termed in chapter 4 how ‘a priori characteristics’ are taken into 
consideration by legal institutions as ‘a matter of fact’: the poor (and criminal) are those 
that inhabit favelas, a marker of the proper place of poverty and crime. The favela’s 
geolocation is taken as an objective indicator by the legal system, even though the image 
of criminality attributed to favelas and their residents has been forged by the operations 
of this system. This is indeed a clear case of geo-legal technology, as addressed by Irus 
Braverman: ‘first, law governs through the visibility of physical spaces; then, it uses this 
same conspicuous visibility to make its own ideological presence invisible.’35 It is important 
to reiterate that this is generally reproduced in the media, where elements of class, race 
and territoriality are central to the composition of a headline. This is also the case in the 
differentiation between drug users and drug dealers: in cases where an individual is caught 
with drugs, he/she will be framed as a user or a dealer depending not on indicators such as 
the amounts of illicit substance they carry on them, but on such aesthetic features of 
poverty. I am calling these elements aesthetic, because it is a sensorial judgement: if the 
individual is seen as poor then they will be framed accordingly.  
The territorial containment of the urban poor is thus a fundamental characteristic of the 
landscape of Rio. As such, the categories of social exclusion and inclusion are inadequate 
tools of analysis in a city that is inherently constituted by segregation. Visual practices 
shape territories of poverty and populations in poverty and thus perpetuate an intrinsic 
ambiguity between the constructed insides and outsides of society, the included and the 
excluded, the central and the marginal, the formal and the informal. There is no 
informality to be fixed when segregation is integral to the urban formation. The 
 
34 Carolina Dzimidas Haber and Natalia Cardoso Amorim Maciel, ‘Judicial Decisions on Drug Trafficking in the 
City and the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro’ [in Portuguese: As sentenças Judiciais por Tráfico de 
Drogas na Cidade e Região Metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro] (2018) (10) Cadernos de Segurança Pública. 
35 Irus Braverman, ‘Hidden in Plain View: Legal Geography from a Visual Perspective’ (2010) 7(2) Law, Culture 
and the Humanities 186. 
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‘disappearance of disappearance’36 puts into question the very existence of such bodies 
and terrains, manifesting a pattern of invisibilisation which denies not only the presence 
but the very existence of the urban poor in the city, as has been addressed above. It refers 
to geo-legal techniques of annihilation, in which populations are simply vanished as if they 
had never existed – be it in cartographic representation; by removals driven by urban 
renovation; or by police incursions that result in (legally validated) extrajudicial executions. 
These techniques are deployed at a global scale and are exacerbated in the case of Rio de 
Janeiro where local particularities mobilise context-specific visual resources and ways of 
seeing. In a quite literal way, certain aspects of poverty are made statistically visible, while 
others are rendered invisible, or selectively visible. What I have sought to stress in this 
section is how strikingly concrete and material this selective visibility of urban poverty can 
be. Segregation and modes of appearance/disappearance determine where in the city it is 
acceptable for one’s body to be found as a black, poor and favelado. The appearance of 
such a charged body at a bus stop may well activate the operations of an apparatus of dis-
apparition and instant annihilation.  
 
5.2 Legal-aesthetic modulations of poverty 
What happens in the passage from the visualisation practices of previous chapters to these 
contextual circumstances? I argue that law does. That which we presume to have always 
been there, the organising principle at the source of the order of things, is rather an 
emergent effect of legal practices. I argued in chapters 3 and 4 that law cannot be 
captured as a unified and pre-existing formation, which compiles and encompasses all 
legal principles, concepts, objects and agents. Instead, law comes to be, it emerges, it 
appears in the world embodied in normative frameworks, posited directives and 
prescriptions and, indeed, in institutions with missions and goals. International 
development law is one such emergent effect. And so are criminal law and the quasi-
criminal administrative orders followed by law enforcement agents. Being emergent 
effects of visualisation practices is, in fact, the only thing that these branches of law have 
in common and which justifies their placement in the same category as 'law'. As chapter 2 
illustrated, there is nothing else, no preceding fundamental commonality, no intrinsic plan, 
no institutional enterprise, not even a common genealogy. 
 
36 Feldman (n 29). 
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My claim, then, is that ‘law’ is what bridges the discussions from the previous chapters in 
this thesis and the worldly elements of this final chapter. Law enables data and images to 
be functional and productive of spatial and temporal transformations, which is to say, law 
activates data and images. In chapter 4 I addressed a preliminary bridging moment where 
law marks the shift from data to facts. I am now taking a step further in pointing out that 
this shift also marks the passage from description to prescription, from standards to 
action, from apprehension and to intervention. In light of this perspective, the violent 
incident opening this chapter is not so much an extrajudicial execution, something that is 
outside of law and which corrupts law. Indeed, it can more adequately be construed as 
law's own doing, the primitive gesture of violence that continually re-inaugurates and re-
establishes law. Ultimately, it is the same order of violence, displacement and 
categorisation described in chapter 1 as the elements of propertylessness, with which this 
reflection started.   
What are the practices behind that intervention (the shooting) that can, in retrospect, be 
unified as law? How is this concrete setup of spatial injustice in Rio’s urban landscape 
linked to the practices of poverty knowledge and of antipoverty intervention? Although 
there are multiple contingent factors which could be raised and combined in the attempt 
to answer these questions – and which would establish a more clear-cut attribution of 
liability in order to frame the shooting in terms of domination, control, discipline or 
punishment – I would like to point to the practices and dynamics which mediate the 
international industry of global poverty reduction and the microcosms of territories of 
poverty and violence in Brazil. This perspective, in turn, situates the shooting as one of 
such practices of visualisation which create a phenomenon to look at, to be known and to 
be acted upon.  
There is a multitude of agents, institutions and experiments taking place in this mediation. 
A constellation of practices forms what is commonly termed ‘civil society’: practices of 
NGOs, neighbourhood associations, social movements, collectives, activists, researchers, 
experts, academics, entrepreneurs, scientific social investigators, fieldworkers and charity 
aid volunteers. There are also multiple practices recognised as ‘the State’ operating in (or 
upon) that microcosm of the favela: public offices, official bodies, representatives, social 
workers, healthcare agents, public defenders, police officers and the military. And there 
are also countless private sector practices by: entrepreneurs, foundations, philanthropists, 
commerce and so forth. Through funding schemes, international organisations and 
193 
 
corporations are also present and operating in favelas. Public and private funds sustain 
both public and private ventures, either separately or in partnership.37 These seemingly 
disconnected practices and entities are here construed as the material infrastructures of 
the making of poverty in Rio – the making of favelas as territories of poverty and of 
violence simultaneously. Through them, favelas become an entity which transcends their 
local arrangements and spatial contiguity, i.e. a statistical entity with concrete effects.38  
We can see how these infrastructures operate by tracing my interactions as a practitioner. 
From the point of view of a practitioner in the field (a socio-legal professional of practice 
research, as I established was my position), the way the industry works is through such 
funding schemes. Applying for funds is a big portion of the craft of a practice researcher. 
The funders establish the kind of initiatives they will be willing to fund, frequently by 
setting out restrictions as to themes, scopes, nature of activities, desired outcome, and 
adequate categories of expenditure. These restrictions and criteria are based, in theory, on 
reliable knowledge of best practices, subject to audit requirements to generate evidence 
of achievements, in terms of outcomes, outputs, deliverables and impact factors.  
In addressing the failures of the international ‘dream’ of ending global poverty despite the 
growing infrastructures and financial resources that have been raised around it in the past 
60 years, Sundhya Pahuja remarks that the project of development itself has not been 
discredited.39 In fact, Pahuja remarks that its reliance on indicators continues to increase 
and to intensify the overall trust in development as the solution to poverty. Namely, 
indicators of success and of impact, are increasingly mustered to demonstrate the efficacy 
of development in a way that is counterintuitive in face of poverty's global growth. In 
chapter 4, I mentioned what Sally Engle Merry described as a corporate culture of audit 
 
37 On public-private partnerships in favelas see Alexandre Fabiano Mendes, ‘Between Shocks and Finance: 
“Pacification” and the “Integration” of the Favela into the City in Rio de Janeiro’ [in Portuguese: ‘Entre 
Choques e Finanças: a “Pacificação” e a “Integração” da Favela à Cidade no Rio de Janeiro’] (2014) 18(31) O 
Social em Questão 237. 
Also in: Lívia de Cássia Godoi Moraes, ‘Investment Funds in the UPPs: The Financial Speculation of Misery’ 
Margó Hufstetler tr RioOnWatch (Rio de Janeiro, 15 December 2013). 
38 The ethnographer Eugênia Motta explains how, from a technical-analytical point of view, the disorderliness 
of favelas can figure as a resisting factor against quantification, as a challenge for both cartography and 
household censuses. It is because of such a challenge that favelas came to be officially defined as ‘subnormal 
agglomerates’ in 1950. Motta explains how this classification situates the favela as an entity and, thus, how 
statistical scrutiny defined that entity as a problem. Eugênia Motta, ‘Resisting Numbers: The Favela as an 
(Un)Quantifiable Reality’ [in Portuguese: Resistência aos Números: a Favela como Realidade (In)Quantificável] 
(2019) 25(1) Mana 72. 
39 Sundhya Pahuja, ‘The Poverty of Development and the Development of Poverty in International Law’ in 
James Crawford and Sarah Nouwen (eds), Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, 
vol 3 (Hart Publishing 2012). 
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that is being employed to quantify social responsibility and human rights compliance.40 In 
her ethnography of indicators, Merry also addresses how statistical measures have 
transformed the work of civil society organisations by establishing international standards 
and technologies of audit that promote ‘evidence-based funding’ and ‘business-based 
means of accounting for productivity and accomplishments’. This, in turn, leads to chains 
of delegation, in which techniques of performance recording are passed on along the 
funding stream all the way to grassroot community groups in remote territories of 
poverty. In my own experience as a participant in the circuits of poverty knowledge and 
intervention, I observed how this is highly onerous on grassroot community organisations 
which work towards poverty reduction and which struggle for material resources 
themselves, frequently relying on precarious labour to carry on. In order to comply with 
these demands and to record successful performance, organisations often allocate a great 
deal of their resources to producing attractive indicators, to adjusting their projects to 
invest in activities that can produce quantifiable impact and outcomes, and to designing 
methodologies able to produce positive feedback and markers of accomplishments. They 
might also attempt to be creative in restructuring (or simply rewording) their work in order 
to fit the remits of international expectations and demands for indicators which, in turn, 
will confirm the appropriateness of such expectations and indicators in an endless cycle of 
new and more precise technologies of audit.  
The presence of the police and of the military in favelas is also premised on indicators and 
‘creative’ alternatives against undesired records. Indicators of police lethality are a 
typically unstable record in the history of Rio, conditioned to intermittent control 
mechanisms and reward systems for police officers meeting targets of crime reduction.41 A 
community organisation in a favela in Rio de Janeiro which deals with the interfaces of 
 
40 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance’ (2011) 52(3) 
Current Anthropology 83. 
41 For example, the System of Goals and Results Tracking, a programme instituted in 2009 to monitor crime 
statistics by setting crime reduction targets and providing monetary rewards to officers whose districts meet 
those targets. See César Muñoz Acebes, ‘“Good Cops Are Afraid” The Toll of Unchecked Police Violence in Rio 
de Janeiro’ Human Rights Watch (New York 2016).  
Recently, in September 2019, the ‘death resulting from police intervention’ has been suspended as an 
indicator to be accounted for in the reward system. See Carolina Heringer et al, ‘Witzel Changes Targeting 
System that Encouraged Reduction of Deaths in Confrontation with the Police’ [In portuguese: ‘Witzel Muda 
Sistema de Metas que Estimulava Redução de Mortes em Confronto com a Polícia’] O Globo (Rio de Janeiro, 
24 September 2019). 
Before that, in the 1990s, a reward system of a ‘bravery bonus’ to police officers who killed the most was 
trialled and resulted in a drastic increase in police lethality at the time. An overview of institutional changes 
and the culture of police rewards based on crime rate can be found in Beatriz Magaloni, Edgar Franco and 
Vanessa Melo, ‘Killing in the Slums: An Impact Evaluation of Police Reform in Rio de Janeiro’ (2015) Center for 
International Development Working Paper n556 . 
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poverty and violence will need to structure their project proposals into the framework of a 
rights-based approach to poverty and to work towards increasing access to rights – 
producing evidence of their achievements, of course. How derisive is it that organisations 
that have been created to combat the historical scene of police violence, will need to work 
with the police, to treat the incidents of such violence in terms of drawing the population 
closer to the police institution, supposedly peacemakers, framing incidents of violence in 
terms of corruption of the institutional culture – in other words, to blame it on local 
inability to comply with global standards of good governance. We have seen in chapter 2 
how this frame of knowing ‘underdevelopment’ works to continually reinforce the frame’s 
own expansion, by calling for more international law, more state-building interventions, 
more institutions, rights and enforcements.42 
The conflicting yet constitutive relationship between favela and ‘the’ city seem to mirror 
the modernization project of the development agenda applied at a global scale, dividing 
north and south, the developed and the under developed world. The divide calls for 
integration of the poor into modernity, by aiding them to renounce their backwardness. 
This apparent ‘mirroring’ could be assumed to be due to the fact that the practices that 
make up the international and the local arrangements are the same, i.e., they are part of 
the same circuit of intervention which operate towards assimilation, integration, 
formalisation. Of course, the ‘problem’ of favelas (if we take the statistical category of 
‘subnormal agglomerates’ as the problem’s inaugural milestone in the 1950s along with 
the upsurge in scientific interest in favelas reflected in the drastic increase of scholarly 
studies and publications since then43) coincides with the global development agenda (in 
the 1960s but expanded globally until the 1990s) when new favelas proliferated and were 
gradually recognised in a context of marked increase in poverty rates in the 1980s and 
1990s. Thus, it is a rather inaccurate simplification to consider a causal link between the 
global dictates and the local mishaps. Both the global and the local form part of the same 
circuit on interventions and their practices of integration can also be found in a much 
earlier project, that of colonisation, in a more direct instance, and indeed that of the 
capitalist mode of knowing and seeing as I have established in this thesis. 
Against this background, the shooting which opens this chapter is here construed as 
another practice within the circuits of poverty knowledge and of interventions against 
 
42 A point made in line with Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Global Poverty and the Politics of Good Intentions’ in Ruth 
Buchanan and Peer Zumbansen (eds), Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and Transitional Justice 
(Hart 2014). 
43 Valladares (n 15). 
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poverty. It is not external to the circuits, or an exception to their functioning. But it is also 
not simply punitive or disciplinary of the bad poor. As I will now further explain, it is 
another mundane visualisation practice that works towards modulation, like many other 
unrelated practices of populational and territorial modulation such as banking, social 
housing and monetary aid. Again, although I am not suggesting a direct line of causality or 
reliance between such practices, the international development frameworks and 
standards described above are contained in that violent gesture. The gesture is included 
in, rather than alien to, the circuits of their operations. This could be phrased quite 
simplistically as follows: what the ‘Global North’ determines, the ‘Global South’ executes –
and literally, as an extrajudicial execution. But more productively, I have sought to 
articulate on a grounded basis the argument laid out in the preceding chapters, thus 
establishing a link between (a) the previously addressed practices of visualisation that 
create poverty in the world, and (b) what I have called ‘legal-aesthetic modulations’ of 
populations and territories of poverty. Furthermore, I have argued that law forms this link 
while also forming itself, in the sense that law results from its own operation. 
From this perspective, there is no miscommunication, no accident, no corruption of law in 
that shooting. It is not a primitive gesture from an uncivilised institution that failed to 
follow the modern liberal state handbook.44 It is also not an act of abuse of authority from 
a ‘bad cop’. It is certainly not what it is officially claimed to be: a mistake. In light of the 
discussions of this thesis, that gesture is in fact the basis of modern law, a continual 
reiteration of the violence and spatial injustice described in chapter 1 and which enables 
the very practices of knowing and visualising poverty in the first place. To that effect, the 
militarised control of favelas described above is here associated with the industry of global 
poverty reduction solely in terms of how it works to modulate populations and territories 
of poverty so that they correspond to images of poverty that the international 
development agenda has formed and expects to find in the empirical world. Before 
exposing the effects of interventions which objectively force reforms upon poor countries 
– via legal mechanisms of conditionalities attached to loans, structural adjustments and 
enforceable recommendations to borrowing countries – it is also relevant to unravel such 
legal-aesthetic modulations which determine the conditions of poverty’s appearance in 
the urban landscape in the first place. It is this earlier stage that promotes conformation, 
 
44 I have addressed in chapter 2 how the notion of ‘state failure’ has historically justified transnational state-
building interventions. See Jonathan Di John, 'Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: 




whereby poverty in Brazil can correspond to the international prescriptions so that it can 
be intervened upon. It is, thus, a moment of homogenisation, i.e. it manufactures the 
uniform, homogeneous poor that can be fixed (allegedly) by the development agenda: the 
passive and grateful receiver of aid willing to follow the script and flourish as an agent of 
its own salvation out of poverty. As such, militarisation admits no cultural manifestation 
(the poor of the world are not culturally distinct), no acceptable informality (informal 
economy, informal housing and settlement), no desires (curfew, strict rules of circulation, 
and even dress codes to stay out of trouble) and certainly no political engagement 
(community organisations and activists are often persecuted). No standing at a corner with 
an umbrella (or screwdriver, school bag...), no being black, no being a favela resident, no 
existing.  
Now, to be clear of my intentions, I do not raise this point in order to address the 
reification of the poor, the object of observation, and how this reification enters the 
processes of subjectivation and/or of othering. Instead, I point to what I think are more 
productive questions concerning the observer itself, that is, the spectator, the nonpoor 
who direct their gaze towards the poor. First, what motivates this gaze? I started the thesis 
pointing towards affects of hostility, fascination, fear and hatred towards the poor. 
Second, what are the effects of such a gaze? I am now addressing the effects of 
intervention, which in turn, suggest that the observer is the ‘problem fixer’ who will fix the 
problem created by its own gaze. To accidentalise the incident of the shooting as a 
confusion (a racially biased misperception at any rate) or to call it a corruption of 
democratic institutions (as in a failure of the modernising pathway in the ‘Global South’) 
ends up overlooking a more intrinsic motif that this shooting signals and conforms to: a 
sort of nostalgia for primitivism.45 This nostalgia can be construed as a fundamental 
element shaping the interventions of what has been called the industry of poverty 




45 This is an insight presented in the manifesto The Aesthetics of Hunger by the Brazilian filmmaker Glauber 
Rocha, who criticises the ‘exoticism that vulgarizes social problems’ as the only mode of artistic expression 
that resonates well with European audiences. Rocha is well aware that this is not a predicament exclusive to 
cinema (the ‘third world cinema’), but rather that exists in any formulation in other political spheres where 
the coloniser-observer ‘cultivates a taste for that misery, not as a tragic symptom, but merely as a formal data 
within his field of interest’.  
See in Glauber Rocha, ‘The Aesthetics of Hunger and The Aesthetics of Dreaming’ Manifestos from 1965 and 




5.3 Nostalgia for primitivism  
Taking a moment to focus on the observer is particularly important if we consider, as 
Sundhya Pahuja indicates, how in the context of international law, ‘Interventions directed 
at bringing about ‘development’ are assessed primarily by reference to the intentions of 
the ‘developer’, rather than the effect of those actions on the ‘developing’.’46 As she 
writes, efforts concentrate on the intentions, not the deeds of development interventions. 
In fact, the accountability of the industry is directed to the donors. This is due to the way 
in which poverty knowledge is structured and validated (around development and from 
the perspective of the nonpoor) and to the legal application of technical knowledge (e.g., 
confirming a right to develop the poor world), of which I also spoke in chapter 4. This is 
what Pahuja termed ‘the politics of good intentions’ in international development law, 
which is to say, despite the goodwill of its agents, ‘international institutional attempts to 
address poverty (re)iterated in the idiom of development are likely to make the problem 
worse, rather than better’.47 Development’s framework allows the self-interested 
behaviour to be understood as altruism. Yet, while this way of working is often connected 
to the colonial and imperialist origins of international law, in this thesis I sought to look at 
a particular aesthetic dimension in the compassionate actions directed at the poor, that is, 
the perspectivist encounter connecting the subject and the object of observation and 
intervention.  
With the insights of Luc Boltanski, we can also understand how the politics of pity is 
aesthetically played out in the diverse media representing suffering (such as novels, 
pamphlets, paintings), which leads the spectator towards critique. In contrast to political 
denunciation of the evil-doer which evokes indignation, and to philanthropy as an 
expression of sympathy towards the benefactor, Boltanski’s aesthetic critique leads to a 
sublimation that distances the spectators from the actuality of suffering towards a 
reflexive contemplation of the conditions of human misery.48 Likewise, Lilie Chouliaraki 
draws on Boltanski’s work to analyse the spectator’s attitude towards the distant sufferer, 
in the case of media culture and particularly journalistic television. She refers to the 
aesthetic quality of technological mediation, which stages the public spectacle of suffering 
and which reveals affective regimes of pity that engage the spectator to respond in certain 
 
46 Pahuja (n 42) 46. 
47 Pahuja (n 42). 
48 Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
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ways. Pity, in turn, is analysed as a shaped emotion of modern humanism, a socially 
constructed disposition to feelings of concern for the ‘other’ that also reveals a narcissistic 
inclination toward the suffering of those like ‘us’. In view of this, global news on suffering 
cultivates a cosmopolitan identity for the spectator and ‘shape global viewing relationships 
in terms of the political classifications of ‘us’ and ‘them’’.49  
While Boltanksi aims at a moral theory of action and Chouliaraki pushes a shift towards an 
analytics of mediation in terms of its ethics of public action – which are not what my work 
concerns – their works usefully scrutinise images of suffering beyond representation and, 
indeed, as media technologies (i.e. as media which, in turn, produce effects) connecting 
the western spectator and the distant sufferer. In other words, they refocus the gaze that I 
explored while situating this thesis in the field of ‘law and aesthetics’. I mentioned in 
chapter 3 that critical scholars valuably analyse how the gaze implicates a process of 
constituting the self in the light of alterity, rather than mere knowledge production about 
others as it would generally be understood. My proposition in this thesis, in contrast, has 
been to interrogate how the technical-analytic gaze affects the very populations and 
territories it visualises. Ultimately, I am concerned with the moment in which the mirrored 
constitution of subjectivities strikes back (once again) at those ‘others’ with brutal 
consequences.50  
To summarise and clarify: I have insisted throughout this thesis that the object ‘poverty’ is 
only a unified image by the operations of practices of visualisation, that heterogeneous 
populations and territories are essentialised as one all-encompassing category of ‘the 
poor’ – for, let’s call it, pragmatic reasons of science and technology – and made into an 
observable, monitorable, manageable and ultimately governable phenomenon. I did not 
insist on this to now end the thesis with a reference to a unified version of a subject. Both 
the subject and the object of the technical-analytical gaze are unstable positions. That’s all 
they are: positions in a sensorial relationship, perspectives, rather than identities. It is not 
about a characteristic or an attitude, although these perspectives do materialise into 
aesthetic features down the line, as previously discussed. Like poverty (the object) and like 
law (the mediation of the gaze, the techniques which produce further effects), the 
nonpoor (the subject) emerges as a momentarily unified entity as it occupies the position 
of the spectator, the observer. The subject is that which occupies the vanishing point, 
 
49 Lilie Chouliaraki, The Spectatorship of Suffering (Sage 2006) 61. 
50 A proposition inspired by Du Bois’ ‘double consciousness’ and Fanon’s ‘black consciousness under a white 
gaze’, aiming at the subsequent reactions on the part of the observer yet again. WEB Du Bois, The Souls of 
Black Folk (Penguin 1996); Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (first published 1952, Pluto Press 1986). 
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where everything to be seen about poverty is presented to the eyes. A variety of points of 
view are pre-emptively cancelled (regardless of their actuality) when poverty is presented 
as a ready-made image. It is only in that moment that we can safely speak of the nonpoor 
as a class. Stemming from this perspectivist encounter, entire social structures (and 
economic infrastructures) are organised in terms of the distinction rich-poor. To be clear: 
the material grounds of such distinction was always already there, immanently disposed; 
what was really ‘made’ is the conditions of seeing which organise those material grounds 
according to a clear frame. This frame is, then, applied as a model, a means of intervention 
– hence the reference to its pragmatism.  
The nonpoor are not automatically the rich, but rather those who look at poverty – 
whether in fear, hatred, pity, sympathy or benevolence. The millennial subject, of which 
Ananya Roy speaks, is animated by a global conscience about poverty, and the object of 
financialized poverty, the entrepreneurial poor to be empowered by microloans are 
mobilised in narratives of poverty as a problem of finance. The divide of rich-poor, or 
bourgeoisie-proletariat, which serves as the organising principle of the Marxist critique of 
capital, continues to be active in the figures of the investors and the borrowers in the 
paradigm of capital rentier accumulation. As such, the task of intervention, of saving the 
poor, has historically proved to be profitable and productive, that is, a business of surplus 
extraction – the point in which the nonpoor coincide with the rich. Scholars referenced in 
this thesis have established this underlying machinic operation of the industry of global 
poverty alleviation, but my general question concerns the effects of the practices and 
techniques employed by the industry and enacted upon wider populations and territories 
of poverty, regardless of whether they are the direct objects of intervention (direct 
‘beneficiaries’ of charity, the penal state, cash transfers or microloans). I argue that the 
gaze also produces broader effects on such populations and territories that are not directly 
targeted which, again, are in the realms of violence, displacement and racialisation. The 
shooting described at the beginning of this chapter hints at these effects.   
If the spectator is in the position of a fixer for the very problem that its aesthetic position 
constructed, how does that fixing affect those made to occupy the position of ‘the poor’? 
Perhaps, a preliminary question should be: how do the nonpoor propose to fix the 
problem of poverty? The answer is through a mode of intervention that attends to the 
spectator-fixer’s need to act in the face of a distant suffering. That mode of intervention 
holds little (or at least brief and contingent) connection to any lived experience in poverty, 
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but rather connects with the image of poverty constructed by the gaze. It is a mode of 
intervention that holds close resemblance to colonial and imperialist enterprise not simply 
by way of a historical continuity, but rather because of the inherent aspiration to self-
assimilation and others-distancing that the gaze prompts. This aspiration is nostalgic of 
primitivism in the sense of enabling and/or justifying the implementation of civilising 
projects. Colonisation and imperialism themselves were modes of intervention attending 
this aspiration. Their role was not just legitimating, but constitutive of western modernity 
and indeed of the capitalist modes of (knowledge) production. In contrast to the professed 
values of the industry – growth, development, progress – this nostalgia manifests a 
backwardness, a romanticist view of the past, when the poor were manageable, 
disciplinable, governable and fixable (or indeed exterminable). 
Then the second step would be to ask: how does this mode of intervention rebound upon 
the newly unified image of ‘the poor’? Gestures of salvation are directed at the poor as 
though they corresponded to that image of poverty, regardless of how diverse the 
contingent material conditions of lives can be. As discussed in chapter 4, this image is 
more like a collage and primarily addresses informality – economic, financial, territorial, 
and so forth. The fixing evokes formalisation which is, indeed, the ultimate legal operation. 
As a moment of salvation – in fact, a moment of confirmation in the mirror of the self-
image of the saviour – reluctancy, resistance or inability to be saved frustrate the gesture 
of fixing. Violent gestures retaliate against those who do not get fixed, those who insist on 
remaining in informality (the ungrateful) and who do not capitalise on opportunities for 
their benefit, like banking (the unenterprising). Nostalgia for primitivism is here expressed 
in a wistful preference for the poor that once upon-a-time could be fixed, the poor in their 
purest (or primitive) state which call for civilising investments. Those days are gone, as if 
they ever existed. What is left are masses of ungrateful, insolent benefit scroungers that 
choose to deviate from a universally shared morality of preferring to work than to live on 
benefits. For those, the harshest force of law is deserved – again, not merely as 
punishment, but rather as modulation. 
Hence the poor are not simply reified, as passive objects of the technical-analytic gaze and 
gestures of pity. The poor are also not being saved by the frameworks of poverty 
intervention and its accompanying legal-aesthetic modulations as gestures of goodwill. 
They are indeed being made:  the poor are an amalgamation of diverse lives into one 
general category to solve all the problems these lives represent. What is done to the poor 
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is simply to invent them as an entity. The shooting opening this chapter, a deplorable yet 
very ordinary gesture in territories of poverty, is part and parcel of the visualisation 
practices explored in this thesis, not alien to them. In fact, it could be construed as a 
visualisation practice itself: a binary code being activated in the most bodily dimension 
possible, a selection of what gets to exist and what will be eliminated. It can also be read – 
as I did – as an effect of the practices which create a phenomenon to look at, or a problem 
to fix. Ultimately, this shooting is that inherent gesture at the interface of all the circuits 
traced in this thesis, the most mundane practice that allows poverty – the measurable and 






Returning to the standpoint of a socio-legal practice research 
 
As I now come to the final remarks of this research project, I find myself at the same time 
– and once again – reporting to funders of a practice research project that I developed as 
an international knowledge exchange between institutions in the UK and Brazil this year. 
The object of study and intervention of this short project was a territory of violence and 
poverty in Rio de Janeiro, a grouping of favelas called Complexo da Maré. It brings me a 
sense of irony to be reliving the same uneasiness about my role that prompted me to 
develop this research in the first place. I started and ended this research in a position of 
conflict but now from an inverted angle: I am in the ‘developed world’ sending funds to 
the ‘developing world’ and urging colleagues in the latter to observe guidelines, deadlines, 
and most importantly, to document the indicators of our ‘successful and impactful’ 
experience. The contradictory position of mediation that I presented in the opening of this 
thesis is now heightened in many ways, including by the added complexities of dealing 
with issues of poverty in the context of a global pandemic that was initially announced as 
transcending social differences and treating everyone as equally susceptible to its effects. 
To attempt to raise discussions about access to rights, research ethics and funds 
management in a locality so deeply affected felt unethical or improper to say the least – 
violent and offensive at times. 
Although the conflict is familiar, I find myself more equipped now to perform my role with 
a critical attitude, which prior to delving into the research process of this thesis was just an 
intuitive, unelaborated critique. Ultimately the thesis that I now conclude has allowed me 
to advance a reflection on praxis and a reconsideration about the ethics of the basic 
guiding principles of the socio-legal practice researcher’s craft. Certainly, an actual revision 
and reformulation of modes of practice would require specific dedication. Yet, the 
reflexive journey that I have undertaken in this thesis is a step in that direction. I now 
understand with more clarity the historical and geopolitical sources of my conflicts in the 
fact that the socio-legal practice researcher – as well as other professions that act ‘on the 
ground’ – is the point of contact between the two extremes of the perspectivist encounter 
discussed in the thesis. As such, this point of contact carries or embodies the multiple 
contradictions of the ‘mission’ to deal with poverty – because it does so ‘on site’ rather 
than from a distance. It bares the weight, in daily practices, of the modern project of 
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attempting to know and fix poverty as a symptom of material lack allegedly derived from 
forms of socioeconomic dualism, a culture of informality or even of its environment as the 
many theories of poverty mentioned in this thesis profess. Having been trained to fix a 
social problem that is inherently unjust but framed as quasi-naturally occurring, having to 
show up to the sites of heightened contradictions, where the pretence of aid becomes 
more admittedly turned to the intentions of the nostalgic donors rather than the 
effectiveness of efforts from the perspective of recipients, the socio-legal practice 
researcher is called upon to live through the experience of unresolvable conflict and 
indeed contribute to its continuation. 
At times of intensified crisis, as is the case in the current pandemic context, such conflicts 
are intensified in unprecedented ways. The ‘problem of poverty’ gained new layers of 
complexity and a new sense of critical priorities, transforming both the global poverty 
scene and the experienced tensions explored in this thesis. The heart of the matter – the 
injustices that produce poverty – became more visible and in plain sight. In contrast, all the 
projects and funding available to deal with poverty that ‘the industry’ mobilises were 
unable to avoid the foreseeable outcome of territories of poverty, so typically densely 
populated, being disproportionately affected. For sure, networks of solidarity, of private 
and individual donations – including many millionaire contributions to science and to 
critical contexts – were rapidly formed. But from the local standpoint from which I could 
observe, the funds previously available and being implemented at the time of the 
pandemic outbreak and thereafter, including that of my own short project, were unable to 
be put to a better use. Deadlines were extended, adjustments to previous commitments 
were relaxed, but even in cases where funds could be repurposed, it has been typically to 
secure new forms of achieving the anticipated outcomes, outputs, deliverables and 
impacts of the projects put on hold. The reality is that such funds, as part of the culture of 
audit, are highly rigid and fixed. Community-based crowd-sourcing campaigns were then 
organised to distribute items of basic need to local populations such as food, water and 
items for personal hygiene. Even organisations with vast sources of funding had to resort 
to creative forms of fundraising whilst international funds were often expected to be put 
on hold for after the crisis – this of course does not include the specific funds and awards 
opened to specifically face the crisis from diverse (public and private) sources. 
The analyses that I developed in the thesis sought to explore such contradictions without 
evading the part that mediators play in the circuits of poverty knowledge and intervention 
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– and without exempting myself from the contradictions of my own position, as may occur 
when one’s premises proceed from unveiling a dominant ideology or rationality that is 
held by a self-interested hegemonic group, normalising order or inherent logic ‘out there’. 
Does this approach result in that I corelate or associate, as part of the same machineries of 
poverty production, the practices of both context-based initiatives, which deal with the 
people who ‘ended up’ in a territory of poverty by looking into their existing needs and 
troubles, and international financial institutions that in many ways determine where ‘the 
poor’ can and cannot be settled? Yes, but only to the extent that they are both dealing 
with poverty and some relevant insights can be extracted from seeing them in conjunction, 
where their practices meet and enable each other. Whilst they are certainly not operating 
by the same standards, principles and ethos, by framing them as part of a whole that 
‘deals with the poor’, some aspects of their crafts can be found in common and even in 
mutual collaboration. It is only in this regard, to the extent that construing them together 
allows me to say something about the general gestures and attitudes towards poverty, 
that I put them together. In their own ways and terms – which are often contradictory to 
each other – they are each making poverty seen and negotiating, or indeed disputing, 
ways of seeing poverty. But then comes the question: does this negotiation mean that the 
industry of global poverty reduction could be transformed through a discursive and 
performative dispute that would favour a grounded perspective – as in a perspective from 
below? In that case, the answer that my approach in this research leads me to indicate is 
no. I am not professing a primacy of the local over the global, although it is true that the 
industry is constantly changing, finding new directions and innovations and it has 
drastically reformulated itself over the years, including by incorporating critical voices. 
These transformations, however, are ever contingent and momentary. The task, in turn, 
ends up being to find ways in which different participants of such a global and seemingly 
disconnected network can partake in the productions of ‘the industry’, to enter the stage 
of negotiations, to raise points in the agonistic and impermanent formulations of such a 
métier.  
I acknowledge that throughout the thesis I have repeatedly asserted my intentions and, 
even more so, what I did not intend with this investigation. I understand that the risk of 
doing this is to be read as apologetic and apprehensive but, from my perspective, it was 
important to be meticulous about situating the boundaries of my critique so not to be 
received as adding to current global trends of critiquing science and politics. That is to say: 
at a global time of science scepticism and indeed denialism, it was very important to 
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emphasise that I was not relativizing the content of social research and poverty data in 
terms of their accuracy, validity, reliability or relevance. Nor was I aiming to challenge the 
effectiveness of social policy, provisions, projects and rights, in a global context of growing 
far-right and ultraliberal conjunction leading to public policy minimalism, by raising a 
critique that could lead to conclusions that the more that is done about poverty, the worst 
the situation gets. To be insistent as to what my critique was not has been a necessary task 
in criticising those who are dedicated to doing something about appalling living conditions 
of poverty around the world, particularly with regard to the current Brazilian political 
scenario – where the national census is often under threat of budgetary cuts or content 
restriction, where research, experts and data are not heard and indeed they are 
increasingly curtailed. Yet, here I am advancing a critique of data-driven approaches to 
poverty. The points my research articulate indeed require constant self-critique and 
frequent pauses to set the direction straight in order to be able to move forward. 
Having established – now once again – what my thesis is not, I now turn to the arguments 
that it makes. I have indicated in the initial roadmap to the thesis that each chapter was 
meant to address a stage within how I have mapped interactions between poverty 
knowledge, antipoverty law and interventions upon populations and territories classified 
as in poverty. I indicated that this research path would allow me to address some of the 
conflicts that prompted me to start the research as a ‘socio-legal practice researcher’, 
particularly regarding the legal mediations and legal implications of poverty making. 
Certainly, it does not resolve the conflicts, and it was never meant to. However, the 
insights that this exploration has brought up can usefully lay out the terms in which new 
approaches to socio-legal practice research could be potentialized. How do the chapters in 
this thesis allow me to revisit the tensions that I have been describing as conflictive? 
Particularly in light of the current task that I face, of reporting to a funder, I will now 
elaborate how each chapter offers insight and critique: 
The first chapter explicated that the ways in which poverty is generally conceptualised 
within a capitalistic frame of view is based on its epiphenomenological emergence, which 
ends up turning it into a mere problem of unmet needs in the face of scarce resources, or 
from critical perspectives, the problematic outcome of the accumulation of wealth by 
dispossession. I mentioned how this has been expressed in histories of ideas about the 
nature and the causes of poverty which consolidate poverty as material lack, within a 
seemingly natural order of things where populations and territories reproduce their own 
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poverty. My proposal, in contrast, has been to examine the spatial-temporal dispositions 
of populations and territories not as causes but as effects of active legal techniques, that 
is, as being continually affected by the legal regime of property and modulated into in the 
images of poverty. This conceptualisation has been grasped in this thesis as reactive – be it 
in terms of fascination, hostility, fear, pity, horror, hatred, perception of danger or 
whatever it might be in the established perspectivist relationality. As a reactive gesture, 
the technical-analytical gaze that sees poverty visualises and responds to the vision of the 
propertyless, as forms of attitudes towards poverty. This was thus characterised as a ‘legal 
moment’ in the sense of having the markers of poverty – such as its socioeconomic 
indicators – deriving from proprietary practices and techniques that fall upon populations 
and territories. The practices that I initially signalled concerned the interplay between legal 
techniques of ascription (which designate who are the poor) accompanied by scientific 
techniques of inscription (which classify apparent attributes of the poor) in the gestures of 
tracing, separating, circumscribing, classifying. It is here that a truly legal operation takes 
effect, and becomes noticeable, to consolidate the ascriptions and inscriptions of traces of 
poverty; this is an onto-epistemic operation that essentialises poverty as a problem to be 
fixed and through which poverty appears as a natural condition, an attribute, a state of 
being and a material condition. 
In laying out the grounds of my project, I made no claims about a reality of poverty or 
assumptions about its lived experiences. Yet, this does not mean being oblivious to the 
actuality of deprivation, precarity, misery and need, i.e. to the fact that after being 
formulated and enacted, poverty comes to be an actually existing attribute that affects 
populations and territories. I have raised this reservation since the beginning with the 
intention of displaying precisely the disjunction between the supposed ‘nature’ of poverty 
that antipoverty practices address, and the conditions of poverty to which populations and 
territories are subjected. Rather than a lack, poverty is a negation, a deprivation, an 
injustice. It is not emptiness, it is violence. And this violence has been shown to be 
continually re-instantiated not only via proprietary interactions but also in responses to 
poverty themselves. To treat poverty as a lack, in actual terms, re-instantiates its originary 
violence by failing to acknowledge it. In this regard, the idea of poverty, the material 
manifestation of the ‘reality’ of poverty in the concrete world, and the concrete effects of 
poverty as a lived experience of precarity, although separate productions, are part and 
parcel of the same productive circuits. I have sought to focus on their connections, rather 
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than their distinctions, which are situated in the processes of writing and imaging poverty 
that make it a visible and existing thing in the world. 
‘Propertylessness’, now taken to mean more than lack of material resources and indeed a 
gesture of violent dispossession, promotes a shift in perspective. This shift is an invitation 
to occupy a particular position in the said perspectivist relationality that connects (and 
constitutes) the poor and the nonpoor. This new positionality – and I say this very 
cautiously – is that of intermediation, the position of the socio-legal practice researcher. 
The reason for caution is evident: there is no question that this intermediary is sided with 
the nonpoor, i.e., those who are gesturing a gaze towards the poor and who benefit from 
that gaze. However, in being present ‘on the ground’ or ‘in the field’, gazing through a 
privileged lens of proximity, observing first-hand the effects of antipoverty legislation and 
interventions to which the intermediary undoubtedly contributes, they can also recognise 
a few ironies and contradictions of their own gaze. Unlike the distant observer who 
engages in a politics of pity and benevolence, the intermediary is often right there as a 
‘participant observer’, as their sociological-anthropological parlance rightfully designates. 
What makes this intermediate position intermediate at all is solely the fact that it is not a 
distant gaze, not as distant even though safe distances are certainly kept. It is a position, 
thus, that concedes a vision of poverty both as a social problem and as a social injustice. 
Precisely for that reason, it is an irreparably ambiguous and conflicting position to be in – 
one that is capable of seeing the making of poverty whilst also invariably contributing to it 
by validating its production.  
Chapter 2 illustrated how the reactive conceptualisations of poverty are also directly 
linked to the ways in which its interventive solutions are designed. Legal frameworks 
organise around poverty – in connection to its capitalistic conceptualisation – and 
establish scripts and codes that translate attitudes towards poverty into modes of 
administrations of poverty. By looking into four models of poverty administration (grouped 
in clusters of poverty relief, criminalisation, welfare provision and international 
development), antipoverty law was found to bridge poverty knowledge and interventions 
upon poverty as such a script, with prescriptions and restrictions. This is a two-way bridge: 
conceptualisations of poverty establish strategies to be followed by tackling poverty’s 
purported causes and symptoms; the motives of poverty administration condition the 
ways of seeing poverty by which knowledge practices will proceed in their scrutiny. In this 
circuitous interaction, both knowledge and intervention practices are regulated as well as 
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designating how legislations must be structured to enable their operations. Image-making 
is, here, the ‘legal moment’ to be found: as a technique of visualisation, law takes form 
through codifications that regulate poverty and sets the tone for images of poverty to take 
shape, which, in turn, establish scientific modes of measurement and calculation as well as 
the political responses to fix the ‘newly-formed’ problem. 
The practitioner in the perspectivist intermediation has two basic options here: either to 
implement the prescribed scripts and images, operationalising the images of poverty with 
which they work; or to take a critical stand against the legal frameworks by denouncing 
their doings. Either way, the practitioner is trapped in the (capitalistic) frameworks and 
acts in referential ways, acknowledging their all-encompassing range. Law becomes self-
referential, which is a typical point of critique in critical legal theory. To be released from 
the frameworks, to seek alternative modalities to view and to respond to that which has 
now been consecrated as poverty is only seemingly impossible, particularly from the legal 
standpoint. It would require a-legal, if not illegal, investments – in a similar vein with the 
forms of resistance to or circumnavigation of the law practiced by populations that are 
designated as in poverty. Perhaps more so today than ever before, as the attitude and 
administration of poverty becomes more and more globally unified. In the international 
development landscape of global poverty reduction, the guidelines to follow are clear and 
technically based on evidence. To consider a way of dealing with poverty that does not 
follow a rights-based approach, pro-poor growth and sustainable development is to deny 
evidences of what works, even though critical scholars so clearly point to its failures based 
on evidence and indicators collected by the system itself. To raise the idea of non-growth 
is too alien to be taken seriously.  
Moreover, how can one raise an argument that cash transfers or even universal basic 
income are responding to a specific mode of interpretation and of problems that are not 
exclusively material without falling into the argumentative trap of suggesting their 
ineffectiveness, and thereby instantly overlooking or relativizing the urgent needs of those 
striving to survive as we speak and to which such measures are determinant of life or 
death? There is no other competing framework to follow and there is little space for 
innovation. Are monetary transfers not precisely a distributive gesture (even though no 
one is really relinquishing wealth)? The perspectivist relationality encloses as a trap at this 
point. The alternative to following the guidelines works to confirm them, to validate them 
as well as to contribute to their expansion, finding more and more terrains, new grounds 
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to reach, more frontiers to expand into, more favelas and more residents to assimilate into 
a proper form, one way or another. For sure, there is nothing inherently evil about relief, 
alms, donations, income transfer, credit lending, social rights, social provisions, or aid to 
poor people elsewhere. The problem starts when these attitudes shape or restrict the very 
basic modes of seeing poverty, which are consecrated by law. It is in acknowledging the 
manufacture of legal codifications, the role of law as technique of visualisation, that 
antipoverty law appears as both a source and a consequence of poverty data and 
engenders corresponding modes of visualisation, knowledge and intervention. 
In chapter 3, I turned to the gaze, to situate law as the mediation in the turning point from 
social quantification to qualification, from data to fact, from calculation to attribution. The 
‘legal moment’ here is precisely the passage from knowledge to intervention, which is also 
when law emerges as an existing entity, a sociotechnical formation itself. By emphasising 
the creative (and often effacing) effects of scientific formulations I explore the imaginal 
features of data forming a priori conceptual formulations of poverty to be later detected 
and inferred in the world. In analysing how poverty is thus circumscribed, I conceptualise 
poverty as a legal-aesthetic composition that is continually reshaped by methodological 
innovations of measurement and policy. This proposition can be simplified in the following 
terms: modes of seeing poverty define the configuration of poverty in the world. Having 
been established as a technique of visualisation that frames poverty and allows it to be 
seen, law itself emerges as an acting entity that samples the material grounds of ‘the poor’ 
– bodies and soil, populations and territories – to be subjected to the data-generative 
procedures of knowledge production that order them into intelligible and intervenable 
notions of poverty. Law provides the crucial means through which such ontologisation 
occurs, materialising the poor as seemingly pre-social entities. From this perspective, I 
explored the legal-aesthetics of poverty that mobilise images and modulate the world. 
I have inquired into the very conceptualisation of law and adopted a technological 
perspective that considers ‘law’ to be the code through which socio-technical formations 
coalesce, the rules of the game of algorithmic performance, the fortuitous and 
impermanent scripts of what it takes to get the ball rolling. Yet, such codes are not 
predetermined nor pre-exist what they form; it is not a pre-ordained historical 
development, nor is it propelled by a systemic logic. It is simply the product of contingent 
formations that we can trace back while it is (momentarily) operative. There is no 
pinpointing law as such. One can only identify the workings of a particular mode of 
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functioning that happen to be in place in a set time and space. But the integrated view of 
all such coexisting, competing and supplementary particular codes which administer (and 
create) poverty in the world is unified into poverty law. This unification is simply a 
methodological move. Poverty law does not present itself as a unified scheme and each 
mode seems to operate notwithstanding each other – criminal law practitioners and 
development law practitioners will not even acknowledge that they share and co-create 
the same object. 
The researcher who enters a territory of poverty for fieldwork or to implement ‘access to 
rights’ intervention projects, is faced with these conditions: a pre-selected environment, 
demographics, culture, raciality, spatiality, livelihood, productivity, modes of navigating 
and behaving as well as everyday life dynamics that characterise the ‘slum' – a term that is 
as problematic as its alternatives of favela, bidonville, ghetto, shanty-town... The observer 
who gets this close carries not merely preconceptions but indeed frames of seeing a 
particular form of poverty. To detect ‘the poor’, to immerse oneself into territories of 
poverty, to interact with poor populations, is already an experience which takes poverty as 
an entity, something specific and unique to that place, those people, that social history, 
that disordered planning, in one term: that statistical reality which normatively organises 
the world as if formed by essentialised, autonomous and pre-social categories, that is, 
independent from any form of preceding knowledge and visualisation. Trapped within 
such a visual economy, one cannot infer but effectively only confirm poverty in the 
manifest traces of what is expected to be found in these territories and populations. Does 
this imply that the observer is misapprehending poverty? I have argued that this is not the 
case and indeed I have insisted that there is no reality of a true form of poverty ‘out there’ 
to be apprehended. Field notes are, thus, recognition rather than identification.  
Moreover, beyond apprehension, the observer will also affect the object of observation by 
translating its traces into cohesive categories, to be duly found in order to be worked on. A 
socio-legal practice researcher needs to find what needs to be worked on, that which is in 
need of intervention: indications of lack of access to rights, absence of social services, 
failed planning policies, irregularities in spatial occupation and land use, unproductive 
social dynamics, informal relations and conventions, problematic living conditions and 
overall subnormal populational agglomeration... Whether these findings are beneficial or 
detrimental is irrelevant to my point. The effective critique is to perceive these practices as 
operational within a capitalistic frame of knowing and identifying poverty, a re-
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instantiation of a gaze which engendered these forms of seeing poverty as a problem to be 
fixed in the first place. In the mundane world of socio-legal practice researchers, the 
possibility of reflecting upon the effects of one’s own roles in the modes of seeing and 
intervening in poverty is of crucial importance in order to potentially – always only 
potentially – circumnavigate the capitalistic framework through anticapitalistic practices. 
Still, the possibility of really evading such a visual economy will remain unverifiable. 
Besides, we know quite well how capitalist modes of thinking and living continually 
reinvent themselves as the solution to every new problem these modes create 
themselves. These reinventions have been exemplified in the models of corporate social 
responsibility, sustainable development, pro-poor growth, ethical trade and consumption 
and so on. 
As a matter of fact in the data-driven world of our times, poverty’s definition comes to 
enact an aesthetic interventionism on the part of the industry of global poverty reduction 
that I addressed in chapter 4. As multilateral, financial and/or corporate endowed 
institutions dominate the circuits of poverty knowledge and intervention, the legally-
sanctioned imageries of poverty evoke particular components which coincide with the 
remedies that such institutions formulate. As an imaginal mode of governance is 
established, technical-administrative practices work to produce conclusive figures and 
profiles of ‘the poor’, as has been demonstrated in regard to the financialization of both 
poverty and its solutions. Within this unquestionably capitalistic visual economy of 
poverty, another ‘legal moment’ is manifested in the formalisation of populations and 
territories, i.e., their assimilation into the proper form of poverty. It is within this function 
that rights-based approaches to poverty have been analysed. Rights, I have argued, have 
articulated a very particular legal technique for the formalisation of poverty since very 
early on in the inaugural stages of modern law and its corresponding primacy of 
proprietary regimes of individual and exclusive ownership. In the age of finance, 
globalisation and mainstreaming of human rights, these technological functions of rights 
(as well as their recognisability as such) are only exacerbated. Yet, far from idealising 
informality and vilifying the fight for rights for precarious lives – which include important 
labour protections and should not be quickly overlooked as reactionary – my critique here 
is focused on the operational effects of rights in formalising the poor as poor, pushing such 
precarious lives into a mould of acceptability and turning objectionable types of people 
into a palatable profile of the poor.  
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As part of the ‘industry’ – irrespective of the organisations which host them, the funders 
who finance their projects and the specific terms with which these projects have been 
phrased so as to fit funding remits – the socio-legal practice researcher is basically 
dedicated to promoting access to rights in localities or within social groups marked by a 
somewhat essentialised notion of ‘unequal access to rights’. The practices involved in the 
job, earlier presented in terms of funding bids, demands that the practitioner adjust their 
visions in tune with the funding priorities of funders, irrespective of what local 
configurations and particularities manifest. To propose more radical lines of action that 
consider poverty as an injustice rather than a by-product, is to miss funding opportunities 
to subsidise the practitioner’s activities and their subsistence – in an overall context of 
increasingly restrictive and precarious modes of existence that this practitioner themself 
faces. Indeed, the practice of fundraising determines the possibility of all their other 
practices, including their own professional survival as such. To cater to the funders desired 
models of intervention, that which the distant funder sees as the relevant actions to solve 
local problems, is part of the job. It surely can be subverted and turned on its head, but 
there will always be a degree of negotiation which roots the permanent suspicion from 
other grassroot movements and groups that also act in the field – meaning, deference to 
the demands of distant entities results in ever growing reluctance from local operators, 
often mobilised as ‘research participants’. It is a suspicion that can be expressed in a form 
of hostility towards ‘academics’, broadly speaking, who benefit from their position of 
intermediation, but also a suspicion that is often manifested in the submission to the 
scripts with hopes of seeing change – which itself entails playing roles, like saying what 
‘needs to be said’ in interviews, or to translate longstanding disputes into the language of 
rights.  
As such, little by little, all actors find their roles as conductors in the circuits of poverty 
knowledge and intervention. The formalisation is indeed wide-ranging and all-
encompassing. On the other hand, it is also important to acknowledge that I write at a 
moment when this model of funding is itself in decline – indeed the trust in science and 
policy is also in decline. After decades of a wealth of funding opportunities, institutions 
find it harder and harder to strike a deal. That is to say, after decades of an intense 
investment in institutionalising community groups (i.e. the push for formalisation in the 
so-called NGOisation of social movements and the professionalisation of activists), which 
included changes in legislations regulating the nature and the structures of NGOs, after 
groups have gradually adjusted their forms in order to be able to participate in the 
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industry’s pledges for funds, now they are also being forced to shut doors by lack of 
resources. It remains to be seen what will become of the ‘failed industry’, that critics 
profess, and its supply chains in the years to come.  
In the final chapter I reached the culmination of my argument by taking this discussion to 
the local microcosms that I have, myself, occupied as a practitioner in the past years and 
which motivated this research in the first place. Favelas, as territories of poverty – yet not 
the exclusive ‘habitat’ of the urban poor – could indeed have been more centrally placed 
as my empirical object of observation in this thesis but, for reasons I have exposed from 
the outset, I have made that locus into an (often unmentioned) influence throughout the 
thesis, motivating the reflections in each chapter. By returning to those settings in order to 
demonstrate the very concrete doings as well as the devastatingly wide global-local reach 
of the industry of poverty reduction, I have demonstrated how diverse the passage from 
apprehension to intervention can be in re-enacting the violence, displacement and 
categorisation of propertylessness. The final and grounded ‘legal moment’ evoked is that 
of legal-aesthetic modulations which precisely assemble various gestures of violence and 
create the conditions under which poverty will be configured and will appear/disappear in 
the urban landscape. It is a legal moment of poverty manufacturing that creates a 
phenomenon to look at, or a problem to fix. 
The practice researcher who does fieldwork and leads intervention projects in such 
territories of poverty and violence – human rights-based interventions, to be sure – knows 
quite well that there is an incongruity between their craft and the available resources to 
forge ideal types. From that position of contradiction, it can be perceived that the object 
‘poverty’ is only a unifying image that merges heterogeneous populations and territories 
to fit the expectations of a gaze. As such, by realising that there is nothing exclusionist 
about it and indeed that marginalisation is integrally made – as a constitutive element 
inscribed as external, a containment within – the socio-legal practice researcher might 
prefer to explore and intensify the gap. Hopefully the discussions I raised in this thesis can 
support processes of (self)critique from this privileged position of the mundane, everyday 
live conductor of poverty knowledge, antipoverty law and interventions upon territories 
and populations of poverty.  
To embrace the conflictive nature of the intermediary position of the socio-legal practice 
researcher and to insert it at the core of the industry of poverty reduction came to be a 
fruitful approach as it allowed me to examine the intricate webs of poverty production in 
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the realms of research, policy and law. I have demonstrated that the capitalistic model of 
knowing and fixing poverty rests on much deeper contradictions between public and 
private life, universal and particular, global and local as well as between benevolence and 
violence. Ultimately, the analyses developed in the thesis make such contradictions more 
apparent at any given point of its circuits. As I initiated this research path seeking to open 
up new avenues for a potent praxis, I found potency in intensifying the conflict by 
experiencing it as a practitioner in the ‘Global North’ gazing at the ‘Global South’. I am now 
more equipped in my position because I can now identify a more suitable role from which 
to agitate. Rather than solving them, I channel these contradictions higher up in the 
circuits and back to where they come from: to the centres of the industry’s production and 
of the politics of pity. Making contradictions explicit is the ultimate revolutionary and 
radical gesture to turn a politics of good intentions, pity and distant suffering on its head. 
In effect, the impacts of this reviewed role on the ‘failed industry’ matters less, to an 
extent, than the situated, microcosmic transformations it already propels. This comes to 
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